I keep hearing about the growth of the Late Roman Bureaucracy and how the Empire became a more centralized state in the wake of the third century crises, but what exactly were they managing? Obviously you've got court bureaucrats managing the Imperial splendor after Diocletian's reforms, and the army grew massively in size, meaning there had to be new government offices to make sure the newly-centralized field army was supplied, but other than that, I'm confused as to how the Roman government grew. After all, the court might be huge, but that's not "big government", just "big retinue," and military growth is essentially a traditional form of expenditure by the fisc...
The only thing I can think of is the Church, but even the old pagan cults were (and correct me if I'm wrong), part of a state religion and often patronized by Emperors. Sure, Constantinius II promised subsidies to African churches that followed Nicene doctrine, but the expansion of state involvement in ecclesiastical politics couldn't have been THAT expensive. Neither, I'm guessing, would it have required all that much administrative expansion, because the state could simply rely on Church bureaucracies...
The other thing I thought of would be Constantine's/Diocletian's separation of military and civil authority, with Praetorian Prefectures, Magister Milatums, and the lot ruling in tandem with Senatorial governors, but I'm really rather hazy on that subject, and, after all, the town councils continued to collect taxes in the form of lump sums... so why all the new bureaucrats?
Essentially, it all boils down to a few questions...
How did the Roman government actually expand in the fourth century? Was the new court bureaucracy just for maintaining the Emperor's splendor or was the state actually becoming as centralized as I've read it did?
Where did all the new government expenditure go, besides the expansion of the army? Did tax revenues actually increase all that much or were the chronicler's complaints of tax "excesses" really just the results of skimming by the local elites who collected the money? Or were such "excesses" really exaggerations? (I have heard many of these claims WERE exaggerated-- archaeological evidence has apparently shown that Imperial taxes did nothing to stop a fourth century agricultural boom...).
This might be a repeat of number one, but I'll ask it a bit more clearly: how and to what extent, considering the continued involvement of local town Councillors in Imperial tax collection and administration, did the Roman government become a centralized state?
Thank you in advance for your responses.
--Severian the Torturer
Also: is there a book (preferably not too dry), about the economics of the Empire and the Imperial government in the fourth and fifth centuries? I've recently been reading Peter Brown's "Through the Eye of the Needle" but that's mainly about early Christian attitudes towards wealth. Everything else I've read so far has mostly talked about local elite power in the briefest of terms before getting on to the real subject of Barbarian invasions and the "Fall" of the Empire. Peter Heather goes so far as to mention town council service being "unpopular", and that the Imperial bureaucracy grew, but he only does this to demonstrate that the reported higher taxes didn't actually cause a decline in agriculture. Then he starts talking about the Huns, which is brilliantly written an thoroughly convinced me that migrations destroyed the Western Empire, but left me with nothing to go on when it came to centralization...
Your question is fascinating, yet also huge. Giving as comprehensive an answer as I would like would essentially require writing a book. As such, I will attempt to answer as succinctly as possible, though I apologize in advance for the length. As always, follow ups are welcome.
During the Principate, imperial governance was largely devolved upon the Empire’s local aristocracies. Local elites retained much of their autonomy (as well as the preservation of local customs, laws, and cults) in exchange for maintaining peace, collecting taxes, and providing recruits for the army. The central bureaucracy (both in Rome and in the provinces) was kept small, with bureaucrats mediating relations between the state and provincial communities. As these communities did much of the “leg work” of administration, the central bureaucracy could remain relatively small. Local elites were bound to the imperial center through complicated networks of patronage, in which displays of devotion and loyalty to the emperor (such as through the rituals of the imperial cult) emphasized the social ties between ruler and ruled. Rhetoric such as this softened the fact that ultimate imperial control rested upon armed force. In practical terms, the Roman state had little direct involvement in the lives of it’s subjects.
This system proved remarkably effective for the first two centuries of imperial rule. Local elites enjoyed positions of high social prestige, as they were both leaders of their respective communities and vital cogs in the imperial system, praised both by their constituents and by the emperors. While this system won the Romans the cooperation and loyalty of generations of local elites, this reliance on local autonomy came at a price. With a restricted central bureaucracy, the Romans often had difficulty exerting direct control over the provinces, especially in periods when higher taxes or more recruits were required. Due to their positions of prominence, local elites were often able to resist the state, such that when imperial and local interests clashed, local interests more often then not prevailed. This was especially true in areas far removed from the frontiers, as the state could not easily resort to force, if it so desired. Paradoxically, the ability to resist the demands of the imperial government (within the constraints of constant rhetorical displays of loyalty to the emperor) increased the loyalty of local elites to the system, as it deepened their own feelings of self-importance. Thus, during the Principate, the Romans were willing to accept limited degrees of resistance to imperial control in exchange for the cooperation of powerful local elites. The general stability of the Principate, when the need for sudden increases in taxes or recruits were rare, made this an acceptable trade off.
The instability of the mid-third century A.D. brought huge strains upon this system. The imperial political arrangements of the Principate broke down in a cycle of near constant usurpation and civil war. Both emperors and their usurpers required increased financial resources from the areas they controlled to buy the continued loyalty of their troops (and deal with troubles on the frontier, vital in maintaining legitimacy). Yet the governmental system of the Principate, as I mentioned above, had difficulty extracting large amounts of revenue quickly. Tax rates were traditionally kept low (as local elites could resist increases), and the small central bureaucracy lacked the ability manage and redistribute such sums. When coupled with the economic downturn some (though not all) areas of the Empire faced, emperors often resorted to stop-gap measures to raise revenue, such as currency debasement and outright confiscation of property.
While precise changes are difficult to map out, as this period is incredibly poorly documented, over the course of the mid-to-late third century bureaucratic reforms were introduced. The emperors of the late third and early fourth century (most importantly, Diocletian and Constantine) sought to reform the Empire’s bureaucratic mechanism, with an emphasis on unity and centralization. While practical concerns, such as the more efficient extraction of tax revenue were important, it must always be remembered that political concerns, rather than practical, dominated. By centralizing the bureaucratic apparatus under their control, emperors sought to prevent usurpers from developing independent networks of support. The separation of military and civilian career paths and the concentration of power at the imperial court is reflective of this, as the emperors equated centralization with security. While the merits of these centralizing changes are debated, it must be remember that in Late Antiquity, the Roman state was able to fund a larger army, build Constantinople, and deal with increased pressure on the frontiers, none of which are small achievements.