I imagine having a supply train thousands of kilometers is not practical for an ancient army. Did he loot? Did he force conquered enemies to provide supplies?
So Alexander the Great's great cause he conquered the Achaemenid Persian Empire. Until he passed over the Indus, all the lands he had conquered had either been Persian satrapies or at least within the Persian orbit. This included everything from Thrace, the Levant, Egypt, Babylonia, Assyria, and Persia itself, all highly developed societies with an organized and ancient tradition of rule.
Though every generation saw its share of separatist movements, Persian satrapies were generally quiescent and obedient to Persian rule. Once Alexander showed up as an unstoppable menace however, Persian satraps would often betray the Persian central authority and surrender themselves and their services to the conqueror. The political result of Alexander's conquests being that satraps were either trusted Greek advisors placed to the position by Alexander or they were holdovers from the preceding Persian state. Further, the officials serving within state ministries continued to hail from the local area, as they had under the Achaemenids.
With Alexander's attention focused on his military conquests, oversight of his empire was slack as long as the necessary materiel and soldiers arrived for his campaigning. Alexander notoriously conscripted men from his conquered provinces (much like the Persians had) and expected to collect the same sort of tax revenue as his predecessors. But with his constant warfare, he wasn't going to conduct a full audit of his empire's finances.
Satraps realized this. Basic quotients of money and goods traveled to Alexander or back to Macedon on Persia's famous road system. But beyond what was needed to slake Alex's immediate demands, the administrators of the Persian bureaucracy could act nigh indiscriminately. The Macedonian army wasn't traveling through to set up a longstanding, permanent civilization; they moved at lightning speed, conquering a continental empire in less than a decade. Thus the local politicking of each court, in Susa, in Sardis, in Babylonia, went completely unchecked. Corruption spread as the only state obligations were to Alexander, a foreign conqueror who moved increasingly further away. Sometimes, they revolted, and Alexander executed several of them for this (Arrian VI.26) on his way back from India. Normally, however, they sent goods where they needed to go as the state apparatus built up by Darius and Artaxerxes could easily handle both completing Alexander's limited fiscal desires and fleecing their own pockets.
In addition to receiving replenishment from centralized redistribution Alexander's army could expect to collect sustenance and good grace from any ruler through whose lands it passed. There was of course the underlying coercive aspect to parking the greatest empire the world had ever known next to anybody's palace, but most kings, satraps, or rajs (if that's what they were called yet). When local supplies were limited, such as in the Central Asian steppelands, high mountain passes in the winter, or in the Gedrosian Desert, his army had serious problems with attrition. In sum, they were a much more live off the land type army, though they did it in a rather "civilized," rather than Hunnic fashion.
Sources: Paul Cartledge's Alexander the Great
Arrian: https://archive.org/stream/cu31924026460752/cu31924026460752_djvu.txt Seriously, check Arrian out. Alexander brought a bunch of historians with him to document his conquests, and what gets passed down to us is nothing short of pulp fiction. It paints Alex as a mega badass who successively beats Achilles, Hercules, and Dionysus in his feats.
Duncan Ryan The Achaemenid Empire -super fast breeze through Achaemenid history. Not too much content, but does give a rough trajectory of their empire. I recently read it just to cover my bases as I begin to do more research into Near Eastern history
Donald Engels wrote what is kinda the definitive work on this subject, and I highly recommend it, as it's a fascinating subject, because the accomplishment of Alexander the Great cannot be overstated. (1)
There were large bodies of men not well disposed to this young Greek traipsing through their territories with his army, but more importantly there were vast swathes of often quite hostile landscape across which Alexander had to move his men. Alexander was able to meet these strategic, tactical, and logistical concerns with seeming ease. Much ink has been spilled over the millennia concerning Alexander’s strategic and tactical genius, less so his ability as a logistical commander, and that is a damn shame because he was a genius.
