"Fury" is on tv at the moment and the battle between the single Panzer and the four Americans is one of my favorite WWII scenes of all time. U.S. intelligence and Army planners must have known their workhorse would be outclassed, right?
Unfortunately not. There was a sense of complacency in the US armed forces regarding German tank capability in 1943 and 1944, probably the most important time in which the US could have "reacted" (much like the Germans did, modifying what was to become the Tiger I after their first experiences fighting the T-34 and KV-1) and developed a heavier or better-armed tank in a timely manner.
US Complacency:
When the first Tigers were encountered in Tunisia, it was assumed (correctly) that it was a heavy tank that would be deployed only in small numbers. The Americans had not had much actual experience fighting the Tiger in 1943, and what fighting there was against the Tiger in Tunisia and Sicily had actually gone quite well for the Americans.
The Soviets first recovered intact Panther tanks after the Battle of Kursk. From Soviet intelligence, the Americans thought much the same of the Panther as they did the Tiger; that it would be a heavy tank, deployed in small numbers in separate battalions. There was also no pressure from tank crews in the field; the 75 mm gun of the Sherman had proven perfectly adequate against the early panzers (Panzer III, Panzer IV) encountered in North Africa and Sicily. What the Americans did not know, or refused to know, would hurt them; the Germans eventually intended to make the formidable Panther the backbone of their tank force in 1943 and 1944. The British and Soviets heeded the intelligence gathered. By early 1944, the Soviets had up-gunned the T-34 and KV-1, to make the T-34-85 and the IS-2 respectively, and the British had developed the Sherman Firefly with the QF 17-pounder gun.
General Jacob L. Devers, at the time the head of the Armored Force, fortunately took the reports of the Tiger seriously. In spring 1943, he ordered the development of a 90 mm-gunned tank, preferably based on one of the new T-series prototypes (see below) This program was delayed repeatedly by high Army brass like Lesley McNair (a fierce proponent of the tank destroyer doctrine; his death cleared the way for the production of the M26 Pershing) who were dangerously complacent and thought the 75 and 76 mm guns could do just fine;
"...The M4 tank, particularly the M4A3, has been widely hailed as the best tank on the battlefield today. There are indications that the enemy concurs in this view. Apparently the M4 is an ideal combination of mobility, dependability, speed, protection, and firepower. Other than this particular request--which represents the British view--there has been no call from any theater for a 90mm tank gun. There appears to be no fear on the part of our forces of the German Mark VI (Tiger) tank....There can be no basis for the T26 tank other than the conception of a tank versus tank duel--which is believed unsound and unnecessary....There is no indication that the 76mm antitank gun is inadequate against the German Mark VI (Tiger) tank."
In reality, the Tiger was not encountered very often, (as /u/panzerkampfwagen notes, the Panzer IV with side skirts was often misidentified as a "Tiger") and the Sherman proved itself quite effective against the majority of German assault guns and tanks, save monsters like the King Tiger or Jagdtiger, that it encountered. Keep in mind that only about 14.5 percent of Sherman losses in Northwest Europe, at least on the British side, were caused by fire from actual enemy tanks.
A British study of tank losses in Northwest Europe revealed the following:
| Mines | Antitank Guns | Tank | Self-propelled Gun | Bazooka | Other | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 22.1% | 22.7% | 14.5% | 24.4% | 14.2% | 2.1% | 100% |
Post-war studies of US tank engagements (losses of Shermans versus losses of Panthers and the situation of each) revealed the Panther had a 1.1:1 advantage when it was defending. However, the Sherman possessed an 8.4:1 advantage when it was on the offensive. Overall, the Sherman held a 3.6:1 advantage over the Panther.
The Birth and Proliferation of the 76 mm Sherman:
First, to clear up something. The 76 mm-gunned Sherman was not in response it any German threat. Development of a tank with a 76 mm gun began in August of 1942. Ordnance intended to produce 1,000 Shermans with the 76 mm gun M1 L/57 in the standard 75 mm turret by the end of the year. The project was cancelled when the gun was found to be too big and barrel-heavy for the small turret.
In the meantime, several medium tank projects that were intended to become the eventual successor of the Sherman (the T20, T22, and T23) were developed. Ordnance asked for versions of the T20 and T23 to be standardized for mass production as the M27B1 and M27 respectively, but they were cancelled in July 1943 as the Sherman had entrenched its place in combat and on the production lines. The T25 and T26, conceived in fall 1943, were developments of the cancelled tanks; the T26 would eventually evolve into the M26 Pershing.
The design of the M27 and M27B1 tanks netted a new basic turret type, the "T23". There were several part numbers for specific variations of this turret.
In early 1944, the US planned to begin production of "second-generation" wet stowage Sherman models, phasing out the old "first generation" dry stowage models. The "T23" turret, paired with the shortened 76 mm gun M1A1 L/52, was first used on wet stowage M4A1 Sherman tanks beginning in January 1944. These initial tanks would be the first 76 mm tanks to see combat, in Normandy. These M4A1 tanks were slow to flow into combat, first seeing action in late July 1944, with 50 each issued to the 2nd and 3rd Armored Divisions. The 76 mm-armed M4A3 followed the M4A1 in September 1944.
