More to be said on this, but you might find this old response to be of interest.

In addition to what u/Georgy_K_Zhukov said, dozens of books written by Russian historians exist that quite thoroughly debunk Suvorov/Rezun's theories, almost line by line, to the point where some of his terms (such as Highway Aggressor, his name for BT series of tanks) became memes in the Russian military history community.

Antisuvorov by Aleksey Isayev is available online for free, I don't know what Google Translate can accomplish here, but you might be able to get the gist of what he's saying. The short summary is this:

In the 1990s, when this book became popular in Russia, it was incredibly difficult to assemble all but the driest information on the pre-war and early war Red Army. Rezun provides many numbers of divisions, dates of formation, names of commanders, etc, overwhelming the reader with information that is factual, but completely irrelevant to his argument. In between those factual statements, he inserts false ones: for instance, the presence of a 186th Rifle Division indicating that there were at least 186 rifle divisions or comparing the number of divisions of various nations and even time periods as though they were equivalent structures. Today these omissions would be noticed quickly. In the 1990s, when Rezun gained his popularity, they would have gone unnoticed by most of his readers.

Rezun makes a lot of effort to point out things that are unusual to the casual observer. For instance: the monstrous T-35 tank, a five-engine bomber, the convertible drive of the BT series. All of these peculiarities are interpreted as uniquely offensive traits. What he glosses over is that the T-35 was completely useless in actual combat, the bomber in question only had five engines because Soviet industry couldn't manage to construct a sufficiently powerful turbocompressor, and the BT series were far from the only convertible drive tank in the world. Rezun plays up technical novelties to inflate the apparent might of the Red Army and glosses over both the negligible impact of those novelties and organizational issues that would prevent them from being used in combat effectively.

Then there are claims that have nothing to do with reality, such as the claim that howitzers and other indirect fire weapons are only useful in offensive battle. Rezun claims that production of anti-tank and AA weapons (useful only on the defensive, according to him) ended right before the war broke out. This is technically true, as the production of the 76 mm AA gun and anti-tank gun did stop. However, it stopped in favour of a new generation of AA guns and AT guns, a fact which Rezun omits.

Playing on dozens of these half-truths and misleading assumptions, Rezun managed to construct a narrative that would seem very convincing among the general anti-Soviet sentiment of the 1990s and lack of access to proper sources, but information commonly available today easily allows his theory to be debunked.