I'm referring to this specific passage from Beevor's Second World War, referring to Stalin's communications during Operation Barbarossa:
He called upon them to defend the motherland in a scorched earth policy of total warfare, evoking the Patriotic War against Napoleon. Stalin understood that the Soviet people were far more likely to lay down their lives for their country than any Communist ideology.
I recently wrote a paper about the woman's role in the Soviet Union, and I have a section about how women were portrayed during WWII. An article I read (I'll provide a citation at the end of the comment) revealed something that interesting about propaganda. Whereas before World War II, especially in the early days of the Soviet Union, family life was downplayed and even discouraged. As World War II started, the family became a focal point of Soviet propaganda in the early days of the war (Pre-Stalingrad, 1943), think "Mother Russia" and "A real man fights for their family" as well as propaganda pointed towards women that encouraged them to pick up the work that men in the military left behind (farming duties, factory jobs, etc.). This helps strengthens /u/n1c0_ds ' argument about them stepping away from communist ideals. Post-Stalingrad, as the fighting became easier propaganda focus switched back to "Stalin is Great" and "Look how Communism is winning the war"
Source: Lisa A. Kirschenbaum, “’Our City, Our Hearts, Our Families’: Local Loyalties and Private Life in Soviet World War II Propaganda,” Slavic Review 59, no. 4. 825-847
That statement generally holds true. Especially in the face of German invasion in the time period of 41/42, patriotic themes took center stage. The defense of the homeland against Napoleon, the Teutonic knights (Eisenstein's Alexander Nevsky) and so forth was played up.
When reviewing the works of the early propaganda writings of Ilya Ehrenburg or Vasili Grossmann, this becomes very apparent since their overarching theme was the hardy Russian peasant defending his soil. It also fits generally very well in the transformation of Stalinist rule. Stalin especially during the war but also before meant to return to a policy and symbology of rule more associated with the Tsarist regime than with the early Soviet Union. The roll back on some Leninist policies such as social liberation, the emphasize on the family (something deemed bourgeois by earlier Soviet rule) and even nationality policy all signified a return to more of a pre-early Soviet architecture and understanding of political power. Take also for example the new 1944 anthem that replaced the Internationale. It refers to "Great Russia" in the opening stance. A decidedly non-internationalist approach.
The main vestige of Communist ideology in Soviet WWII was the use of anti-fascism in the propaganda. The fight against Hitlerites and fascists was definitely something that was influenced by Communist ideology but other than that Beevor's assessment is essentially correct.
Sources:
Anthony Rhodes, Propaganda: The art of persuasion: World War II, 1976, Chelsea House Publishers, New York.
Lewis Stegelbaum and Andrei Sokolov, Stalinism As A Way Of Life.
I don't have a huge amount to add to the above answers, except to note that this trend had begun well before the war. To use Nicholas Timasheff's framework, the 'Great Retreat' starts in 1934 when Stalin gradually began to row back from the more radical implications of both 1917 and his own 'revolution from above'. While the period lacked political stability, it did see a return to more traditional (read: Tsarist) norms. This was particularly noticeable in the areas of family policy, elevation of culture over class and a return to Great Russian nationalism.
This conservative shift manifested itself in the likes of the very public rediscovery of Pushkin, tightening of divorce and abortion law, reintroduction of Tsarist ranks and insignia to the Red Army, discouragement of 'specialist-baiting', films on Suvorov and Alexander Nevsky, etc. While the general theme is stability, in a number of these the links to Russia's imperial past are quite clear. And, of course, this only increases with the onset of war.
Timasheff's idea of a retreat to the Tsarist past has been challenged, most importantly by David Hoffman, but there remains a great deal to the core idea. What emerged from the 1930s was in many ways a hybrid state - relentlessly modern yet increasingly buttressed by traditional institutions and propaganda.