US 12th Army Group M4 Strength 1944-1945:
| Type | Jun. | Jul. | Aug. | Sept. | Oct. | Nov. | Dec. | Jan. | Feb. | Mar. | Apr. | May |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 75 mm tanks total | 646 | 781 | 1,317 | 1,367 | 1,267 | 1,521 | 1,377 | 1,695 | 1,749 | 1,937 | 1,664 | 1,449 |
| 76 mm tanks total | 0 | 0 | 95 | 212 | 239 | 572 | 595 | 609 | 758 | 929 | 1,164 | 1,594 |
| 76 mm tanks (arm'd div.) | 0 | 0 | 95 | 117 | 202 | 406 | 418 | 350 | 542 | 624 | 726 | 987 |
| 76 mm tanks (tank bn.) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 95 | 37 | 166 | 177 | 259 | 216 | 305 | 438 | 607 |
| % 76 mm tanks | 0 | 0 | 6.7 | 13.4 | 15.8 | 27.3 | 30.1 | 26.4 | 30.2 | 32.4 | 41.1 | 52.3 |
US 6th Army Group M4 Strength 1945:
| Type | Jan. | Feb. | Mar. | Apr. | May |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 75 mm tanks | 422 | 381 | 332 | 434 | 523 |
| 76 mm tanks | 185 | 208 | 366 | 478 | 557 |
| % 76 mm tanks | 30.4 | 35.3 | 52.4 | 52.4 | 51.5 |
Fury:
The engagement with the Tiger starts at 700 yards, with the American tanks charging towards the Tiger. The 76 mm guns M1A1 and M1A2 which some of the tanks of Fury's platoon possess are more than capable of penetrating the front of the Tiger (100 mm of armor angled at 8 degrees from the vertical) at less than 1,000 yards, even with "stock" ammunition. As /u/panzerkampfwagen again notes, Fury is a movie, and the shells were made to bounce off for dramatic effect.
76 mm gun M1A1/M1A1C/M1A2 penetration table^a :
| Ammunition type | Muzzle velocity | 100 m | 500 m | 750 m | 1,000 m |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| M79 AP | 792 m/s (2,600 ft/s) | 154 mm | 131 mm | 119 mm | 107 mm |
| M62 APC | 792 m/s (2,600 ft/s) | 125 mm | 116 mm | 111 mm | 106 mm |
| M93 HVAP | 1,036 m/s (3,400 ft/s) | 239 mm | 208 mm | 191 mm | 175 mm |
a: armor angled at 90 degrees from the horizontal
At the beginning of April 1945, the 2nd Armored Division had 209 medium tanks out of an allotted strength of 232; 143 75 mm-gunned tanks and 87 76 mm-gunned tanks. 41.6 percent of the tanks were 76 mm tanks.
Many of the M4(75) and M4A1(76) issued before or during the Normandy campaign would still be present, although they would be quite beaten up.
The mainstay of the 75 mm tanks would have been the M4A3(75)W
The mainstay of the 76 mm tanks would have been the M4A3(76)W. The types of gasoline V-engined M4A3 were the Army's preferred model.
Deliveries of the new M4A3(76)W HVSS, what Fury is supposed to be, began in December 1944 and were rapidly accelerating by the end of the war. They were generally issued to replace losses and old tanks. The Ninth US Army, which the 2nd Armored Division was assigned to at the time, had about 200 in April 1945. At the end of the war, the M4A3(76)W HVSS made up roughly half of all 76 mm Shermans, and thus, about a quarter of all Shermans in the ETO.
Delivery of M4A3E8 (76mm) to Armies of 12th Army Group in ETO 1944-45:
| Army | Dec. | Jan. | Feb. | Mar. | Apr. | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| First | -- | 29 | 19 | 57 | 153 | 258 |
| Third | 21 | 28 | 62 | 13 | 132 | 256 |
| Ninth | -- | 33 | 72 | 45 | 64 | 214 |
| Fifteenth | -- | 24 | -- | -- | -- | 24 |
| Total | 21 | 114 | 153 | 115 | 349 | 752 |
Sources:
Data on World War II Tank Engagements: Involving the U.S. Third and Fourth Armored Divisions
The Comparative Performance of German Anti-tank Weapons During World War II, by H.G. Gee
WWII Ballistics: Armor and Gunnery, by Lorrin R. Bird and Robert D. Livingston
Armored Thunderbolt: The US Army Sherman in World War II, by Steven J. Zaloga
M4 (76mm) Sherman Medium Tank 1943-65, by Steven J. Zaloga
Well, for starters "Fury" is a movie and not very accurate.
In that scene Pitt's tank, armed with a 76mm gun, would not have needed to get around behind the Tiger to kill it. In fact, it didn't even need to get around the sides. The 76mm gun on the Sherman could penetrate the frontal armour of a Tiger tank from quite a few hundred metres.
However, Tigers were rare, very rare, and most of the tanks reported by US tankers to be Tigers were in fact the Panzerkampfwagen IV which had a similar box shape to the Tiger. However, the Panzer IV was about on par with the Sherman.
At the end of the day the Panzer IV was the German tank the Sherman was most likely to come up against. There were also quite a few Panzerkampfwagen V Panther but even then in Western Europe the Sherman performed good enough against them. One of the advantages the Sherman had over a Panther was that the Sherman gunner had better optics to spot his targets with. It was wide field of view. The Panther gunner on the other hand had quite a narrow field of view to work with and so could have trouble locating his target. In combat he who gets off the first shot quite often has the advantage.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bNjp_4jY8pY
That link is quite good when it comes to dispelling some of the myths regarding American armour.