Maybe?

So here's the thing about Napoleon, he fits the Great Man Theory of history because it was constructed around him. As such, the idea of him being a unique individual that built something is based on his actions but conversely he was a product of his social and cultural forces.

Political Napoleon

As such I will try to cover Napoleon in a multitude of ways. First we must look at Napoleon as a politician. One thing that is frequently discussed is his "thuggish" style but it evolves over time. At first, Napoleon stared not as a Monarchist but a die hard Corsican Nationalist that slowly was pushed aside for perceived French leanings of Napoleon and a strong connection to France through his family by Paoli. He over time becomes a devout Jacobin, although his devotion is questionable as he did view the violence at the Tulleries in 1792 as questionable and was ready to ditch his Jacobin politics after the Thermidorian Reaction.

From 1974 on, Napoleon acted as a pragmatist. Deftly he handled the Italian republics and kingdoms into a larger Italian Republic that would become an Italian Kingdom upon becoming Emperor. From dealing with Revolutionaries to the Church, Napoleon acts as a pragmatist and works on dealing fair and equal deals in the years of his Consulship. However things start going down hill as he starts building more enemies that want to tear down the moderated Revolution.

Placing family on thrones or creating plans to "defeat" Britain through economics, Napoleon slowly loses his grip. He becomes forceful in his diplomacy, demanding massive reparations and territory shifts to France and her allies to the defeated. Napoleon pushes the Allies to his eventual destruction.

Napoleon in Society

While Napoleon pushed in politics, he also pushed his own social agenda. One thing that Roberts does push that I would argue isn't pushed enough is his misogynistic tendencies. For Napoleon, women were meant to be at home and tending to their families, only good for bearing children and raising them. Part of this is his old, country ways, something that British authors often assert for his "country bumpkin" air (something I would contest but morals doesn't attach themselves to intelligence, the two are separate quantities). Worse the rights of women were severely limited under the Napoleonic Code, with rights being placed with the father or husband. Napoleon didn't trust women in the public sphere, with major individuals such as the Madame de Stael being a major center of intellectual (and therefore Revolutionary) discussion. Napoleon wanted to cut this to preserve the order.

How this all ties together

Now, I gave you context about Napoleon because it's important to set it up. Napoleon is clearly a product of his upbringing in Corsica. He was hopelessly devoted to his mother and held her as a shining example of women. Further he grew into what he became, he didn't pop out as a romantic figure that would have conquered the world, rather Napoleon had to grow into his life.

Further he grows into his downfall. His Continental System shows his ignorance of economics as well as his ignorance of how it fits into the grander socio-political systems of the Early Modern Era. Worse he pushes his defeated enemies into his own defeat.

Why Napoleon isn't the Great Man

All of this work he does, all of his romantic power comes not from him but the fact that he is able to direct the work of others.

The Code Napoleon is the foundation of modern secular law. With his name, it would be presumed that Napoleon sat down and wrote a series of laws as thick as my thigh but rather it was a committee set up by Napoleon but led day to day by Cambaceres, one of the other Consuls that Napoleon placed. At times Napoleon would come in and make a decision or guide the committee but overall it was written by Cambaceres, so it is hardly fair to give Napoleon the full credit.

His own Empire isn't the work of just Napoleon but the numerous members that pull together. Henri Clarke serves not just as a general but as the Minister of War that pulls the logistics that allowed Napoleon to wage war from Spain to Russia. Louis-Alexandre Berthier allows Napoleon to pull the strategic impossible and wage a lighting war that defeats larger and more static armies. The Marshalate and numerous generals and soldiers give Napoleon the victory that he couldn't win with any other army; they fought for him and won him victory, he didn't give it to them instantly.

The Napoleonic Era isn't just Napoleon coming around and announcing victory, countless people fight and work for it. Napoleon's greatest efforts to create a new Empire was the creation of a new nobility. Unlike the nobility of the Ancien Regime that was based on the land and on birth, Napoleon created a nobility based on merit; those whom fight and work hard will find themselves with rank. Napoleon gave rank to those that deserved it (as well as to reward people that has done good by him), placing it on mayors or artists, not just brave men.

If anything, the nobility that Napoleon created proves that the Great Man idea is false. It's about proving the merit of not the head of state but those who contribute to the greatness of France. If anything, that's the little man (sure they're great and famous people, from Davout to David (who was a commander of the Legion D'honneur) but others that aren't normally great men).

Of course there is a larger issue of how women play into this but Napoleon did actively work to ensure that women were silenced or pushed away. Ironically Napoleon's wives were far better rulers and influences than him; Josephine set standards for fashion and culture while Marie-Louise was a fine organizer of state.

Is this rant ending?

Yes it is!

I've never been a fan of the Great Man theory. It denies agency to others that deserve it. Without Cambaceres, Napoleon wouldn't have made his legal code; without Davout Napoleon wouldn't have had a rock to lean on; without Clarke, there wouldn't be soldiers to fight on; without Berthier, his armies would be scattered to the wind and lost. Napoleon depended on people, he would have been nothing without others.

Hello there. Currently, Historians of the Wars of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars are influenced heavily by the Annales School of historiography. This school of thought emerged in France in the late 1920s from the history journal Annales d’historie economique et soicale and was in response to the micro-history of the time, which also focused heavily on socioeconomic history. What emerged was a ‘total history’ which aimed to embrace all the social sciences and looked to focus on the sociocultural make up of history. Led by two wonderful French historians in Lucien Fevbre (16th century expert) and Marc Bloch ( a specialist of the Middle Ages) they concentrated on the synthesis of patterns one can identify from social, economic and cultural history.

