I can answer the first question. The Prussia-driven unification culminating in the proclamation of the Empire in 1871, spearheaded by Bismarck represented the kleindeutsche Lösung (Small Germany Solution) to the Deutsche Frage (German Question), meaning that Germany would be united under Prussian, Protestant leadership, excluding Catholic Austria (the alternative would have been the großdeutsche Lösung - Great/Big Germany solution, which would have included the Austrian parts of the German Confederation - Deutscher Bund - i.e. Bohemia, Moravia, modern Austria, South Tyrol and even Triest).

Bismarck was a reactionary monarchist, not a nationalist. He cared about ensuring Prussian dominance in Germany. He was interested in Austria as a future ally, not as a part of his Prussian-lead state (It's important to keep in mind the German Empire was a federation of states itself; and Prussia continued to exist inside of it).

Switzerland, which had never been part of the German Confederation, had left the Holy Roman Empire centuries before, would have added yet another catholic region to the Empire and whose annexation would enrage the great powers, was never considered as a future German province.

It is true that intellectuals and artists like Ernst Moritz von Arndt for whom Germany was "soweit die deutsche Zunge klingt" (as far as the German tongue is heard) supported a third solution to the German Question, the "alldeutsche" (All-German), which would have included the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland and sometimes even Denmark. But these people were a fringe minority, and neither the members of the national assembly gathered in the Paulskirche in 1848, who tried to unite Germany as a Democracy, nor Bismarck in 1871 who tried to preserve as much of Monarchy as possible considered those ideas - the national assembly never even laid claim to Alsace-Lorraine and Bismarck was notably opposed to its annexation, so you can see how Realpolitik, not nationalist fever dreams of "Alldeutschland" motivated the decision makers.