Luck is a feature of all armed conflict because war, by its very nature, is chaotic. That said in doctrinal terms you can make your own luck through effective planning and ingenuity. In this sense the all volunteer British task force, deploying some of the UK’s best units, had a distinct advantage over the Argentinian forces who were largely conscripted albeit with some good quality units in key positions. I must point out that my knowledge is largely of the British forces, I look forward to any responses with an Argentinian focus. I will argue that British commanders and their doctrine were the decisive factor.

Arguably the most important of the British principles of war is Selection and Maintenance of the Aim and the order given to the British task force was simple: liberate the Falkland Islands. From the off British commanders were given a simple objective and relative freedom to develop their own plans and adapt them to the situation with minimal political interference.

At sea the decisive moments appear to favour the Argentinians: with a favourable air situation they sank 7 British ships with the loss of MV Atlantic Conveyor in particular putting a hole in the British logistics plan with the loss of 10 helicopters and a large amount of expeditionary infrastructure. For a force operating several thousand miles from home territory this could have been disastrous, but the British response was to improvise and maintain attacking momentum to continue the operation. Seizing the initiative in this way is a good example of how to deal with chaos: Offensive Action is one of the British principles of war and Western doctrine broadly supports the notion of taking action early in order to force your will upon the enemy, known as the Decision Action cycle or OODA loop. Flexibility is also a British principle of war and is evident in the decisions made by commanders in the stages after the loss of Atlantic Conveyor.

So the one remaining Chinook helicopter was flown to its absolute limits (incidentally the aircraft, serial BN "Bravo November" is still in service and is something of a legend in the Royal Air Force) and infantry forces resolved to make do with limited fire support from 105mm guns as the sole helicopter capable of carrying them was rather busy. Here the professional nature of the British Army shines through: the British infantry forces consisted of 2 guards battalions (1 WELSH GDS and 2 SCOTS GDS), 2 battalions of the Parachute Regiment (2 PARA and 3 PARA), 3 Royal Marine Commandos (40 Cdo, 42 Cdo and 45 Cdo equivalent to 3 battalions) and 1 battalion of the Ghurka Rifles. The word elite is bandied around rather often, but it is a strong argument that these battalions consisted of some of the finest infantry in the world. Confidence in these units’ abilities led to rather remarkable decisions: loaded marches to contact by 2 PARA (13 miles from San Carlos to Goose Green in 4 hours) and 3 PARA and 45 Cdo from San Carlos to Mount Kent and then Stanley (50 miles/80km in 3 days). Pictures of these marches became one of the iconic images of the war.

Another British principle of war is surprise. 2 PARA’s advance caught the Argentinian forces at Goose Green off guard. Although they had been expecting an assault of some kind they just didn’t know when. The area had been thoroughly reconnoitred by British Special Forces and was occupied by a mixture of conscripts and professionals who had not fought together before. By contrast 2 PARA were well organised and highly motivated and had taken the initiative by advancing and attacking at night. It was no cake walk, by the end of the battle 2 PARA were exhausted and having to share rations, but they managed to defeat a force of roughly equivalent size in an entrenched position and capture over 900 enemy personnel in just over 24 hours.

The advance of 45 Cdo and 3 PARA was very risky, it extended lines of communication across difficult terrain and exposed lightly armed infantry to being cut off and/or surrounded. Fortunately the sheer audacity of the 50 mile march and effective harassing operations by Special Forces around Mount Kent reduced the Argentinian ability to interdict the force. The commander of 3 Cdo Brigade had taken the time to order reconnaissance of Mount Kent, an important defensive position West of Port Stanley, so his soldiers understood the enemy’s positions and identified and neutralised Argentinian Special Forces in the area who could have scuppered a British assault.

