Although the Napoleonic period saw some of the first attempts at providing systematic battlefield care for the wounded, the general state for of battlefield medicine for all combatants was generally poor and inadequate. A typical Napoleonic era battalion or regiment had their own medical personnel attached to them, but their training was rather rudimentary. A number of armies had already instituted reforms for medical education in the military, such the Austrian Josephinium but the quality of personnel and their medical knowledge left much to be desired. Accounts from veterans of this period often spoke of the poor quality of military surgeons and the horrifying nature of field hospitals. Even ignoring deficits in training, the number of medical personnel seldom could meet the needs of the battlefield. Evacuation of the wounded from the battlefield was often ad hoc and stretcher-bearers were delegated to lightly wounded or units unfit for combat.

The main priority for Napoleonic era battlefield medicine was to evacuate the lightly wounded swiftly from the battlefield and quickly restore these men to the battlefield. Most armies of this period would establish rear-area field hospitals for this purpose, but they were often quite small. When coupled with increasing numbers of casualties, this meant a number of gravely wounded men were often left on the battlefield. A number of veterans' accounts attest to the frightening nature of the abandoned wounded. One extreme example of this was the Battle of Talaverra in which dry weather conditions caused the grass to set fire due to musket fire and burned many wounded alive. These abandoned men were often left on the battlefield and often subject to robbery and murder by various looters, whether civilian or military, leading to such grim items like Waterloo teeth which were often reputed to have come from the corpses or near corpses of the wounded young men. Evacuated wounded often found that conditions in the field hospitals were seldom a source of relief. Overworked and sometimes ill-trained surgeons often had to quickly probe wounds for the ball or shrapnel, sometimes with crude instruments or with their own fingers. Naturally, such conditions lent themselves quite easily for infection.

Both Napoleon and Wellington instituted and fostered reforms of the medical services. The French reforms tended to build upon preexisting experiments in battlefield medicine of the Revolutionary period. Under the auspices of Dominique Jean Larrey, the French Army of the Rhine had begun experiments with ambulances volantes (flying ambulances) with special vehicles for battlefield organization and a more regimented system of medical personnel. Larrey's personal connection to Napoleon allowed Larrey to implement some elements of his reforms into the Grande Armee. The British reforms were likewise initiated under the care of Sir James McGrigor who pushed for the creation of more, smaller hospitals and more systematic training. Wellington encouraged these efforts in the Peninsula because he recognized that his own manpower reserves were far from infinite and the British and Portuguese forces needed to preserve its manpower.

Yet neither of the British or French reforms of battlefield care really have that much of a direct impact on the conditions for soldiers. Although Napoleon showered much praise upon Larrey and his fellow reformer Pierre-François Percy, the French emperor tended to underfund the medical services and ambulances volantes were much more the exception rather than the rule for battlefield medicine. Nor was Napoleon amenable to the creation of a permanent surgical corps or allow surgeons to hold rank within the army. Although Wellington allowed for the use of prefabricated hospitals to accompany the army's baggage train in its advance in 1813/14, the British commander balked at specialized ambulances like the French. Medical personnel in both the British and French armies were often short of material and personnel, and despite the reforms of the likes of Larrey and McGregor, medical care was still very much ad hoc and a low priority for Napoleonic generals.

Convalescence and recovery from wounds was also rather haphazard. Sanitary conditions were often quite poor and thus became breeding houses for various infections. Added to this problem, Napoleonic armies were often housed in poor sanitary conditions and epidemic diseases like typhus were quite common. As usual in many militaries, officers enjoyed much better treatment than the rank and file. Wounded officers were sometimes billeted in private homes for convalescence and often had contact with more qualified physicians. Elite units like Guards also had more preferential care and resources devoted to them than regular units. The recovery rates for wounded soldiers were rather low given these conditions, often hovering around 50% according to Gunther Rothenberg.

For permanently wounded soldiers, there were some efforts to provide for them. Napoleon expanded the ancien regime's hospital/retirement home system for disabled veterans (Les Invalides). Britain had the royal hospitals at Chelsea and Greenwich and a system of pensioning based upon service and type of wounds. However, like Larrey's reforms of battlefield medicine, these medical programs found it difficult to care for the sudden influx of discharged veterans after 1815. More often than not, care for these men was delegated either to private charities or through their own regimental support networks.

Sources

Muir, Rory. Tactics and the Experience of Battle in the Age of Napoleon. New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1998.

Rothenberg, Gunther E. The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978.

Riaud, Xavier. "Medicine on the battle field during the Napoleonic wars." The Napoleon Society. http://www.napoleonicsociety.com/english/riaudwars.htm