First and foremost was the preparation that took place under his father, Philip. Key among these preparations was the organization of the Macedonian Army into the most efficient campaigning force the Mediterranean had ever seen. A key part of this plan was expanding the prestige of the infantry unit, which would prove so essential to his battle plans. Philip accomplished this by making the soldiers of the infantry loyal to him personally, in a shift away from their home region or city. These ‘foot companions’ enjoyed the prestige of being considered directly connected to their king just as the aristocracy already had been for generations. (2)
By making the men individually and as a unit loyal to their commander and king, Philip was aiming to wage war in a way that Greeks had not done before. Greek discipline operated in a way that might be alien to our modern idea of discipline, which places an emphasis on following orders.
The main focus of Greek discipline was on the opinion of your fellow soldier-citizens, and in trials for failure to obey orders, the key concern was whether the soldier-citizen had disobeyed orders for reasons of cowardice. Cowardice was the principal concern. Philip’s reforms to the Macedonian military are key to understanding the way he changed the army’s discipline. The existing institution of the Cavalry Companions, consisting of the elite of the Macedonian state, had enjoyed extensive freedom to question their commander and king bluntly. By expanding this and other privileges to include the infantry, Philip was also able to induce a constriction on the freedom of all his soldiers to disobey. The soldiers, having theoretically gained the right to question their king, gave up their traditional freedom to disobey. Effectively, the old nobility were given new obligations, and a new nobility was recruited on the basis of professionalism, meritocracy, and most important of all - loyalty.
It would not have been difficult to impress upon the men that loyalty meant obedience, by demonstrating that the rewards for loyalty flowed to those most obedient to commands. Therefore, reforms such as Philip’s forbidding of wagons and restricting the number of servants each fighting man was permitted created a situation wherein the armed force was able to field four combatants for every one servant. The men accepted such restrictions, and requirements to carry their own supplies, because to do so meant they would be rewarded. (3)
Under the hitherto existing Greek system, men would go so far as to bring their commanders up on charges for giving them orders they did not like, even when those orders were to help a wounded comrade to safety. Under Philip’s system, both discipline as obedience and discipline as courage are improved.
So, reforms are in place, time to invade Persia!
Engels’ breakdown of the logistical framework after the crossing of the Hellespont estimates about 48,000 soldiers, with support personnel bringing the total army’s size to 65,000 individuals. The number of pack animals necessary to carry sufficient rations and other noncomestibles at this point would be, by Engels’ calculations, around 10,000, a sufficient amount to ensure that the army was sufficiently well fed for up to ten days. (Engels, p12)
During the initial campaign in Persia, it is most likely that Alexander took a relatively coastal route. Arrian tells us “He sent Parmenio to take over Dascylium; and this was done without trouble, as the guards had abandoned the town.” (Arr. 1.12.9) Dascylium lay directly between Granicus and Sardis. Alexander relied on the fleet for most of his supply solutions until Miletus, and then transport of his siege train through to the battle of Issus, which was preceded by a near-disaster. Darius, acting on the belief that the Macedonian forces remained scattered in Cilicia, and due to his own supply issues in the Amik plain, accidentally flanked Alexander’s army. (Arr. 2.7.2-3)
Alexander, of course, immediately turned around, met Darius, and was victorious.
Having won a crushing victory at Issus, capturing some three thousand talents on the field itself, with Parmenio capturing more treasure at Damascus, any and all issues in paying for anything his army needed were resolved, as his new wealth proved sufficient to see him to Gaugamela.
There is a lot more to say about the rest of his campaigns through Hyrcania, Parthyaea, and Bactria. Then there's the total fucking disaster of the Gedrosian campaign, and god damned Nearchus.
Go read Engels's book, for real. It's very good. He leaves a few questions unanswered, like how reinforcements and discharges were sent to and from the Mediterranean to Alexander’s army on campaign in far off places. Certainly they used the same routes and methods that were employed for purposes of communication and supply, and it is clear enough that Antipater’s needs on the home front led Alexander to cease sending all the way to Macedonia for reinforcements after 331, but how discharges from the army and the receipt of reinforcements was handled, there are questions unanswered that may well be unanswerable. That being said, Engels is extremely thorough.
