I have a lot of complicated feelings about this one, for sure.

I hate, loathe, resent postmodernism, especially from it's literary aspects of draining the world of meaning and purpose and invalidating all forms and structures and casting them aside arguing that you make your own truths and ideas and paths. And I come at this from a English BA background that specialized in postmodern literature and theory, and I think that it's a very important movement in literature and in some of the culture that surrounds literature. However, I view it as antithetical to history, and what is more, has been incredibly damaging to history and the humanities in this era where we are failing as public intellectuals to justify out existence to the larger public.

But, as /u/baronzaterdag notes,

I think a large part of this comes from insecurity within the historical community about legitimacy. The idea that history is a science (it isn't) and that it should be a science (it shouldn't) is still very much present to this very day, because there's still a very heavy bias towards the worth of hard sciences vs human sciences.

'History' in the European and Western as a field and a style of writing is still very much stuck in the are within the hygienic halls of Ranke's Germany, filled with the purified and rarefied air of Prussian Wissenschaft (Ranke was very influential in the US--he elected as the first honorary member of the AHA). Just as any history reflects on the historian who wrote it, as well his own place in time, Ranke wrote after the Sturm und Drang of the French Revolution, and he was “weary of history written for...the purposes of revolutionary propaganda. He wanted peace. The ruling classes in Germany, with which he was affiliated...wanted peace” (221). One historian argues that it was only logical that his style was “fitted into the great conception of natural science” (221) of the 19th century and thus the “marriage” of history and science was consummated. Ranke did not seem to be deliberately attempting to make history into a science, but instead, seemed to be pushing for it to be more scientific by focusing on primary source material.

However, the marriage with science was not a perfect or even necessarily a lasting one: if it is conceded, that history is a science or, at the bare minimum contains scientific elements, then, too, it must also be an art, because of the use of narrative and the creative powers of the historian. This was the point argued by historians responding to the sudden rise of the philosophies and theories of Ranke's disciples. Italian philosopher Bernadetto Croce who wrote a generation after Ranke, pointed out that, although science and history deal with 'facts,' science attempts to discover general laws from the specific, whereas history attempts to explore complexity, building upon specific facts. Based on this reasoning, and because history 'narrates' he argues that history is not a science , it is an art and even though the “methods of research have made progress, while the interpretation of the data...has made progress, the idea of doing history has not changed because it cannot change. History narrates”. Conceiving of history as a science leads—essentially—to attempts at formulating laws of history, which in turn generates 'laws' that are so general as to be obvious. Croce also agrees with this, saying that history “in the proper sense...does not formulate laws but tells what happened”. History, in the hands of stubborn 'opinionaters', becomes an indecisive spouse, drifting between the rational, factual sciences and the creative, literary arts.

The back-and-forth arguments between the art and science camps of historiography had an obvious impact upon the public audience: it would not be difficult to postulate that the current lack of public interest in academic histories is a result of this division. This is made more than apparent by the Croce speech quoted above. Even in his awareness of the science/art conflict arising from “too narrow a concept of art and too broad a concept of science”, Croce insists that history is an art—digging a trench with his words. A house divide against itself can not stand, especially as the foundations of history were dug up in a trench warfare that served as a sort of parody/prelude to the First World War.

History had always relied on a literary 'foundation' that both educated and interested the general public. However, the opponents of history-as-art “destroy[ed] the foundations” in their repudiation of earlier historians who used literary elements in their histories. As a result, the public “hearing thus on authority that [the historians] had been 'exposed' and were 'unsound' ceased to read them—or anybody else. Hearing that history was a science, they left it to the scientists”, and the scientists would fight amongst themselves for decades afterward.

And on to the scene comes postmodernism, which attacks structures and understood meanings and purpose and all of the things that postmodernism does. And as history had become so dependent on this stylized 19th century writing he is the most devastated out of all the humanities fields. Until recently, there are no historical experiments with new sorts of writing, there are no postmodern stylist or even impressionist or realist style historical writers. So history and all of the valuable things it does (teaches and shapes and narrates and guides and explains--I see it as a sacred act, almost) is unable to cope. So it flounders.

As Hayden White correctly identifies in "The Burden of History", the First World War was the turning point for history's prized place between art and science in society. Before the war, “historical studies, if we include classics under that term, had formed the center of humanistic and social scientific studies...and it was therefore natural that they should become a prime target of those who had lost faith in mans capacity to make sense out of his situation” (120) The turning of the century had witnessed many European intellectuals discussing topics such as the 'end of war' (because the European had supposedly evolved beyond it) and the possibilities of science to save mankind. Young men of an entire generation were educated in the classics, and raised on the heady histories of glorious battle and pro patria mori .

