After the Communists won the Chinese civil war there was a big debate in the U.S. about who was responsible for "losing" China.
How do historians view the Chinese civil war now? Was a communist victory inevitable? Was there anything the U.S. could have done to prevent a Communist victory?
I'll take a few notes out of Jonathan D Spence's The Search For Modern China as my notes and articles on Republican China are sadly missing.
While I can't speak with very good (if any really) authority on the nature of the debate within the US, it's difficult to say whether or not the Communist Victory was inevitable. It's important to note that the Post-War Nationalist China had rather serious economic and labor problems. For one the Nationalist economy had rather serious crises with inflation. Spence argues that in tandem with the corruption and cronyism that was rampant in Shanghai, the Republican attempts to print more money amidst a dwindling economy compounded with a mass of strikes that may or may not have been instigated by communist agitators severely hindered any Republican efforts of stability.
I'll offer that characterizing the loss as inevitable only works in hindsight. At the time, Chiang's and by extension the Republic's punitive attitude towards punishing and seeking out communists on paper did little to engender any favor. Consider the dire state of the post-war economy and the takeover of Manchuria back into Guomindang (KMT) hands. Though understandable, the allowance of profiteering that ran rampant among Manchuria, Shanghai, and elsewhere only worsened the impending if not already present economic woes. Considering the South had been ravaged by war, rebuilding China was no easy task.
On the other hand, it was clear that in 1946 the Communist were ill prepared. Though their base centered in Harbin the communists in 1946 faced few good times, with a bubonic plague endemic, and attempts to build up an army the Communist faced not only a larger KMT army but also internal problems. Through some rather clever maneuvering, Lin Biao in 1947 manages to raise a rather large host of troops into Manchuria, though he does not win a conventional battle, in cutting the railroads between KMT cities, many of the Nationalist troops end up abandoning their posts leaving behind supplies and weapons. Though mildly defeatist, 1947 marked a moment between the US and China where faith in Chiang's ability to consolidate China dwindled rapidly and almost embarrassingly. Combined with the economic woes and inflation that became unmanageable (give or take the Yuan dropped to almost 10% of its original value from 1947-1948) and the lack of assistance from the US to stabilize the economy, late 1947 and 1948 so a slew of domestic and military defeats for the nationalists. To make matters worse, much of Manchuria ended up in communist hands by 1948, convincing Chiang Kai Shek that the best course of action was to remain and attempt to re-capture Manchuria, as his prestige was at stake.
By Spring of 1948, Chiang faced waning popularity, a fiasco of shooting students in a protest in Beijing and a series of military losses caused by Lin Biao's campaigns in Manchuria. On the foreign policy side, the US had decided to embargo China and Chiang's generals end up getting out maneuvered in the end of 1948 resulting in mass nationalist desertions fueled by poor leadership, a lack of morale, and constant local peasantry attacking supply lines. By January of 1949, in a flurry of mistakes, economic woes, and military setbacks, Chiang Kai Shek's Nationalist China became the CCP.
Historians I find generally have a well justified opinion that Chiang was rather out of his depth in handling post-war China. Though the victory was inevitable, Chaing and the nationalist administration failed to establish stability within the domestic economic sphere to such a degree that even among the US, much of his actions post-1945 sapped amidst a flurry of corruption and erratic decisions from Chiang.
I would argue that there's little the US could do. Though the US did little to help, nothing could have really helped the Nationalists defeat the Communists who had success within military matters and local support within Manchuria. By late 1948, there's very much nothing the US could do despite the $700 million of aid given to China. Outside of a full invasion or commitment, I would argue that the US didn't lose China as much as the ability to keep China non-communist faced many obstacles of which the aforementioned were central to weakening the nationalist cause.
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