It's incredibly selective and biased. I'm going to take on two points in particular.

The entire Chinese resettlement part is blatantly untrue and incredibly dishonest.

The Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) is still to this day seen as the textbook example of a successful counterinsurgency. The British, with a co-ordinated and adapted strategy to local conditions, managed to defeat a communist insurgency based out of the Chinese minority in Malaya.

The rural portion of the Chinese minority in Malaya, those targeted for resettlement which I will speak about in a broader context in a moment, lived as squatters on the fringes of the jungle and thus occupied land illegally. Due to the poor conditions (and the fact that many of these families either had a direct or semi-direct relationship with someone in the communist insurgency), they were a breeding ground for recruits and vital supplies for the insurgents.

At the beginning of the Malayan Emergency, there was no real sign that a proper (modern) counterinsurgency strategy was ever forthcoming. Colonial policing was far more on the schedule and conventional tactics more akin to colonial warfare were used in the form of large search and destroy sweeps and a very heavy-handed approach towards the local population. The soldiers involved had no experience in fighting insurgencies nor were they trained for it, which led to such atrocities as the Batan Kali massacre in 1948 - typical of the sort of atrocities committed by forces more focused on killing insurgents than trying to win over the population to their side.

As anyone can imagine, this certainly did not led to any results and it alienated the population away from British efforts to gain their trust. By 1950, it was recognized that the strategy had to be revised. This came first in the Briggs plan (named after Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs, Director of Operations) which pushed forward the concept of a counterinsurgency focused on the population. That meant that the population had to not only be separated from the insurgents (and thus denying the insurgents a base of support) but also to provide them with safety by continuous presence by police and military forces. The Briggs plan also pushed for more administration strength as well as overall co-ordination between both military and civilian administration. These were all good ideas and when put into practice, it did not all turned out well. The resettlement was done poorly, heavy-handed approaches by the police and military was still happening and an overall co-ordination was still not fully completed. As they say, Rome wasn't built in a day and it is important to mark the Briggs Plan as a foundation for what would come next.

The first step was to get an individual to both command the military and civilian administration. That man was Lieutenant General Sir Gerald Templer. Templer's approach mirrored that of what we could call a modern counterinsurgency approach: population-centric with a focus on hearts and minds. He wanted to win the population over by winning their 'hearts and minds'. This meant no more heavy-handed approaches or cultural insensitivities. The police was given proper training, resettlement to what was to be called the 'Model Villages' were carried out in a far more efficient and humane way than under Briggs and more importantly, these villages began to be provided with medical facilities, schools, clean water, access to the outside world through roads etc., as well as jobs or their own land which the resettled population could cultivate. This not only made them feel more like citizens but also like they had something to lose by supporting the insurgents. This, in combination with increased security by native police, made it very effective. At the same time, the military forces kept the pressure on the insurgents with the use of smaller, more mobile units who with the help of intelligence now openly provided by a safe and supportive population were able to set up ambushes or hunt insurgents down directly. With the removal of food supplies, the insurgents began to starve and many surrendered. The final death blow came in the form of socio-economic and political reforms which ultimately led to the independence of Malaya in 1957.

There were other local conditions which made it easier for the British to combat these insurgents however: Malaya received an economic boost due to the Korean War (1950-53), the insurgency was localized to the visible Chinese minority and the insurgents had no safe haven over the border with Thailand, making it difficult to gain equipment and supplies.

Many rightfully point at the Malayan Emergency as the birth of the Hearts and Mind theory and it is still rightfully looked at with admiration. The idea that the resettlement policy was racist is absurd: The Malayan Chinese made up a majority of the MCP (Malayan Communist Party) and they specifically targeted the Chinese minority for support. It is a basic strategy in counterinsurgency to separate the insurgents from the general population and it is ironic that it would be dubbed an atrocity more than 50 years later - the Malayan example of resettlement is perhaps the most humane way it has ever been carried out.

The article dishonestly portrays the British response to insurgents in Aden as immediately resorting to torture centers. This was not the case. There is no doubt that these centers existed, but it obviously ignores the entire context of the conflict.

The Aden Emergency was in many ways a disaster. There was no focus or will coming from the British government to see this conflict through. The British were unable to offer socio-economic reforms and even the idea of resettlements were skipped since it would have been impossible to carry through due to the isolated nature of the tribes in the Radfan region. This made it very hard to gain any intelligence as well. The tribes in the Radfan had a very isolated way of living and had no love for outside interference. Even in the urban centres of Aden, the insurgents carried out a campaign of urban terrorism. Mix this with very friendly border territories for the insurgents and the fact that the insurgents were so entrenched that not even the British offer of independence made the support for them weaker. While in military terms, everything was done well and a focus on smaller units like in Malaya (especially making good use of paratroopers and SAS), the British were completely unable to infiltrate the insurgents or in other way separate the people from them. With the rise of Pan-Arabism at this time and the Israeli victory in the Six-Day War that same year (a defeat that Egyptian dictator Gamal Abdel Nasser blamed on British and American support for Israel) that triggered a mutiny amongst indigenous forces, the support for the insurgents was simply too strong for the British to penetrate.

Regarding the Boer War concentration camps:

One has to keep in mind that these camps were not part of a systematic policy to be cruel. These were relocating camps, to devoid any type of food or shelter for the Boer guerillas from supporting Boers. However, the administrators assigned to these camps had no idea of how to handle the task at hand and thus the camp fell into misery with bad sanitation, overcrowding, tainted food, etc. The government didn't technically know about it. Emily Hobhouse's report on the conditions in these camp did create quite a stir in the British opinion and the government was forced to act. There were no clear figures on the camp and even in Parliament before Emily Hobhouse even published her report, there were questions about it. It wasn't until the government sent a woman's commission headed by Millicent Fawcett to South Africa to confirm Hobhouse's finding, which they did in their own report. It was this report which confirmed not only her findings but also her suggestions and even added a few of their own. Things did change towards the end of the war, mainly thanks to Emily Hobhouse's report.