History, which “was supposed to provide some sort of training for life...had done little to prepare men for the coming of the war” . Science was supposed to be a savior of mankind, just as it had saved history from becoming 'mere' literature. Instead, modern science had been turned against the creators themselves, for the first time, and the clash of 20th century weapons with 19th century tactics would see nearly an entire generation traumatized as their worldview was shattered before them, as captured by Hemingway's The Sun Also Rises. Historians, still caught in their struggle between art and science were unable to rise to the incredible challenge that the war presented: they were “incapable of rising above narrow partisan loyalties and making sense of the war in any significant way” (120) . Instead, historians had become frozen in the headlights, just as unprepared for the crisis as their students

Now, I am not smart enough to really postulate where history will go next or how it will survive or move on from some of the attacks levied against it in the 80's and 90's -- instead we've seemed to agree to ignore the PoMo critiques and move on from things and go about our business as historians without answering these questions but this cannot be allowed to continue. We are dying out there. Humanities funding is being destroyed and we suck at justifying our purpose to the public. We need to rally the troops and do better.

[ctd]

Doesn't much of this hinge upon your definition of history? A lot of the arguments against the more 'radical' postmodernist texts seem to hinge upon the assumption that history is the straight-up retelling of the past and that history could theoretically - though the reading of sources - be fully known. That assumption is debatable in its own right, but it also limits the definition of history to one specific (Western) line of thought.

I'm personally very partial to the idea that history's worth is not in knowing the past, but in how the past reflects the present and the lessons it can teach - not lessons that come out of the past, but out of our study of the past. When taking this approach to history, the sanctity of the sources and other dogma's are no longer important. In fact, the PoMo texts that call into question these dogma's are vital to this line of thought.

That radical PoMo thought is able to form an existential threat to the more traditional historiographical schools shouldn't really be seen as as criticism of PoMo thought - if anything, it should lead to more traditional historians asking themselves why their school of thought doesn't really have an answer to these PoMo questions.

I think a large part of this comes from insecurity within the historical community about legitimacy. The idea that history is a science (it isn't) and that it should be a science (it shouldn't) is still very much present to this very day, because there's still a very heavy bias towards the worth of hard sciences vs human sciences. By letting go of the "rational" approaches and turning more to the "irrational," historians are afraid to finally and fully let go of the idea that history can lean into the hard sciences. They're afraid to fall in with the more social studies which are often (wrongly, if I might add) dismissed as unworthy and bunk. (except poli-sci which is total rubbish, fight me irl)

I think any future shifts in historiography have to be made on the fundamental level - questions about what history is, what its purpose is, and so on. I think it's perfectly possible to create a historiographical framework that doesn't have to shy away from tough PoMo questions, while still being robust and with a decent methodological background. It'd be a pretty huge shift in everything from mentality to methodology, but it's necessary. I just find it difficult to take approaches that cannot or will not provide answers to these PoMo questions seriously. What's the point in going beyond Post Modernism when we clearly haven't come to terms with it yet?

I would just like to point out that science is not even a science in the sense offered up by many here. This is perhaps more radical a direction than people want to go. But I've found that many historians — historians who are not historians of science and technology, specifically — seem to fall into this trap of holding "science" out as the timeless paragon of objectivity and legitimacy. But it's not, as any historian of science can tell you. Science is itself "made," discoveries are themselves at least partially "invented," science is social, objectivity is tricky, and last time I checked science was as prone to accusations of bias as any other human endeavor with "stakes" (consequences).

The history-is-or-isn't-science question is not just misleading about what history is, it is misleading about what science is.

This does not mean, however, that we have to be postmodernists or deny expertise or knowledge. It just means that we can't hold out some kind of magical yardstick for what perfect knowledge would look like. It doesn't exist. The fact that we still can get very reliable knowledge, knowledge that can enable us to do things in and to the world, ought to be an indication that perfect knowledge is not a requirement in any case.

The work of historians is going to have some tenuous and problematic relationship with the actual events of the past, just as the work of the scientists has a tenuous and problematic relationship with the structure of the natural world. Both are still meaningful enterprises and important to human society, even if neither are ever going to completely get outside of the human frame of mind.

In Latour's We Have Never Been Modern, he suggests the way out of the thickets of postmodernism lies not with an attempt to reaffirm the false dichotomies of modernism, but to embrace the fact that things have always been negotiated and messy and always will. We embrace that, we try to be conscious about what we are doing, we try to make our goals and values as transparent as we can, we try to make things that matter. To admit to our human role in the production of knowledge is not to retreat from truth, but rather to assert our own agency and responsibility.

As a hobby Marxist, I don't think post-modernism is going anywhere until there are greater changes to the socio-economic structure of the world. Post-modernism works quite well to explain a multicultural, simultaneously globalized and decentralized world. It explains ISIS as well as it explains Facebook.

