In the Pacific, most of the contested landings undertaken by Allied forces took place later in the war (1943, 1944, 1945), simply because thats when the Allies were on the offensive, rather than the defensive. So, Dieppe actually took place before the bulk of the combat landings in the Pacific, which means that it likely was a useful learning tool.

Over time, the Allies (especially the US) learned a lot about beach assaults from the Pacific, and some of that certainly transferred to Overlord. One of the most important aspects I can think of that directly transferred from the Pacific to Normandy was the timing of landings based on tides.

There is an absolutely fascinating book that I read heavily but didn't end up using too much for my undergrad thesis on the Pacific called World War II Pacific Island Guide: A Geo-Military Study (Gordon L. Rottman, Greenwood Press, 2002). One of the central ideas of this book is cataloging the various geophysical attributes of the islands that would be taken into consideration for each landing.

Here's a basic rundown of the actual conditions to consider for a landing in the Pacific.

1. Is it an atoll or a volcanic island? If it's an atoll, you have to decide if you're going to try to penetrate the lagoon and land on the inward side of the islands, or if you're going to try to force the landing across the outer reefs. If it's volcanic, well, you still have reefs to deal with, but now you're more restricted based on landing locations just based on where there are beaches available versus cliffs.

2. The reefs themselves. How wide are the reefs, how far offshore are they, and how deep are they? On the windward side of the island, the reefs usually grew slightly slower, so there was often more clearance, but there were more instances of abnormal coral spurs, and generally rougher conditions on the water. On the leeward side of the island, the water is usually calmer, and there is a tradeoff with the reefs: usually less clearance, but also fewer coral spurs.

There is where tidal data comes in. On some islands, it was impossible to conduct a landing against the leeward side of the island even during the highest tides of the year (at least until amphibious tracked vehicles were developed and produced in large enough numbers to be used exclusively), so the windward was the only option.

3. Once you have decided where you're landing, you start planning your actual landing beaches, offshore marshaling points, and the "attack vectors" that the landing craft are actually going to utilize to get to the beach. Some reefs are going to have natural (or artificial) channels through them. If these are wide enough and numerous enough, they can be used as landing lanes with the tradeoff of some bottlenecking effects. Otherwise, frogmen can be deployed to create your own artificial channels, or if tidal conditions make it so you don't have to worry about the draft of your landing craft, you can just conduct landings across a very broad beach front.

All of these conditions gave the defenders some degree of advantage: you could concentrate your defenses on the most suitable landing beaches (based on the previously discussed factors such as reefs, tides, the actual size of the beach itself, etc), and in some cases you could predict when landings might occur.

Now obviously in Normandy they didn't have to worry about reefs, but the Germans had set up obstacles to prevent landings on the beaches. After some surveying, it was determined that the landings could take place with good tidal conditions. In effect, the German landing obstacles acted much like an artificial reef, and had the same potential effect on an amphibious landing force. The lessons learned in the Pacific came into play heavily in the actual timing of the landings.

The Allies needed a combination of a few factors: the phases of the moon to get ideal light conditions for the opening parachute and glider operations, coupled with a suitable tide at dawn in order for their landing craft to get over the "reef" of obstacles that the Germans had created to deter a potential amphibious landing.

So yes, while the two theaters were rather different, the lessons learned in the Pacific did translate directly to the landings in Normandy. I cannot say for sure how much the lessons from the Pacific truly played into the planning of the landings since I've never really read primary source stuff documenting the planning of the Normandy landings, but I can certainly say that the lessons learned from the Pacific would have been applicable, and it would at least appear that they were applied to the landings on Normandy.

Here are some potentially applicable sources:

Dod, Carl C. The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Japan. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1966.

Miller, Donald L. D-Days in the Pacific. New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2005.

Miller, Edward S. War Plan Orange. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991.

Strahan, Jerry E. Andrew Jackson Higgins and the Boats that Won World War II. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1994.

Rottman, Gordon L. World War II Pacific Island Guide: A Geo-Military Study. London: Greenwood Press, 2002