Follow up question. I heard a story of Alexander the great pouring out his water in front of his soldiers while crossing the desert, saying something to the effect of "If my men don't drink, I don't drink." Any truth to this story?
Anybody have any feedback on Donald Engels book "Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army"? I thought it addressed this topic in some depth.
Looks like yes, and yes:
Alexander’s 35,000-man army could carry no more than a 10-day supply of food when remote from sea transport. Yet, he and his troops marched over thousands of miles at a rate of 19.5 miles in any one day without problem.2 In the process, Alexander conquered every nation and city on which he set his sights. At the most basic level, he was able to perform his legendary feats because he included logistics and supply-chain management into his strategic plans, just as any modem-day corporation should do to maintain a competitive edge.
King Philip had been murdered just before he was preparing to travel to Thebes and Athens to quell threatened rebellions. When Alexander replaced his father as king, he took over the Macedonian army and personally led them in Philip’s place. He timed his departure so the 30-day supply of rations, carried by sea transport, would last until 10 days after harvest at the first destination city. This provided a seamless supply of food and water for his men until the conquered city could provide Alexander’s men with needed additional supplies. (To avoid as much future bloodshed as possible, Alexander completely destroyed Thebes and its inhabitants, helping influence target cities to surrender instead of fight.) This type of planning is consistently found throughout Alexander’s campaigns.
www.proactiongroup.com/news/logisticslessons.pdf (additional citations in source document)
Looks like yes, and yes:
Alexander’s 35,000-man army could carry no more than a 10-day supply of food when remote from sea transport. Yet, he and his troops marched over thousands of miles at a rate of 19.5 miles in any one day without problem.2 In the process, Alexander conquered every nation and city on which he set his sights. At the most basic level, he was able to perform his legendary feats because he included logistics and supply-chain management into his strategic plans, just as any modem-day corporation should do to maintain a competitive edge.
King Philip had been murdered just before he was preparing to travel to Thebes and Athens to quell threatened rebellions. When Alexander replaced his father as king, he took over the Macedonian army and personally led them in Philip’s place. He timed his departure so the 30-day supply of rations, carried by sea transport, would last until 10 days after harvest at the first destination city. This provided a seamless supply of food and water for his men until the conquered city could provide Alexander’s men with needed additional supplies. (To avoid as much future bloodshed as possible, Alexander completely destroyed Thebes and its inhabitants, helping influence target cities to surrender instead of fight.) This type of planning is consistently found throughout Alexander’s campaigns.
www.proactiongroup.com/news/logisticslessons.pdf (additional citations in source document)
Looks like yes, and yes:
Alexander’s 35,000-man army could carry no more than a 10-day supply of food when remote from sea transport. Yet, he and his troops marched over thousands of miles at a rate of 19.5 miles in any one day without problem.2 In the process, Alexander conquered every nation and city on which he set his sights. At the most basic level, he was able to perform his legendary feats because he included logistics and supply-chain management into his strategic plans, just as any modem-day corporation should do to maintain a competitive edge.
King Philip had been murdered just before he was preparing to travel to Thebes and Athens to quell threatened rebellions. When Alexander replaced his father as king, he took over the Macedonian army and personally led them in Philip’s place. He timed his departure so the 30-day supply of rations, carried by sea transport, would last until 10 days after harvest at the first destination city. This provided a seamless supply of food and water for his men until the conquered city could provide Alexander’s men with needed additional supplies. (To avoid as much future bloodshed as possible, Alexander completely destroyed Thebes and its inhabitants, helping influence target cities to surrender instead of fight.) This type of planning is consistently found throughout Alexander’s campaigns.
www.proactiongroup.com/news/logisticslessons.pdf (additional citations in source document)
Looks like yes, and yes:
Alexander’s 35,000-man army could carry no more than a 10-day supply of food when remote from sea transport. Yet, he and his troops marched over thousands of miles at a rate of 19.5 miles in any one day without problem.2 In the process, Alexander conquered every nation and city on which he set his sights. At the most basic level, he was able to perform his legendary feats because he included logistics and supply-chain management into his strategic plans, just as any modem-day corporation should do to maintain a competitive edge.
