In High School I was taught WW2 began because of the Treaty of Versailles. However on /r/warcollege and /r/shitwehraboossay the users often point out the Germans not only came out of WW1 economicly strong but that the Germans sabatoged their economy. Can someone expand?

There are two things to disentangle here.

Firstly, much of what the two subreddits mentioned are doing is tackling popular misconceptions about the Versailles Treaty and the impact of reparations upon the German economy. In short, the popular view is that it was a Carthaginian peace in which the Versailles Treaty imposed undue and harsh levies upon a defeated Germany. This is an opinion that dates back to the 1919 with Keynes's argument that the peace terms were too severe and contrary to the wider interests of both the victors and defeated. The type of posts that are often debunked on these subreddits often take this popular notion and add a particular pro-German slant to it, with some verging into a defense of Hitler and National Socialism.

The reality behind the Treaty and the immediate postwar economy was more complex and nuanced. To speak of "Allied" demands on Germany, for example, suggests that there was a unified Allied policy for Germany, when in fact there was comparatively little Allied unity. By the same token, there is some argument to be made that Germany was the strategic winner out of the postwar system. Russia (now the USSR)'s diplomatic persona non grata status meant that German encirclement was no longer possible, the "Little Entente" of Eastern Europe being a much less potent adversary and a highly fractious one to boot. Germany was intact, aside from some key territories, and not as demographically weakened as France. Nor had German territory been occupied during the war, so its economic infrastructure was still intact. The disarmament provisions meant that Germany did not have to maintain expensive armaments, which was a source of budget headaches in an era of rapid technological change. This type of revision can of course can be taken too far, but it is a good thought exercise to escape conventional wisdom.

This more differentiated picture of Versailles is rather old hat to historians and claiming that the Versailles Treaty was not all that bad is a bit of banging at open doors. The mainstream view of the Treaty is that there was a discrepancy between its punitive clauses and the mechanisms to enforce them. In short, it was a was kind of a Schrödinger's cat, being both too weak and too strong simultaneously. But that does not mean that there is a consensus among historians about the impact and trajectory of the Versailles Treaty upon German politics and its economy. Especially with the issue of the relationship of hyperinflation to reparations, there are actually some rather sharp debates about this topic.

Herein lies another problem with these subreddits is that some of the posters present the historiography about this contentious topic as somewhat settled. To put it simply, there are two contemporary historical camps about the nexus between hyperinflation and reparations. The first camp emerged in the late 1960s and challenged the Keynesian orthodoxy and argued that hyperinflation was self-sabotage on the part of the Germans to evade their responsibility for payments by undermining the system. Sally Marks in a highly influential 1969 essay, followed up by a stronger one in 1978, argued that the reparation demands were not too onerous and Germany had the resources to meet their Treaty obligations but elected not to for reasons of politics. Stephen Schuker would also likewise argued that the Germans were not acting in good faith and the French Ruhr policy was more rational than the Keynesian paradigm asserted. Marks in particular relied upon the opening of Allied archival sources which showed much of the Allied consternation over German actions.

This anti-Keynesian thesis did not go unchallenged though. In a spirited exchange in Central European History, David Felix questioned a number of the key precepts behind Marks's assertions. The German historian Peter Krüger also questioned the assumption that Germany had the ability to pay its reparations and maintain something resembling fiscal sanity. Two of the most forceful counterattacks upon the self-sabotage thesis were Niall Ferguson and Gerald Feldman. Ferguson, before he went down the dark path as a public intellectual (which, judging by the rather mediocre The Deluge, Adam Tooze is heading down too), contended that finances in this time was a complex mishmash which included important data that Marks and the like ignored or minimized that painted a much more complicated picture. Feldman eschewed Ferguson's propensity for economic figures and data and instead argued that political restraints, both foreign and domestic, hemmed in German options.

Elements of Feldman's approach are worth repeating because it taps into the OP's question. One of the legacies of the war was the the Republic would have had to deal with inflation even if the Treaty had been magnanimous. German war finance relied overwhelmingly upon loans in the expectation that they would be paid off by reparations from the defeated Entente. One of the baleful legacies of the Bismarckian Reich was that it saddled the German government with an inefficient tax system; and the level of taxation on the German public was well below the other great powers in the war. While this might seem short-sighted on the part of the German government (and it was), it is important to understand that state financing was a third rail of Kaiserreich politics. The popularly elected Reichstag's most powerful tool against the Kaiser-appointed executive was the former's control of the budget and this habituated a generation of German politicians to avoid touching the tax system. To Weimar's credit, the central government did enact a major reform of the tax code, but such a reform took time. Therefore, deficit spending in the 1920s was necessary for the Weimar state. The fact that Weimar relied upon a narrow coalition for governance precluded more extreme options such as soaking the rich, or, as some German industrialists called for, workers donate an extra two hours of their shift without pay. The state could have cut spending to meet reparations, but such a strategy would have been politically dangerous to the extreme as the Republic was beset by insurgents on both the left and right. One of the immediate priorities for the Republic was a stabilization of the domestic economy to denude these insurgents of a mass base. This led to a curious phenomena in which inflationary policies fed exports so that German unemployment was actually somewhat better than in Allied countries in 1920-21. The problem was this was an unsustainable policy, albeit an understandable one, and Feldman notes that hyperinflation had actually begun before the French demands of 1923. Additionally, the resurgence of political violence also created a disincentive for the Weimar government to pursue an alternative course of stabilization through cooperation with the Allies, especially after the Rhineland occupation. Allied reparation policy also played a role in this impasse; as J. P. Morgan noted at the time, the Allies were confused as "to whether they wanted a weak Germany who could not pay, or a strong Germany who could pay." The hyperinflation did not benefit any parties, and mass panic also played a role in sustaining the crisis. As the German economic historian Knut Borchard put it aptly in Perspectives on Modern German Economic History and Policy:

The end of this witches' sabbath did not come immediately. Stabilization only succeeded after the money economy reached the verge of total collapse in 1923, and no one could any longer gain advantage from the situation: not the government or the employers, and not the organized and employed workers. In November 1923, the Mark was worth only 1/10 ~12 of the old gold Mark. But the real expropriation of monetary assets lay further back, and had nothing to do with the occupation of the Ruhr in 1923, which had merely further accelerated the inflationary cycle. It is surely insignificant whether one retains a thousandth of one's assets, or only a millionth millionth.

All of this, naturally, does not justify Hitler or his unilateral abrogation of the Versailles system. Stresseman was more than capable of gaming the Versailles system to Germany's advantage without rejecting it. But a proper evaluation of the Weimar economy and Versailles needs to account for the numerous domestic and international complexities of this period and reducing the hyperinflationary period to just "sabotage" misses a lot of the important context.