Presumably the actual terms were some sort of compromise between the views of Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Wilson. What did each of these statesmen have to leave out, in exchange for getting higher-priority items into the treaty?
The French had a number of ideas going into the Paris Peace Conferences (the Treaty of Versailles was only one of five treaties drawn up as a result of these conferences). Foremost was a plan that involved the establishment of a League of Nations that would have bore some resemblance to the UN. Essentially, the Supreme Allied War Council and the Inter-Allied fund would be maintained, with the result that American dollars would fund the recovery of Europe while the British, French, Americans, and probably the Italians and Japanese would be able to enforce the new settlements under the aegis of the League. Wilson shot down both these ideas, as he A) didn't want the League to be a 'winners club' and B) was adamant that the British and French should repay their debts to the US.
The result was that the French pursued Reparations and a settlement regarding the Rhineland vigorously. In the end, Reparations were supported by Wilson, but proved very difficult to enforce (the Germans sabotaging their currency didn't help), culminating in the Young and Dawes Plans of 1923-24. As for the Rhineland, Marshal Ferdinand Foch and the more hardline members of the French delegation wanted either an independent Rhineland as a French satellite, or it's outright annexation. In the end, Clemenceau won out with a demilitarized zone in the Rhineland, though a time limit was placed on it's existence, with withdrawal to take place by 1935-36 and/or whenever the Germans paid their reparations. The Germans would only pay some of the reparations, and the French would withdraw in 1936 on the heels of the German remilitarization of the Rhineland.
Paris 1919 by Margaret MacMillan, The Deluge by Adam Tooze, and Stephen Schuker's The End of French Predominance in Europe are worth reading on the subject.