King Philip had been murdered just before he was preparing to travel to Thebes and Athens to quell threatened rebellions. When Alexander replaced his father as king, he took over the Macedonian army and personally led them in Philip’s place. He timed his departure so the 30-day supply of rations, carried by sea transport, would last until 10 days after harvest at the first destination city. This provided a seamless supply of food and water for his men until the conquered city could provide Alexander’s men with needed additional supplies. (To avoid as much future bloodshed as possible, Alexander completely destroyed Thebes and its inhabitants, helping influence target cities to surrender instead of fight.) This type of planning is consistently found throughout Alexander’s campaigns.
www.proactiongroup.com/news/logisticslessons.pdf (additional citations in source document)
Looks like yes, and yes:
Alexander’s 35,000-man army could carry no more than a 10-day supply of food when remote from sea transport. Yet, he and his troops marched over thousands of miles at a rate of 19.5 miles in any one day without problem.2 In the process, Alexander conquered every nation and city on which he set his sights. At the most basic level, he was able to perform his legendary feats because he included logistics and supply-chain management into his strategic plans, just as any modem-day corporation should do to maintain a competitive edge.
King Philip had been murdered just before he was preparing to travel to Thebes and Athens to quell threatened rebellions. When Alexander replaced his father as king, he took over the Macedonian army and personally led them in Philip’s place. He timed his departure so the 30-day supply of rations, carried by sea transport, would last until 10 days after harvest at the first destination city. This provided a seamless supply of food and water for his men until the conquered city could provide Alexander’s men with needed additional supplies. (To avoid as much future bloodshed as possible, Alexander completely destroyed Thebes and its inhabitants, helping influence target cities to surrender instead of fight.) This type of planning is consistently found throughout Alexander’s campaigns.
www.proactiongroup.com/news/logisticslessons.pdf (additional citations in source document)
Looks like yes, and yes:
Alexander’s 35,000-man army could carry no more than a 10-day supply of food when remote from sea transport. Yet, he and his troops marched over thousands of miles at a rate of 19.5 miles in any one day without problem.2 In the process, Alexander conquered every nation and city on which he set his sights. At the most basic level, he was able to perform his legendary feats because he included logistics and supply-chain management into his strategic plans, just as any modem-day corporation should do to maintain a competitive edge.
King Philip had been murdered just before he was preparing to travel to Thebes and Athens to quell threatened rebellions. When Alexander replaced his father as king, he took over the Macedonian army and personally led them in Philip’s place. He timed his departure so the 30-day supply of rations, carried by sea transport, would last until 10 days after harvest at the first destination city. This provided a seamless supply of food and water for his men until the conquered city could provide Alexander’s men with needed additional supplies. (To avoid as much future bloodshed as possible, Alexander completely destroyed Thebes and its inhabitants, helping influence target cities to surrender instead of fight.) This type of planning is consistently found throughout Alexander’s campaigns.
www.proactiongroup.com/news/logisticslessons.pdf (additional citations in source document)
Looks like yes, and yes:
Alexander’s 35,000-man army could carry no more than a 10-day supply of food when remote from sea transport. Yet, he and his troops marched over thousands of miles at a rate of 19.5 miles in any one day without problem.2 In the process, Alexander conquered every nation and city on which he set his sights. At the most basic level, he was able to perform his legendary feats because he included logistics and supply-chain management into his strategic plans, just as any modem-day corporation should do to maintain a competitive edge.
