It surely can't entirely be due to Napoleon's genius as a strategist. I've been reading up on some of the earlier battles (like during the Wars of the Third and Fourth Coalitions) and time and again it seems like the French win and escape with fewer casualties, despite having fewer soldiers and weapons. Some examples include the battles of:

• Austerlitz (French: 67,000 men, 9,000 casualties; Russians/Austrians: 85,400 men, 36,000 casualties)
• Pułtusk (French: 18,000 men, 1,200 casualties; Russians/Prussians: 50,000-55,000 men, 3,500-5,000 casualties)
• Friedland (French: 60,000 men, 8,000 casualties; Russians: 80,000 men, 20,000-40,000 casualties)

Was France not still in dire financial straits after the American revolutionary wars? Was the nation not fractured by the repeated insurrections and executions of the French revolution? Moreover, how is it that France resisted the might of giants like Russia, Prussia, Austria and Great Britain for so long?

I have looked at this thread (https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/2f8y58/what_were_the_main_differences_between_the/ck75032) which was helpful but didn't quite answer all my questions. The top response mentions that the Austrian army was made up of a lot of satellites (listing this as a weakness), but so was the French army -- I mean, in the War of the Fourth Coalition, the French satellites included Bavaria, Württemberg, [Saxony], Polish Legions, parts of Italy, Naples, Etruria, Holland, Spain, and Switzerland... I must admit I hadn't considered the French officer school (vs Austrian aristocratic officers) -- could that really be what made all the difference?