Oddly enough, war reconstruction, when properly funded, is actually very good at causing a nation to expand economically, as massive reconstruction projects functionally pour money into the economy. It is somewhat similar effect to the absurd rates of growth that developing economies experience as they try to catch up to already established infrastructural bases and implement widely known technology. Since the end result is known and the methods and means to reach them are standardized, reconstruction allows rapid growth fairly easily.

The fact that Germany was devastated to a greater degree than France, but had aid after the war and the ability to take out loans from the victorious Americans, allowed it to grow more rapidly in comparison, at least initially.

According to The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, Germany had many economic advantages over pretty much every other nation in Europe. Its military inspired infrastructure, like the Autobahn, was possibly the best in Europe, and the destroyed sections were repaired rapidly. It had a well educated population, large amounts of coal and other resources, and some of the largest companies in the world. Disarmed, Germany's economy no longer had to support a large military and was able to completely focus on expansion and exports, with industrial output more than doubling between 1948 and 1952.

Functionally, Germany translated its weakness into a opportunity for economic strength. It accepted its position as subordinate to the Allies and took advantage of the protection of other nations rather than trying to rearm.

France, however, did not necessarily enjoy the same advantages. While it did grow rapidly after WWII, as the same rebuilding growth occurred, and was relatively large in the long term, averaging around 5% for the next two decades, this was substantially less than growth seen in Germany.

Systemic issues in the French economy hindered its growth. Much of the economy was still based on agriculture, and the political forces in Paris were unwilling to abandon support for the traditional small farm, which are less efficient than larger farms, slowing productivity growth and industrialization. Moreover, France was heavily dependent on outside energy sources, causing it to import massive amounts of oil, which negatively affected its trade balance and caused money to regularly flow out of the economy.

Additionally, France was more concerned with political power in some ways. It spent large amounts of money maintaining its dwindling colonial empire, had to fund a large military to deal with uprisings in places like French Indonesia, and de Gaulle sought to make France great by weakening US power in Europe. It withdrew from NATO, funded its own nuclear bomb program, and attempted to establish French superiority in European politics. None of these were beneficial to the French economy and it tended to strain relations with both the US and Great Britain, which further led to economic slowing.

Functionally, France enjoyed high growth initially, which slowed as its economy matured and the damage from WWII was repaired. This, due to political and systemic factors, occurred sooner than Germany, which allowed Germany to become economically superior to France in the longer term.

I don't feel qualified to comment upon the relative differences in political power, but Paul Kennedy argues that political power follows economic power, and France rapidly fell behind in the latter.

Sources:

The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers by Paul Kennedy

French International Policy under de Gaulle and Pompidou: the Politics of Grandeur by Edward Kolodziej.