King Philip had been murdered just before he was preparing to travel to Thebes and Athens to quell threatened rebellions. When Alexander replaced his father as king, he took over the Macedonian army and personally led them in Philip’s place. He timed his departure so the 30-day supply of rations, carried by sea transport, would last until 10 days after harvest at the first destination city. This provided a seamless supply of food and water for his men until the conquered city could provide Alexander’s men with needed additional supplies. (To avoid as much future bloodshed as possible, Alexander completely destroyed Thebes and its inhabitants, helping influence target cities to surrender instead of fight.) This type of planning is consistently found throughout Alexander’s campaigns.
www.proactiongroup.com/news/logisticslessons.pdf (additional citations in source document)
Looks like yes, and yes:
Alexander’s 35,000-man army could carry no more than a 10-day supply of food when remote from sea transport. Yet, he and his troops marched over thousands of miles at a rate of 19.5 miles in any one day without problem.2 In the process, Alexander conquered every nation and city on which he set his sights. At the most basic level, he was able to perform his legendary feats because he included logistics and supply-chain management into his strategic plans, just as any modem-day corporation should do to maintain a competitive edge.
King Philip had been murdered just before he was preparing to travel to Thebes and Athens to quell threatened rebellions. When Alexander replaced his father as king, he took over the Macedonian army and personally led them in Philip’s place. He timed his departure so the 30-day supply of rations, carried by sea transport, would last until 10 days after harvest at the first destination city. This provided a seamless supply of food and water for his men until the conquered city could provide Alexander’s men with needed additional supplies. (To avoid as much future bloodshed as possible, Alexander completely destroyed Thebes and its inhabitants, helping influence target cities to surrender instead of fight.) This type of planning is consistently found throughout Alexander’s campaigns.
www.proactiongroup.com/news/logisticslessons.pdf (additional citations in source document)
Looks like yes, and yes:
Alexander’s 35,000-man army could carry no more than a 10-day supply of food when remote from sea transport. Yet, he and his troops marched over thousands of miles at a rate of 19.5 miles in any one day without problem.2 In the process, Alexander conquered every nation and city on which he set his sights. At the most basic level, he was able to perform his legendary feats because he included logistics and supply-chain management into his strategic plans, just as any modem-day corporation should do to maintain a competitive edge.
King Philip had been murdered just before he was preparing to travel to Thebes and Athens to quell threatened rebellions. When Alexander replaced his father as king, he took over the Macedonian army and personally led them in Philip’s place. He timed his departure so the 30-day supply of rations, carried by sea transport, would last until 10 days after harvest at the first destination city. This provided a seamless supply of food and water for his men until the conquered city could provide Alexander’s men with needed additional supplies. (To avoid as much future bloodshed as possible, Alexander completely destroyed Thebes and its inhabitants, helping influence target cities to surrender instead of fight.) This type of planning is consistently found throughout Alexander’s campaigns.
www.proactiongroup.com/news/logisticslessons.pdf (additional citations in source document)
Looks like yes, and yes:
Alexander’s 35,000-man army could carry no more than a 10-day supply of food when remote from sea transport. Yet, he and his troops marched over thousands of miles at a rate of 19.5 miles in any one day without problem.2 In the process, Alexander conquered every nation and city on which he set his sights. At the most basic level, he was able to perform his legendary feats because he included logistics and supply-chain management into his strategic plans, just as any modem-day corporation should do to maintain a competitive edge.
King Philip had been murdered just before he was preparing to travel to Thebes and Athens to quell threatened rebellions. When Alexander replaced his father as king, he took over the Macedonian army and personally led them in Philip’s place. He timed his departure so the 30-day supply of rations, carried by sea transport, would last until 10 days after harvest at the first destination city. This provided a seamless supply of food and water for his men until the conquered city could provide Alexander’s men with needed additional supplies. (To avoid as much future bloodshed as possible, Alexander completely destroyed Thebes and its inhabitants, helping influence target cities to surrender instead of fight.) This type of planning is consistently found throughout Alexander’s campaigns.
www.proactiongroup.com/news/logisticslessons.pdf (additional citations in source document)
Looks like yes, and yes:
Alexander’s 35,000-man army could carry no more than a 10-day supply of food when remote from sea transport. Yet, he and his troops marched over thousands of miles at a rate of 19.5 miles in any one day without problem.2 In the process, Alexander conquered every nation and city on which he set his sights. At the most basic level, he was able to perform his legendary feats because he included logistics and supply-chain management into his strategic plans, just as any modem-day corporation should do to maintain a competitive edge.