As of right now, the only reactions against post modernism are just that, reactions. They're attempts at creating "neo-conservatism" utilizing the language and tools of post-modern/structuralism. Consider for a moment that's precisely what Trump is doing with his political movement.

History is the same way. Even attempts to move past the post merely adopt its tools in an attempt to move backward.

Basically, I say its time we stop worrying and start loving post modernism/structuralism as a facet of late capitalism. Sooner or later, the mode of production will shift, and none of this will be necessary.

"This radical PoMo position has argued that "the past is not discovered or found. It is created and represented by the historian as a text" and that history merely reflects the ideology of the historian."

Is 'ideology' supposed to refer to something that's biased or that gets chosen by the historian as 'the Truth' w/o their considering actual information, or is 'ideology' something else?

There is a certain way in which some readings of history become teleological and then (by virtue of their teleology) begin to describe events that are incomplete or incompatible with the real world somehow. I think this usually starts as some sort of assumptive idea - like when radical feminists deny trans identities by arguing some sort of ethereal 'women's' power that is inaccessible to trans persons.

So if I'm writing a history and I decide to address one primary structural injustice, I'll isolate and discuss that aspect. But there is some aspect in which this narrative - which isolates and discusses a single aspect of history - can also become something dangerous or silly. So I think it's useful to talk about where 'ideology' (in the sense that an ideological stance assumes a teleology and then uses an assumed 'telos' against which to judge contemporary/historical issues) and 'history' or 'narrative' diverge, but I think it's also important to look for aspects of history that, while being ideological, are actually compatible with aspects of contemporary existence.

Maybe this avoids the question a bit? It seems to me that if you ignore any aspect of the world in your history it's either (A) because you're pretending that aspect doesn't exist, or (B) because you've never experienced it yourself. And it also seems that if you invent a new aspect of the world in your history it's either (A) because you're trying to convince somebody of something, or (B) because you're experiencing something nobody else can/does experience. I generally think that particularly subjective, narrative-heavy interpretations of history have a mystical quality to them that is very useful and produces an engagement with the subjects of theory, but which often seeks a practical/nontheoretical/semi-transcendent history that attempts to focus down a line of ideas and thoughts, rather than a mere description of what's occurring and what's causing it.

But does this analysis just assume an objective space and then dissolve the power of subjectivity into it? And is it possible to create simultaneous objective/subjective spaces in history without dissolving them into each other?

This radical PoMo position has argued that "the past is not discovered or found. It is created and represented by the historian as a text"

The problem, quite frankly, lies more with the methodology. That /u/baronzaterdag and many others argue that history isn't and shouldn't be a science is in itself the problem.

Traditional history - the school of Herodotus - is in fact ultimately rooted in story-telling. And if your focus is in telling a story, then there will always be the tendency to editorialize in order to make a particular point. This is why many "history" texts nowadays are just exercises in confirmation bias - the author has a particular story he wants to tell; he simply chooses historical trivia that will support the story. This is completely not science in any way or form; hard science or social science.

Science - when practiced properly - does not editorialize because it's not trying to tell a story. It instead observes what happened, and draws potential conclusions based on what happens. And structures exist in science - such as Occam's Razor and Null Hypothesis - that exist as safeguards against confirmation bias.

But very rarely will you see a historian point to a historical event and say "this may indicate X leads to Y, but we need further testing", which is what happens in real science. Instead many best-selling historians are more fond of saying "X happened and this is why Murica is the best", and thus implying that historical evidence has more credence than actual scientific and statistical testing.

In reality historical evidence often has less basis than social studies evidence, especially the farther into the past that you go. And yet you still have best-selling authors like Victor Hanson who keep trying to make Ancient Greece (especially Athens) to be this ideal model for Western supremacy and democracy; while ignoring all of the bits where the Greeks kept losing to monarchist enemies based on historical evidence alone (much less the massive sociological differences social science comparisons will reveal between the modern West and the Ancient Greeks).

Can present and future approaches strike a balance between quantitative and "rational" approaches, and an appreciation for the influence of the "irrational"

I would argue that the problem is with the idea there are "irrational" factors in history at all. People simply call them irrational because of their own failure to explain them. It does not mean they will forever remain beyond our understanding; and that's why social science and psychology were developed.

Indeed, Social science and psychology are not "bunk" sciences and dismissing them automatically quite frankly points to the provincialism of many historians.

Sociology and psychology are instead young sciences - in that they don't have centuries of data and observation available to back up their conclusion. Census and demographic statistics for instance - the core of sociology studies - were not widely conducted until the latter half of the 19th Century and only globally in the 20th.

That said even the early findings of many of these young sciences are quite illuminating; and indeed I'm much more impressed by James Loewen's (a sociologist no less) "The Lies My Teacher Told Me" than by any recent history book due to its insight on how modern high school history has devolved into memorization of trivial myths designed to pander to the egos of the text book publishers and school administrators.