I'm no expert on this subject, but I have read extensively on it, and I consider David Glantz and Jonathan House's When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler to be a well researched and nearly authoritative study of the war from the Soviet perspective. These researchers were granted nearly unlimited access to Soviet Military archives after the fall of the USSR, and used it to craft an unparalleled (at the time) narrative of the Soviet's "Great Patriotic War" from the Russian perspective. Sorry in advance for the wall of text.

Although some of the claims made by this article can be seen as a new interpretation of known history, "6) It was the Arctic cold that halted the German offensive"; and "8) The Soviet partisans" can be questioned.

6. It would be shortsighted to dismiss the German failure at the gates of Moscow to merely the interference of the cold in the first place, the Wehrmacht was suffering from sever shortages of fuel, equipment, ammunition, victuals and winter clothing after having been worn down (particular the junior officer ranks) over the previous five months of campaigning, while the Russians were able to concentrate their forces in advance of the German attack on a narrow frontage, and had the psychological advantage of fighting in front of the capitol and protecting the government itself from the invader. The author's claim that fighting in minus 38 degree weather being mitigated by a sudden thaw and rain which brought it up to between 0 and minus 5 isn't indicative in my mind: fighting in that kind of weather is still incredibly difficult.

7. The assertion that the Soviet Partisans were not an effective force as militants behind German lines feels disingenuous to me: during the first 18 months there was little attempt to properly arm and organize Soviet Partisans due to the lack of weapons and leaders to spare from the field armies, and if the Soviet leadership expected to win the war (which following the German failure in front on Moscow they decidedly did) they would have had little concern about whether the control of armed bands harassing the Germans presenting an real threat to their power. If, in fact, the orders from the politburo to individual partisan bands (such as could have gotten through) had been to try and reestablish party control its the first I'm hearing of it - more likely it is a misrepresentation of Moscow's inability to control bands of partisans operating outside communist ideology, notably Ukrainian partisans that favored neither the Germans nor the Russians, but Ukrainian independence.

A further two claims are, in my opinion and based on my reading, misleading: "3) Master spy Sorge contributed to the alleged relocation of the Soviet Far East armies that are supposed to have saved Moscow"; and "4) The wearing down of the Wehrmacht through relentless Soviet counter-attacks."

3. The statement by Sorge is accurate, despite the spy's advice that the Japanese intended to force a conclusion of the war in China, and to appropriation the raw materials and resources from the Imperial Powers in the Far East in order to prosecute that war, and to deny the Western Allies the ability to intervene (both correct, and showing a clear understanding of Japanese priorities and strategic thinking). However, while the author's claims that a mere 8 Eastern divisions were relocated to the Moscow Sector is accurate, it is misleading. Approximately half of the far eastern ground forces, nearly all mechanized units and all aircraft were transferred to the Western Front (which stretched from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea) starting as Early as late July (I don't have good numbers in front of me as my book is in the bedroom where my wife's asleep right now. Sorry, if anyone would like me to get more specific, ask and I'll try to tomorrow). The story of the Siberian Divisions saving Moscow in December is a myth, but significant forces were transferred from the East during the first 6 months of war.

4. The Soviets did counterattack. Often. Just as often they were unsuccessful due to the poor organization, training, leadership and lack of communication. The Soviet High Command prior to the commencement of hostilities thought that Hitler would target the Ukraine's rich farmland and the Donbas' coal while securing the Black Sea coast in order to more easily access the oil of the Caucasus and Middle East (predictions that proved in the end prescient), and so deployed the majority of the mechanized forces and equipment toward the southern end of the front. The Germans initially attacked north of the Pripyat marshes and caught the Soviets off balance, making deep advances into northern Russian along the Minsk-Smolensk-Moscow axis. Although Soviet command and control broke down almost immediately, the southern advance of the Germans was repeatedly held up by armored and mechanized attacks undertaken by local commanders acting essentially independently, and without any semblance of coordination. The Germans proved time and again capable of overcoming these assaults, but eventually a massive salient jutted eastward to the north of the Ukraine and Kiev. Hitler ordered it enveloped, suspended the advance on Moscow, caused more wear on his Panzer forces, and succeeded in encircling the largest body of troops in history, but also ensured the Wehrmacht's eventual inability to capture Moscow in 1941.

The last one I'll address (if anyone is even still reading this far down) is "5) The vast numerical superiority enjoyed by the Soviets."

5. This is just plain wrong, and betrays either an agenda on the part of the author, a complete lack of understanding of Soviet force structure, or both.

I'm going to do a quick down and dirty on Soviet force organization because its important to the point: the Soviet organization of platoons, companies, battalions, regiment and brigades are similar in fighting strength with Western standards excepting all but the most rudimentary (that is, prior to 1943) of support units, and were supplied with replacements for casualties only when being prepared for an attack. Soviet divisions were roughly 10,000 men at full strength as opposed to 12,000 to 15,000 men for a full strength western division. Because the purges had left Soviet commanders with so few experienced senior leaders, and the chaos of the invasion and disorganization of the force, the corps echelon was eliminated almost immediately after the invasion. Now Army commanders commanded from 3-5 undersized divisions directly, and were therefore equivalent to a western Corps minus the support elements found in nearly all other contemporary armed forces. These "Armies" were then grouped together as "Fronts" (Soviet for Army Group) of which about 7 were formed before the end of June from the military districts they were named for and were fighting on the front lines. These "Fronts" were equivalent to an understrength German Army with poor support, and faced 7 German Armies (usually 3 corps each, so 21), 4 Panzer groups (2-3 Panzer Corps) and a Romanian Army, which they opposed with 20 Soviet "Armies". So, it is true that the Western Front was outnumbered 2:1 in men by Army Group Center (2 armies and 2 panzergruppes), but it is as irrelevant as the true scope of Soviet front line troop strength as comparing a German Corps to the Front it faced. It wasn't equivalent.

Behind these fronts (which were initially outnumbered by the German invaders), Soviet Command set up several more military districts that could deploy as Fronts, and allocated their armored formations in strategic reserve for counterattacks. By the end of 1941 the Soviets had fielded a further 30 or so armies, and added another 5 fronts, so despite losing nearly two million in casualties (mostly POWs) the ill-armed and poorly led Soviet force increased during this time, and was never to be outnumbered by the Germans again. Once production got onto a war footing, and could properly equip this force, the war was a matter of time.

In my opinion, a lot of this guy's claims don't stand up.