King Philip had been murdered just before he was preparing to travel to Thebes and Athens to quell threatened rebellions. When Alexander replaced his father as king, he took over the Macedonian army and personally led them in Philip’s place. He timed his departure so the 30-day supply of rations, carried by sea transport, would last until 10 days after harvest at the first destination city. This provided a seamless supply of food and water for his men until the conquered city could provide Alexander’s men with needed additional supplies. (To avoid as much future bloodshed as possible, Alexander completely destroyed Thebes and its inhabitants, helping influence target cities to surrender instead of fight.) This type of planning is consistently found throughout Alexander’s campaigns.
www.proactiongroup.com/news/logisticslessons.pdf (additional citations in source document)
Looks like yes, and yes:
Alexander’s 35,000-man army could carry no more than a 10-day supply of food when remote from sea transport. Yet, he and his troops marched over thousands of miles at a rate of 19.5 miles in any one day without problem.2 In the process, Alexander conquered every nation and city on which he set his sights. At the most basic level, he was able to perform his legendary feats because he included logistics and supply-chain management into his strategic plans, just as any modem-day corporation should do to maintain a competitive edge.
King Philip had been murdered just before he was preparing to travel to Thebes and Athens to quell threatened rebellions. When Alexander replaced his father as king, he took over the Macedonian army and personally led them in Philip’s place. He timed his departure so the 30-day supply of rations, carried by sea transport, would last until 10 days after harvest at the first destination city. This provided a seamless supply of food and water for his men until the conquered city could provide Alexander’s men with needed additional supplies. (To avoid as much future bloodshed as possible, Alexander completely destroyed Thebes and its inhabitants, helping influence target cities to surrender instead of fight.) This type of planning is consistently found throughout Alexander’s campaigns.
www.proactiongroup.com/news/logisticslessons.pdf (additional citations in source document)
Looks like yes, and yes:
Alexander’s 35,000-man army could carry no more than a 10-day supply of food when remote from sea transport. Yet, he and his troops marched over thousands of miles at a rate of 19.5 miles in any one day without problem.2 In the process, Alexander conquered every nation and city on which he set his sights. At the most basic level, he was able to perform his legendary feats because he included logistics and supply-chain management into his strategic plans, just as any modem-day corporation should do to maintain a competitive edge.
King Philip had been murdered just before he was preparing to travel to Thebes and Athens to quell threatened rebellions. When Alexander replaced his father as king, he took over the Macedonian army and personally led them in Philip’s place. He timed his departure so the 30-day supply of rations, carried by sea transport, would last until 10 days after harvest at the first destination city. This provided a seamless supply of food and water for his men until the conquered city could provide Alexander’s men with needed additional supplies. (To avoid as much future bloodshed as possible, Alexander completely destroyed Thebes and its inhabitants, helping influence target cities to surrender instead of fight.) This type of planning is consistently found throughout Alexander’s campaigns.
www.proactiongroup.com/news/logisticslessons.pdf (additional citations in source document)
Looks like yes, and yes:
Alexander’s 35,000-man army could carry no more than a 10-day supply of food when remote from sea transport. Yet, he and his troops marched over thousands of miles at a rate of 19.5 miles in any one day without problem.2 In the process, Alexander conquered every nation and city on which he set his sights. At the most basic level, he was able to perform his legendary feats because he included logistics and supply-chain management into his strategic plans, just as any modem-day corporation should do to maintain a competitive edge.
King Philip had been murdered just before he was preparing to travel to Thebes and Athens to quell threatened rebellions. When Alexander replaced his father as king, he took over the Macedonian army and personally led them in Philip’s place. He timed his departure so the 30-day supply of rations, carried by sea transport, would last until 10 days after harvest at the first destination city. This provided a seamless supply of food and water for his men until the conquered city could provide Alexander’s men with needed additional supplies. (To avoid as much future bloodshed as possible, Alexander completely destroyed Thebes and its inhabitants, helping influence target cities to surrender instead of fight.) This type of planning is consistently found throughout Alexander’s campaigns.
www.proactiongroup.com/news/logisticslessons.pdf (additional citations in source document)
Looks like yes, and yes:
Alexander’s 35,000-man army could carry no more than a 10-day supply of food when remote from sea transport. Yet, he and his troops marched over thousands of miles at a rate of 19.5 miles in any one day without problem.2 In the process, Alexander conquered every nation and city on which he set his sights. At the most basic level, he was able to perform his legendary feats because he included logistics and supply-chain management into his strategic plans, just as any modem-day corporation should do to maintain a competitive edge.
