I'm actually just reading about this in the book Inferno by Max Hastings.

First, a quote by Hastings:

The ruthlessness of the Soviet state was indispensable to confound Hitler. No democracy could have established as icily rational a hierarchy of need as did Stalin, whereby soldiers recieved the most food; civilian workers less; and "useless mouths," including the old, only a starvation quota... The Soviet achievement in 1941-42 contrasted dramatically with the feeble performance of the Western Allies in France in 1940.

So, in the context of 'winning the war', did the Soviet state's economic policies do more harm than good? I think the answer is that it didn't do any good at all. Instead, it did harm to try to prevent greater harm, like someone cutting off a limb to prevent an infection from spreading, and in this Stalin had some success. There is, of course, always the question of whether things could have been done differently, like trying your best not to dispossess millions of peasants in the process, but that isn't really a question relevant to this subreddit.

Stalin's economic policies reflected his acceptance of Mikhail Frunze's (a war minister under Lenin) total war doctrine. Basically, Stalin's Russia had been preparing itself since 1917 to fight an enormous war against Western capitalism, in which the Western parts of Russia would undoubtedly be on the front lines, targets for aggression. So, there was a huge migration of factories and workers eastwards, upwards of 1,360 major production plants. Hastings' numbers are:

Fifteen percent were transferred to the Volga, 44 percent to the Urals, 21 percent to Siberia and 20 percent to Soviet Central Asia, in 1.5 million railway wagon loads. Some 16.5 million workers embarked on new lives in conditions of appalling privation, laboring eleven hours a a day, six days a week, initially often under open skies.

The effect this forced industrialization of the 1930s meant that even after impressive German gains in Western Russia in the 1941 offensive, more than half of Russia's heavy industry capabilities remained untouched. So, to answer your question, Stalin's embrace of the total war doctrine of economic mobilization didn't necessarily increase industrial capacity or modernize it, as much as it saved it from complete obliteration. It was more about location than technological, logistical, engineering, or macroeconomic progress. Hastings notes that in Russia, it still took five times as many man hours to produce an aero engine as it did in the US.

At the end of the day, I think all we can credit Stalin's economic policies with is the fact that he understood the strategic value of his country's enormous size. Of course, he didn't come up with this insight, and even further, we should be suspect of his analytic powers considering he didn't see the German offensive in 1941 coming at all, and as a result, entire Russian armies were lost.