Bergstrom is unfortunately engaging in a bot of banging at open doors. Aviation historians have long known that the Bf-110 was not an unmitigated failure (although that contention is still rather common in popular literature) and the aircraft's employment as an escort in Battle of Britain did not play to the aircraft's strengths.

The 110 itself had a number of positive features working in its favor. For one thing, the airframe itself proved quite adaptable to accommodating new engines, armament, and avionics. The 110 also found itself put in roles that Messerschmitt did not anticipate such as night-fighting or intruder work and the 110 managed to fill these missions somewhat admirably. The aircraft's range was of great use in theaters like Scandanavia or the Eastern Front and the plane's handling characteristics were quite good.

There is a danger of revising the 110's performance too positively though. Although the 110 was capable of making good airspeed, its acceleration was sluggish and its maneuverability was poor. These problems were apparent to the Luftwaffe as early as the Battle of France. Oberleutnant Victor Moelders of ZG 1 noted that "The Bf 110 was not maneuverable. The steering was too heavy. In tight turns it slid about and fell out of the sky like a leaf from a tree. Trimming the aircraft or increasing speed didn't help." This lack of maneuverability was particularly dangerous when confronting single-engine opponents for a number of reasons. Firstly, it minimized one of the 110's key strengths: its heavy concentrated armament. Zerstörer pilots often had to rely upon surprise to gain the upper hand on a single-engined opponent as these aircraft could easily slip out of the 110s line of fire. The large visual profile of the 110 made such surprise more difficult to achieve. This lack of maneuverability also meant that a 110 pilot had to work much harder than his opponent to get the most out of his aircraft in these aerial encounters. This contributed to a lack of situational awareness and the rear gunner helped, but the range of fire from the rear gun was often inadequate. Finally, the type's lack of acceleration and maneuverability meant that once in a melee, the 110 pilot often had little choice but to complete it; the initiative tended to be in the hands of the more nimble single-engined plane to continue or break off the attack.

The 110's problems were often inherent to most of the heavy, twin-engined fighters of the war which often had to sacrifice maneuverability and other flight characteristics in exchange for heavy armament and range. P-38s in the Pacific often had to use tactics that played to the type's strengths and avoid low-speed turn dogfights with the Japanese. In conditions without air superiority and against a modern opponent, it was no surprise that 110 did not find great success in the Battle of Britain. As the late, great Eric Brown concluded, "No designer, however talented, had come up with a magic formula enabling a long-range fighter to compete in terms of agility with contemporary, single-engined short-range seaters." Even though statistically the 110 did not badly fail during the battle, many within the Luftwaffe perceived that it had underperformed. The 110's replacement, the Me-210, was shorter to make the type more maneuverable, which in turn generated more problems for the program. The result was the 110 had to soldier on well past its intended replacement date, which the type did.

Sources

Brown, Eric. Wings of the Luftwaffe: Flying German Aircraft of the Second World War. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1978.

Holmes, Tony. Hurricane I Vs Bf 110: 1940. Oxford: Osprey Pub, 2010.

Weal, John A., and Tony Holmes. Messerschmitt Bf 110 Zerstörer Aces of World War 2. Oxford: Osprey Aviation, 1999.