King Philip had been murdered just before he was preparing to travel to Thebes and Athens to quell threatened rebellions. When Alexander replaced his father as king, he took over the Macedonian army and personally led them in Philip’s place. He timed his departure so the 30-day supply of rations, carried by sea transport, would last until 10 days after harvest at the first destination city. This provided a seamless supply of food and water for his men until the conquered city could provide Alexander’s men with needed additional supplies. (To avoid as much future bloodshed as possible, Alexander completely destroyed Thebes and its inhabitants, helping influence target cities to surrender instead of fight.) This type of planning is consistently found throughout Alexander’s campaigns.
www.proactiongroup.com/news/logisticslessons.pdf (additional citations in source document)
Looks like yes, and yes:
Alexander’s 35,000-man army could carry no more than a 10-day supply of food when remote from sea transport. Yet, he and his troops marched over thousands of miles at a rate of 19.5 miles in any one day without problem.2 In the process, Alexander conquered every nation and city on which he set his sights. At the most basic level, he was able to perform his legendary feats because he included logistics and supply-chain management into his strategic plans, just as any modem-day corporation should do to maintain a competitive edge.
King Philip had been murdered just before he was preparing to travel to Thebes and Athens to quell threatened rebellions. When Alexander replaced his father as king, he took over the Macedonian army and personally led them in Philip’s place. He timed his departure so the 30-day supply of rations, carried by sea transport, would last until 10 days after harvest at the first destination city. This provided a seamless supply of food and water for his men until the conquered city could provide Alexander’s men with needed additional supplies. (To avoid as much future bloodshed as possible, Alexander completely destroyed Thebes and its inhabitants, helping influence target cities to surrender instead of fight.) This type of planning is consistently found throughout Alexander’s campaigns.
www.proactiongroup.com/news/logisticslessons.pdf (additional citations in source document)
Looks like yes, and yes:
Alexander’s 35,000-man army could carry no more than a 10-day supply of food when remote from sea transport. Yet, he and his troops marched over thousands of miles at a rate of 19.5 miles in any one day without problem.2 In the process, Alexander conquered every nation and city on which he set his sights. At the most basic level, he was able to perform his legendary feats because he included logistics and supply-chain management into his strategic plans, just as any modem-day corporation should do to maintain a competitive edge.
King Philip had been murdered just before he was preparing to travel to Thebes and Athens to quell threatened rebellions. When Alexander replaced his father as king, he took over the Macedonian army and personally led them in Philip’s place. He timed his departure so the 30-day supply of rations, carried by sea transport, would last until 10 days after harvest at the first destination city. This provided a seamless supply of food and water for his men until the conquered city could provide Alexander’s men with needed additional supplies. (To avoid as much future bloodshed as possible, Alexander completely destroyed Thebes and its inhabitants, helping influence target cities to surrender instead of fight.) This type of planning is consistently found throughout Alexander’s campaigns.
www.proactiongroup.com/news/logisticslessons.pdf (additional citations in source document)
Looks like yes, and yes:
Alexander’s 35,000-man army could carry no more than a 10-day supply of food when remote from sea transport. Yet, he and his troops marched over thousands of miles at a rate of 19.5 miles in any one day without problem.2 In the process, Alexander conquered every nation and city on which he set his sights. At the most basic level, he was able to perform his legendary feats because he included logistics and supply-chain management into his strategic plans, just as any modem-day corporation should do to maintain a competitive edge.