This school of thought has transformed the research of the Napoleonic Wars from drums and bugles, to a wider examination of the period as eloquently explained in a wonderful tome of a book called “Warfare in Europe 1792-1815” edited by Frederick C. Schneid. Schneid has compiled journal articles from historians who have attempted to answer your very question and do so by examining all the contributing influences from as far back as 1718. This tome attempts to put forth the societal and cultural forces of the time as the influencing factor over the individual qualities of 'Great Men'. Indeed, many of the men who contributed to this body of work; Hochedlinger, Black, Leggiere and certainly Esdaile from the University of Liverpool, would dismiss much of Robert’s historical assumptions. Certainly Alan Skeed, a wonderful Habsburg historian, doesn’t think much of Roberts and his narrative history. He once wonderfully stated ‘Indeed, I can think of at least one historian who has apparently spent a lifetime writing on Napoleon but who seems to have no idea why he was defeated.’ Even so, That book is a needed attempt at rebalancing British ideas of the Napoleonic Wars and of the continent during that time. I would also encourage you to search out the BBC 4 “In our time” podcast on Napoleon and Wellington where Esdaile categorically rejects Robert’s assumption of Prussian nationalism contributing to the defeat of Bonaparte in 1813. Unfortunately, it was at the very end of the show and Esdaile had little time to elaborate.

To directly answer your question, Napoleon was a product of his time and was just as much a tool for others as others were for him. This is the nature of human interaction and existence. We are all a product of our time. Though, this may be a statement best left to a philosopher to dismantle. In any case, Napoleon’s meteoric rise was as much a testament of his fighting qualities, especially against the cumbersomely handled Habsburg armies of 1796 and 1797, as well as the opportunistic politics of the day. Was Bonaparte any different to the other Revolutionary generals of the age? Massena was just as good, Jourdan a competent commander, Desaix the real hero of Marengo. Bonaparte remember, was ably supported by his whip smart and pro-revolutionary brother Lucien, who probably had more to do with Napoleon elected as consol than Napoleon himself. For me, it is this family connection, as well as Napoleon’s marriage to Josephine, which enabled him to navigate the politics of the day, where other military leaders just didn’t much care. If the Revolution did not happen, Bonaparte would have spent much of his time laying guns in fortresses as a minor battery commander.

But of course it did happen, yet the conflicts which raged across Europe had more to do with the extension of the eighteenth century realpolitik and less to do with Imperial views of Bonaparte. If you step back and start researching the real motives of the continental coalition parties and Britain, they were all more or less wanting to extend their ‘sphere of influence’ at the expense of France, who had been the enemy for most of the coalition countries for nigh on three hundred years. Many of the histories written before the end of the cold war and ready access to archives on the continent, took a post 1815 view of the conflict, but if you examine European war say from the Treaty of Westphalia – war was constant and was an intrinsic part of the social, political, and cultural fabric of the time. What German Monarch in their right mind would want to immediately reinstate a dynasty which had looked to control the diplomacy of central Europe? It is a fallacy and one used by much of early 20th century English written history.

Still, Napoleon’s reaction to Britain’s disdain for the Treaty of Amien was unprecedented, as such overt signs of aggression were rarely so advertise. It was this lack of diplomatic finesse and Britain’s stubborn refusal to cede Malta, which led to the Napoleonic Wars. Though the war party in Vienna has much to answer as well. Thugut, Colleredo, Cobenzl and Stadion all bear responsibility for war in Europe, as does Pitt the Younger.

In conclusion, without the actions of other parties in Europe, Napoleon would not have had the ability to showcase his unique characteristics. There is also no doubt that he was a wonderful strategist, but without the skills of Marshalls such as Davoust, Massena, Lannes and the individual skills of many of the French officer corps, the extent of Imperial France’s influence would not have stretched to Warsaw by 1809. There is also a good chance the Confederation of the Rhine would have fragmented along Habsburg and Prussian lines much sooner if the Wars of the Fifth Coalition had have gone Stadion’s way, leaving much of Napoleon’s work undone. At home, Napoleon was also supported by Fouche, Talleyrand and his extended family – all of which provided him far greater support then he would have admitted. I would also argue that even greater political animals existed before Thermidor, but all of them were swept away by factors outside their influence. Just as Napoleon benefited from events he could not control.

This is a pretty big question and you have raised some interesting points of interpretation. This may take a few back and forths if you are interested. Thank you.

Warfare in Europe 1792-1815 / edited by Frederick C. Schneid

Who's afraid of the French Revolution? Austrian foreign policy and the European crisis, 1787-1797 / Michael Hochedlinger German History. Aug2003, Vol. 21 Issue 3, p293-318. 26p.

The origins, causes and extensions of the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon / Gunther E. Rothenburg – The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 4/1/1988, Vol. 18, Issue 4, p. 771-793

The collapse of the second coalition / Paul W. Schroeder The Journal of Modern History, 6/1/1987, Vol. 59, Issue 2, p. 244-290

The Annales school : critical assessments / edited by Stuart Clark. London : Routledge, 1999

Austria, Prussia, and the Wars of Liberation, 1813–1814, Alan Sked, Austrian History Yearbook, 2014.

Edit: Inability to write.