It's more or less true. Since December 1912, Moltke (chief of the general staff) had been adamant that Germany needed to defeat the Entente before the 'window of opportunity' closed. This rhetoric seems to have rubbed off on those around him, as Annika Mombauer relates in her recent examination of his role in the July Crisis. Arthur Zimmermann, of the Foreign Office, stated in July 1914 that it would be better to fight now than in two years time, and Chanceollr Bethman-Hollweg used this to justify his actions when he lost his position in 1917, claiming that it would have been better for Germany to go to war in 1914 than two years later, when Russia's Great Armaments Programme would be complete. It is worth noting, in all of this, that the Germans had no proof, nor did they believe, that the Russians, French or both would seek to attack them. The primary fear was that Germany would be unable to attack and defeat them.