The final British principles of war I will refer to here are Concentration of Force and Co-operation. By early June, despite losing much of their logistic equipment and having only one heavy lift helicopter, the British had 3 battalions (3 PARA, 42 and 45 Cdo) within striking distance of Port Stanley. In addition the 5^th Infantry Brigade (1 WELSH GDS, 2 SCOTS GDS and 7 GR) was approaching by sea to join them. Co-operation features here because in barracks the Royal Marines and Parachute Regiment are renowned for being fiercely competitive, but in battle they worked together to great effect. All was not rosy, however, and on 5^th Infantry Brigade’s landing ships (RFAs Sir Tritram and Sir Galahad) a heated discussion was taking place about where and when elements of the Brigade should land. Co-operation broke down and as a result the offensive impetus was lost. This hesitation left the ships vulnerable and on 8^th June they were attacked by Argentine aircraft with the loss of 32 Welsh Guards killed and over 150 injured. Stanley was eventually taken on 11^th June.

It was very much more based on an assessment of Britain's willingness to fight, rather than any serious evaluation of their relative military strengths. The Falklands War came at a time when the British Government was making serious cuts to their armed forces. The 1981 Nott Report, which summarised Government defence policy, had the RN losing a sixth of their surface capability, and its amphibious capability. The carrier Invincible (which would later fight in the Falklands) was to be sold to Australia in 1982. The patrol craft Endurance, the only RN ship on station in the Falklands, was to be withdrawn from service. To the Argentinians, and to foreign observers, this suggested that Britain had no intention of fighting over the Falklands.

As to whether the British military was lucky, arguably yes. Once troops had been landed on the Falklands, the issue was never in doubt - the British troops were better supplied, trained and motivated than the Argentinian conscripts they were facing. However, at sea, the question was more in doubt. Had the Argentinian Exocet missiles or bombers been able to hit one of the aircraft carriers, then the RN would have been unable to protect and support the landing forces. Similarly, had one of the liners pressed into service as troop transports been hit, then losses might have been high enough to prevent a landing, or to force the British to negotiate. However, the Argentinian bombers tended to go for the escorts, rather than the transports (likely hoping to sink them, so they could hit the transports without being threatened). The carriers were well-protected and supported enough that Argentinian threats were unlikely to reach them - the loss of Atlantic Conveyor to an Exocet was unlucky, and due to the fact that she didn't have any means to protect herself.

If you read Admiral Woodward's account, "One Hundred Days", he termed it a "damned close-run thing." Towards the beginning of the book, he uses a line when referring to the chances of a successful operation when debating whether to go along the lines of "several not incompetent organizations didn't believe it possible, to include the British Army, the Royal Air Force and the US Navy."

It was a much harder fight than people give it credit for. By the end of the war, only one of the first echelons of warships was still in the fight, all the rest were sunk or sent home for repair.

That said, I don't think luck had much of a factor in the final conclusion, only in terms of how many losses the British had sustained. Much is made of the fact that the Argentine carrier, 25 de Mayo, was becalmed on the day of its planned strike and couldn't launch its air wing, but it is doubtful that its eight Skyhawks would have put Hermes out of the fight for good. (Woodward estimated that he could afford to lose Invincible, but Hermes would have been a knockout punch). Hermes wasn't a fragile Type 21 frigate built to mercantile standards, she was an older ship built like the solid bricks of carriers that the British were building at the time and could probably take a bomb or three. Either way, Woodward was taking no chances, keeping the ships so far from the fight that people joked about getting an Indian Ocean campaign medal.

There were certainly individual lucky incidents. When the Type 209 submarine's fire control system was badly wired, a British frigate survived, but the loss of the frigate would not have been a deal breaker for the overall war. Glamorgan's fire in the missile magazine was put out by leaking fuel, though she was sent home afterwards. At the higher level, as Fourth man observers, the British were lucky that the war happened as soon as it did. The Navy was facing significant cuts in strength.

Of course, the British could have said to have suffered from bad luck as much as good. Having Atlantic Conveyor go down to an unfortunately timed Exocet attack was a "right pisser." The Welsh Guards has a rather unfortunate piece of luck that Skyhawks happened upon them as they were dithering about off loading.

Ultimately, though, like any good professional military, the British made their own luck and took advantage of it when they could. They ran calculated risks, and took what mitigating factors they could. To say that the British lucked out is likely doing a disservice to the Royal Navy.