The short answer is a yes to all your questions. It is a completely Eurocentric yet legitimate periodization that does effective has a very easy end (Waterloo).

The Early Modern Era is effectively defined by a march toward modernity in the State. This sees European nations centrializing power for the purpose of refined and greater control of the State. The State would be defined not by language or geography but by government and the head of state. As such, there will be an expanse of power in the State at the expense of the nobility and to a lesser extent, the common person. With greater state power, you will start to see proto Nationalism occur and blossom during the French Revolution, causing the genie of Nationalism from getting out.

Does it apply to the rest of the world? No, of course not because it s a very Eurocentric time period, however conversely the Medieval era is also a Eurocentric periodization. I cannot speak about about eras in other regions of the world but it being Eurocentric doesn't detract from others as at least here it is focused on the growth of a centralized Europe.

This is a hugely important question which historians continue to debate.

 

In his article, "The Problem of the 'Early Modern' World," Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 41 (1998): 249-284, Jack Goldstone criticized the idea of "Early Modernity" as ill-defined and Eurocentric. Early Modernity has often been described as being related to the "transition from feudalism to capitalism," which is seen as a core feature of modernity. The problem with this that feudalism, as a mode of production, "had no exact analogue (or even close analogue except perhaps in Japan) outside of Europe" (p. 254). Thus this core criteria for measuring "early modernity" cannot realistically be applied to the world outside of Europe.

 

However, Goldstone's main criticism of the term "Early Modern" hinges on the fact that elements commonly attributed to "early modernity" can be found all over the globe during other time periods as well.

 

"Consciously designed constitutional authority among landed citizens is evident in ancient Greece... and the Swiss cantons of the twelfth century, and in the later Venetian Republic. Nonetheless, we do not consider the constitutional governments of 2500 years ago, or of 500-700 years ago, to be 'modern,' or even 'early modern,' because these societies showed no other signs of progress toward full "modernity" in the following centuries." (p. 256)

 

In addition, "Song China made extensive use of coal in a variety of factory processes, to the degree that Hartwell speaks of an eleventh century 'Industrial Revolution' in China. Yet here we would have an entire millennium between the onset of 'early modernity' and the beginning of a fully 'modern' China c. 1911."

 

In other words, one can identify individual features of "early modernity" in innumerable places and times. Yet, "if by 'early modern' we seek to denote a society that was simultaneously progressing toward fossil-fueled powered economies, constitutional government, and religious freedom and secularization of daily life, we do not find such societies until eighteenth century England and nineteenth century Europe and America; in other words when the modern world is already upon us." (p. 258)

 

If we define "early modernity" in narrow terms - simply as the development of merchant capitalism - then we find it everywhere, from eleventh century China and Java to Greco-Roman Egypt. If we define "early modernity" in wide terms, requiring all the criteria listed in the above quote, then we find it nowhere. That's the problem which Goldstone identifies with the "Early Modern World." It is both everywhere and nowhere to be found.