Just looking at Bismarck since it is sort of unfair to critique the fighting qualities of a warship that spent its career at anchor like the Tirpitz.

In general we can say a few things about her and her faults, and uses.

1. Is that no matter what, since the idea of Guerre de Course(commerce raiding essentially) has been formalized, raiders have 3 fates. Either they are sunk. Captured or forcibly interned in a neutral port. Or somehow make it back to a friendly port. When speaking of actual warships, and German attempts in particular, the first 2 are vastly more common fates.

But Germany of course in 1941 thinks they might have an answer! Having finally gained a few Atlantic Ports in France a few fast ships might make it out and raise hell, then run back without having to deal too much with the RAF and RN. And the cruise in the Spring of 1941 by the Scharnhorsts had been marginally successful sinking about 2 dozen transports, but twice withdrawing in the presence of escorts.

So getting an even more capable ship into the Atlantic could do even more harm, and raise the possibility of an actual German Battle Squadron operating in company. Or spreading so wide as to stretch the RN to its breaking point trying to protect everything everywhere.

So that was the general idea that sent a battleship and a heavy cruiser sailing into the backyard of what was still in May 1941 the largest Navy on Earth. And the problem with bringing more escorts was 2 fold. 1 is that Germany had lost most of her destroyers previously trying to take Norway. And escorts increased the need for fuel, which either limited cruise length, or increased reliance on prepositioned disguised support ships, or both. While the Germans never had an abundance of surface ships to begin with.

So then we ought to consider the ships themselves. And several things do jump out. One of them to look at is her secondary armament. Others include her being badly overbuilt, armored for a short to medium range knife fight in the North Sea despite knowledge of the ever expanding distances of naval gunnery.

It would be wrong to call her the best Battleship ever, or the best battleship built in Europe, or even the best battleship built by Germany, in most respects I would point to the Bayern class as the height of German attempts.

The fact is that her designers were above all worried about protecting a ship that might not have many escorts(as Plan Z was by no means assured and a long process) from light destroyer or torpedo attacks. That called for a solid secondary armament, and her designers provided that with 6 dual mounts of 15cm guns that were essentially copies of what was being used on German cruisers. But these were just single purpose guns. They couldn't be used against aircraft. meaning more guns had to be installed for that purpose which primarily involved 8 dual mounts of 10.5cm guns, which were just ok weapons, but their fields of fire were not universal. We can compare that with the North Carolina class designed shortly after who would have 10 dual mounts of the excellent 5"/38 guns. Which were both very effective dual purpose guns, and would be used on just about every class of warship the US built from 1935 on.

Both classes then had just a smattering of smaller guns .50 cals, 20mm cannons, 1.1in mounts, and 37mm guns. However by late war standards every battleship everywhere was woefully lacking in AA.

And that is the crux of it. In 1941 though many admirals remained skeptical, a small surface squadron of large warships, without air cover was a sitting duck. Even if an attack did not sink an enemy it could wound him and delay long enough for the kill to be completed by others. It was thought that between AA and maneuvering that any attack could be spoiled sufficiently, and that a large high speed warship was safe in the open sea.

Thus while a lucky hit might have scrapped Lutjens plans to continue raiding after the Denmark Straight, it was the torpedo hit to the rudder(protection of propulsion and steering has always been a challenge and not one there is a good answer for) that doomed him. A ship that cannot maneuver is asking to be cornered. And with every major surface ship of the RN sailing to stop her the Bismarck was dead, just a matter of finding the time. Had the rudder and maneuverability been more properly restored, and had the RN not had working search radar it is possible she could have escaped, or just prolonged the chase, dragging other German ships down with her trying to effect a rescue.

The Royal navy would get their own harsh lesson in this. Just a few days after pearl Harbor, of the coats of Malay, a British squadron would be attacked by several dozen long ranged Japanese bombers. The Battlecruiser Repulse and BB Prince of Wales would both be sunk, and the 4 escorting destroyers left to pick up the survivors.

Until adjustments, like the massive upgrades in AA armament, fire control, and escort practices. And the final appreciation of the need for aircraft on scene, any surface ship was vulnerable. The USN, RN, and partly the IJN could make those adjustments. Germany was never in a position to.

Was there a design flaw? Did the German fleet provide inadequate support fleets which left them on their own? Was the era the end of the battleship and beginning of the aircraft carrier which resulted in the best battleships being obsolete?

Basically, the answer to all these questions is yes. The Bismarck design was based on out-of-date theories of naval warfare, with manufacturing and design flaws. They were not, and arguably could never be escorted to a level necessary to protect them against all threats. They were constructed at a time when naval air power was beginning to exert its supremacy. Finally, they were going up against a power that could afford to (and needed to) bring overwhelming force to bear on them.

The Bismarck class was essentially a modernisation of the WW1-era Bayern class design, bringing their propulsion and armour layout up to modern standards. However, the armour layout was strongly flawed. It was excellent at keeping shells out of her machinery spaces and magazines. This would be advantageous in a close-range engagement in the North Sea. However, the trend in the inter-war period had been towards longer-range engagements. Flooding was also considered to be a bigger threat than direct penetrations of the ship's vitals. The armour of the Bismarck class was flawed against both of these threats. At long ranges, her layered deck armour could easily be penetrated by shells, especially since the outermost layers could change the trajectory of shells passing though it to those that were preferable for penetrating the lower layers. Her layered belt was also a disadvantage - shells exploding between the outer decapping belt and the main belt could open up massive holes for flooding. Her angled main belt seriously reduced her reserve buoyancy, making her much easier to sink through flooding than her competitors. These last two flaws were a large part of Bismarck's sinking in 1941. There were also issues with the design and construction of their sterns. The long, graceful stern of the class was supported mainly by the ship, not by the water. This meant that if it was hit by a torpedo, the resulting whipping would cause the stern to collapse. This was a recurring issue with German ships, and was exacerbated by poor welding. Finally, the ships had an insufficient AA armament, though this was common to battleships of this era.

I've gone over the issues with escorting Bismarck here. Tirpitz was well protected by the Luftwaffe in her fjord, but could still have received more protection against British attacks. The lack of escorts meant that these ships were consistently vulnerable to aircraft and submarines, as well as torpedo attacks by smaller ships. However, neither ship could really receive the necessary protection, due to a lack of available ships, and due to the incompatibility with escorting destroyers and the raiding role.

Both losses really demonstrate the amount of firepower the RN and RAF could bring to bear on the outnumbered German Navy. Over the course of her career, Bismarck had to face four battleships, four cruisers, two carriers and eight destroyers (not counting the ships that were en route to engage her). Tirpitz was attacked eight times by British aircraft - five times by carrier aircraft and three by Lancasters. She was also attacked by midget submarines. When a ship faces firepower this overwhelming, it is difficult for it to do much else than sink.

This is excellent work! I'd ask though, of all of you here, /u/DBHT14, /u/thefourthmaninaboat, and /u/jschooltiger, can you contribute to a bibliography on this topic? What are the main secondary (or primary?) works on this?