King Philip had been murdered just before he was preparing to travel to Thebes and Athens to quell threatened rebellions. When Alexander replaced his father as king, he took over the Macedonian army and personally led them in Philip’s place. He timed his departure so the 30-day supply of rations, carried by sea transport, would last until 10 days after harvest at the first destination city. This provided a seamless supply of food and water for his men until the conquered city could provide Alexander’s men with needed additional supplies. (To avoid as much future bloodshed as possible, Alexander completely destroyed Thebes and its inhabitants, helping influence target cities to surrender instead of fight.) This type of planning is consistently found throughout Alexander’s campaigns.
www.proactiongroup.com/news/logisticslessons.pdf (additional citations in source document)
Looks like yes, and yes:
Alexander’s 35,000-man army could carry no more than a 10-day supply of food when remote from sea transport. Yet, he and his troops marched over thousands of miles at a rate of 19.5 miles in any one day without problem.2 In the process, Alexander conquered every nation and city on which he set his sights. At the most basic level, he was able to perform his legendary feats because he included logistics and supply-chain management into his strategic plans, just as any modem-day corporation should do to maintain a competitive edge.
King Philip had been murdered just before he was preparing to travel to Thebes and Athens to quell threatened rebellions. When Alexander replaced his father as king, he took over the Macedonian army and personally led them in Philip’s place. He timed his departure so the 30-day supply of rations, carried by sea transport, would last until 10 days after harvest at the first destination city. This provided a seamless supply of food and water for his men until the conquered city could provide Alexander’s men with needed additional supplies. (To avoid as much future bloodshed as possible, Alexander completely destroyed Thebes and its inhabitants, helping influence target cities to surrender instead of fight.) This type of planning is consistently found throughout Alexander’s campaigns.
www.proactiongroup.com/news/logisticslessons.pdf (additional citations in source document)
Looks like yes, and yes:
Alexander’s 35,000-man army could carry no more than a 10-day supply of food when remote from sea transport. Yet, he and his troops marched over thousands of miles at a rate of 19.5 miles in any one day without problem.2 In the process, Alexander conquered every nation and city on which he set his sights. At the most basic level, he was able to perform his legendary feats because he included logistics and supply-chain management into his strategic plans, just as any modem-day corporation should do to maintain a competitive edge.
King Philip had been murdered just before he was preparing to travel to Thebes and Athens to quell threatened rebellions. When Alexander replaced his father as king, he took over the Macedonian army and personally led them in Philip’s place. He timed his departure so the 30-day supply of rations, carried by sea transport, would last until 10 days after harvest at the first destination city. This provided a seamless supply of food and water for his men until the conquered city could provide Alexander’s men with needed additional supplies. (To avoid as much future bloodshed as possible, Alexander completely destroyed Thebes and its inhabitants, helping influence target cities to surrender instead of fight.) This type of planning is consistently found throughout Alexander’s campaigns.
www.proactiongroup.com/news/logisticslessons.pdf (additional citations in source document)
Looks like yes, and yes:
Alexander’s 35,000-man army could carry no more than a 10-day supply of food when remote from sea transport. Yet, he and his troops marched over thousands of miles at a rate of 19.5 miles in any one day without problem.2 In the process, Alexander conquered every nation and city on which he set his sights. At the most basic level, he was able to perform his legendary feats because he included logistics and supply-chain management into his strategic plans, just as any modem-day corporation should do to maintain a competitive edge.
King Philip had been murdered just before he was preparing to travel to Thebes and Athens to quell threatened rebellions. When Alexander replaced his father as king, he took over the Macedonian army and personally led them in Philip’s place. He timed his departure so the 30-day supply of rations, carried by sea transport, would last until 10 days after harvest at the first destination city. This provided a seamless supply of food and water for his men until the conquered city could provide Alexander’s men with needed additional supplies. (To avoid as much future bloodshed as possible, Alexander completely destroyed Thebes and its inhabitants, helping influence target cities to surrender instead of fight.) This type of planning is consistently found throughout Alexander’s campaigns.
www.proactiongroup.com/news/logisticslessons.pdf (additional citations in source document)