It is important to realize that there was no single unified French response to Napoleon's return. Parts of central France were relatively supportive of Napoleon's restoration, while the Midi and Brittany remained loyal to the Bourbons. There was actually a great deal of apprehension about the resumption of a Bonapartist government which might have meant a resumption of the wars, an assumption that was proven correct. One popular Parisian joke during the Hundred Days was "Why has the price of bread risen, but the price of meat fallen? Because the baker [the corpulent Louis XVIII] has left and the butcher has returned." Other contemporary accounts like Hippolyte Carnot's spoke of public dejection in the streets. Some regions were hostile to the resumption of imperial rule, especially in the south and west. There was still another part of the population that was either apathetic or hedged their bets as to which group would eventually triumph. For example, some municipalities in Normandy sent declarations of loyalty to both Louis XVIII and Napoleon. Yet during the Hundred Days there were some populist uprisings in favor of Napoleon that grew as he marched on the capital. The Bourbon's domestic policies which seemingly undercut all the gains of the Revolution that Napoleon had cemented lay behind much of this sentiment. Although the Bourbons had pledged not to engage in political retributions, Louis XVIII's government actively purged the state of those who had been active during the Revolution and started to pressure for the return of the biens nationaux lands that had been acquired during the Revolution.

There were two critical groups of the state and French elite that were vital for Napoleon's swift resumption of power. For French liberals like Lazare Carnot, Napoleon's return created an opportunity to restore republican ideals within the country. The fact that Napoleon would have to compromise to set the country into order, something which prior precedent showed the Emperor was ill-prepared to do. Much of this liberal sentiment accrued around Benjamin Constant, who wanted Napoleon to accept a constitution and become an constitutional dynast. Napoleon was amenable to their overtures, but the brevity of his return precludes any final judgement as to whether he was seriously entertaining the thought of accepting limits on his power.

The second group was the army and this component of the state was vital for Napoleon's success and was the bedrock of popular Bonapartism within France. Louis XVIII's tightening of the fiscal belt had retired a number of officers and the Restoration's elimination of the Grande Armee's symbols like the tricolor and its eagles were deeply unpopular in the army. Furthermore, Napoleon himself was enormously popular within the army. Although Napoleon had prided himself as a meritocratic ruler, the statistics show that the majority of his new nobility (67.9%) were military men in origin. Here Napoleon's well-honed skills as a charismatic military leader reaped great benefits. Napoleon's ability to act upon the bonds of loyalty and glory from the empire meant he was able to win over large swaths of the armed forces. This proved decisive for Louis XVIII's abandonment of Paris as he knew he did not had lost control over the strongest state institution. The advance of Napoleon and the growth of his army in his march on Paris created a sense of collective effervescence within France and fed into a resurgence of Napoleonic nationalism.

The problem facing Napoleon though was this restoration was on incredibly shaky ground. Napoleon's new found popularity required him to both deliver victories and peace, both of which were highly unlikely given the geopolitical context of 1815. The liberal support for Napoleon was highly conditional and easily abandoned. The army and its veterans would remain a force for Bonapartist politics after Waterloo, but the army of the Hundred Days could not deliver the type of victories Napoleon needed to solidify his return. Although the Hundred Days fed into the Napoleonic legend, the swiftness of the Napoleonic state's collapse after Waterloo is a testament to the limited degree of deep loyalty Napoleon enjoyed in France outside of the army.

Sources

Alexander, R. S. Bonapartism and Revolutionary Tradition in France: The Fédérés of 1815. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Dwyer, Philip G. Citizen Emperor: Napoleon in Power. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013.

Natalie, Petiteau. “The Nobility of the Empire and the Elite groups of the 19th century - a Successful Fusion.” Napoleon.org. http://www.napoleon.org/en/reading_room/articles/files/nobility_empire_elite_arsenic.asp#ancre3

Woloch, Isser. Napoleon and His Collaborators: The Making of a Dictatorship. New York: W.W. Norton, 2001.