The Chasseurs ardennais were created in 1931 to guard the hilly, wooded Ardennes region. Conceived as an elite unit with high esprit de corps, they were given a unique uniform with a distinctive green beret and a wild boar badge. Initially composed of only one battalion, they were expanded throughout the 1930’s until they consisted of a full division of three regiments, plus a reserve divison. Each regiment had three infantry battalions equipped with bicycles, a motorcycle company, a squadron of T-15 tanks, and a company of T-13 tanks (The T-15 had a machine gun, while the T-13 had a 47mm gun). The Chasseurs ardennais also had an artillery regiment with 75mm and 105mm guns. They consisted of some 30,000 troops.

Despite their numbers, the Chasseurs ardennais were defending a long front, and were not intended as a strong defense. The Belgian main line of defense was to be established along the Meuse River and Albert Canal, from Namur to Maastricht to Antwerp. This was because the Belgians (and French and British) believed the German’s main effort (Schwerpunkt) would be through the Gembloux gap, similar to the World War I Schlieffen Plan. The Chasseurs ardennais and the rest of Group K, under command of General Maurice Keyaerts, were to conduct a delaying action through the use of obstacles and long range fires in the rough terrain. Keyaerts positioned a series of strongpoints along two main lines of defense, one from Bastogne to Martelange to Arlon, and the other from Libin to Libramont to Neufchâteau to Etalle. He would then withdraw to the northwest towards Huy and Liège. The French, for their part, intended to move their cavalry into the Ardennes along roughly the same line, but due to Belgium’s declaration of neutrality on 1936, there was no coordination between the two forces. Unbeknownst to the Allies, the German plan involved sending their main effort, Panzer Group von Kleist, through the Ardennes to the Meuse River. The Group’s three panzer corps would advance along only four roads in a carefully coordinated attack through the dense terrain. This meant the Chasseurs ardennais would face a heavy concentration of troops and tanks. It also meant the Germans would be bottled up and strung out along the roads for miles. As part of the deception, German aircraft would initially be concentrated farther north, while fighters over the Ardennes would largely concentrate on destroying Allied reconnaissance aircraft.

The Chasseurs ardennais were involved in two notable actions on the Tenth of May, 1940. The first, at Chabrehez, by a company of the 3rd Regiment, against the advanced guard of Rommel’s 7th Panzer Division, is probably the action referred to in Sabaton’s song. The Chasseurs, under Lieutenant Lejeune and his platoon leaders, Gourmet, Cermer, and Catin, lacked any artillery support or tanks. In the initial attack by a lone German tank, some of Catin’s men tried to flee. Catin faced them down, pistol in hand, and ordered them back to their positions. The moment of panic passed, and Catin’s men forced the tank to withdraw with only small arms fire. Gourmet’s machine gunners were very successful in stalling the German attack. Faced with the volume of fire from the men of the Chasseurs ardennais, the German commander, Major Steinkeller, pulled back to await reinforcements. Unfortunately for the Chasseurs ardennais, Rommel made a habit of appearing wherever his key engagement was going to be, and here was no different. With the arrival of a motorcycle battalion and some tanks, Rommel was able to envelop the Chasseurs ardennais from the north and capture or kill many of them.

The second action occurred around the town of Bodange. The attack was preceded by an airlift of 400 men of the III Battalion, Groβdeutchland Regiment into the towns of Nives and Witry. Lacking transport aircraft, the assault was to be conducted in two waves of 98 small Fieseler Storch airplanes. The near fiasco saw many aircraft getting lost in the fog, with many of them landing near Nives. The commander of the Nives detachment, Captain Krüger and many others landed near Lèglise, some fifteen kilometers from Nives. Only nine men of the Witry group landed near their objective, including the overall commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Garski. Garski’s second wave, however, reinforced them and Krüger’s force finally made contact around noon.

The road to Neufchâteau wound through a narrow route through Martelange and Bodange along the Sûre River. The 4th Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Regiment of the Chasseurs ardennais occupied positions at Martelange, while the 5th Company held a particularly strong position at Bodange. The 4th Company blew demolitions early in the morning of the 10th, however one of those explosions also cut their communication lines with 5th Company and the battalion headquarters. 4th company came under heavy German attack, and withdrew through 5th Company’s position around 1115 hours, and the demolitions 5th company had prepared were detonated to block the German’s advance. The 5th Company commander, Major Bricart, then received orders to send his T-13 tank (which possessed the only anti-tank gun in the company) to the rear to help deal with the German air landings in their rear. The last order Bricart received was a message to defend in place as long as possible. Unfortunately, some of the demolitions charges had severed their communications with battalion, and the battalion itself was cut off from regimental HQ by the Germans in Witry.

The 1st Motorcycle battalion, 1st Panzer Division was halted by Bricart’s strong defenses. One company circled the town to the south, linking up with Garski’s force at Fauvillers, a couple of kilometers west of Bodange. The assault on Bodange was taken over by the German 3rd Battalion, 1st Infantry Regiment around 1400 hours. Elements of the motorcycle battalion had managed to force the Belgian 2nd platoon off their positions on a hill on the southern end of the Belgian defenses, but strong fire from their 3rd platoon kept the Germans from occupying the hill. Meanwhile, the Germans had managed to get one battery of artillery and four 88mm guns through the snarled traffic to pound the Belgian positions. Bricart’s last message at 1600 hours indicated his was under artillery fire. It was not until 2015 hours that the Germans had taken the town, cleared the minefield, and were able to move west on the road to Neufchâteau. Bricart’s 1st platoon was also able to delay the advance of the German 2nd Panzer Division, holding until around 1700, and their destruction of the bridge across the Sûre River delayed the Germans until repairs were completed in the early morning hours of the 11th.

Doughty, Robert A., The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940

Epstein, Jonathan A., Belgium's Dilemma: The Formation of the Belgian Defense Policy, 1932-1940

Hautecler, Georges, Rommel and Guderian against the Belgian Chasseurs Ardennais: The Combats at Chabrehez and Bodange