So the question I would think every historian studying the British role in WWII has to deal with...

Montgomery... Quite the contentious commander when it comes to views on him. How do you evaluate his reputation and legacy?

Hi Gary, and thanks for doing this AMA. Although I must confess I haven't read "Mettle and Pasture" yet, I will say that I love those microhistories that follow the fate of a single unit through the war. So what exactly drew you to the 2 Lincolnshire specifically, and in comparing them to the larger experience of the British Army as a whole during the War, do you feel that there is any quality or aspect to them that makes them standout uniquely?

How closely were Allied planners paying attention to the marine landings in the Pacific when preparing for Operation Overlord? Did they learn any lessons from them, or were conditions deemed too different?

I am sorry for my questions but I do not know much about the Western Front in the Second World War, hopefully my many questions won't be too much of a headache.

I remember reading that the Axis forces were tricked into believing the main allied invasion was going to be in Calais and as a result they focused most of their reinforcements defending it. If they Axis focused all their resources on Normandy like they did in Calais would it be possible for the allies to still be able complete the invasion successfully?

I also remember reading that the bulk of the defenders of the Atlantic wall were mainly Eastern European POW's while the main experienced Axis troops were in Calais. Did the Eastern Europeans surrender immediately to allied forces? And how were the treated under captivity?

Now for my last question, what happened the bulk of the Axis defenders in Calais? Did they see any major action later in the war after the invasion of Normandy?

Thanks!

Hi Mr. Weight.

In discussions on Reddit (not this sub...I'm not a historian), I often have to contend with iterations of this general assertion: the Soviets basically won the war and the Western Front was small potatoes by comparison. In a recent case, a user claimed it was "strategically insignificant" to the broader war. In my view, this is obviously wrong.

Am I wrong? If not, what do you think is the most direct and potent rebuttal of that argument? Or is this question so pants-on-head ridiculous that it doesn't merit a serious answer?

Thanks for your time!

Hello, thanks for doing this AMA. :D

Firstly, sorry for my bad english :P I am not a native speaker.

Its a huge coincidence, in fact. I recently made (with a partner) and am publishing in september a small research (almost nothing new, but i am still a student :D) about "La nueve": La 9e compagnie de la 9e division blindée which role in the liberation of Paris you surely know. The research was a revision of the sources with a critical view: why 'foreign ("volunteer") armies' role wasn't specially considered by historiography until really recently.

When I was working on it, this topic came relevant: Acording to numerous sources, the british commanders were originally not in favor of liberating Paris, as it would be a kind of unnecesary detour from some of the most important objectives in the occupied France.

Which would you say were the main reasons that made it to change their opinion? De Gaulle stood up for it "because it would be not only a military win but also a morale boost" and some other reasons. I already have some sort of answer, but, given your expertise, I am really curious about your insight. Or maybe i am completely wrong, that could be really possible :D

Hello! This might be a pretty generic question for an expert but I have enjoyed the book Is Paris Burning?/Paris brule-t-il? a lot, and I was wondering if you could recommend books about the War in a similar vein? Especially in the west, obviously. The book felt so much "alive", for a lack of a better word, it was just so "readable", you know? All the while teaching me about history.

Hi

Can you provide any insight into cooperation between UK/US/Canada and the non Anglo-Saxon elements of the Allied armies. I'm mainly thinking of the Poles and the French.

I thought about this when reading the Wikipedia entry on the Polish 1st Armoured Division. It mentions the language barier as a significant issue and the fact it suffered from two significant episodes of friendly fire during Operation Totalize. Do you know whether this was any more of an issue when compared to English speaking units?

In Poland, the 1st and 2nd Army Corps are treated with much reverence for their heroism, but I'm curious what is the perception among Western historians when it comes to coordinating a multi-national, multi-lingual force. Especially since in modern NATO armies, fluency in English is a necessity for career advancement.

Do we know what % of combat units in the Western theatre were non-English speakers and what impact, if any, did this have on Allied planning?

Well that's just great, another book to add to my reading list! ;)

Within the context of the campaign in NW Europe during the Second World War a lot of focus is on the American struggle in the bocage and subsequent breakout and pursuit across France. Comparatively less emphasis is placed on the fighting at the Eastern end of the bridgehead and the progress through Belgium and the Low Countries. It's great to see a book that touches that experience. (Feel free to expand on that theme if you would like)

Anyway, here's a question... From the initial battles in Normandy to the Crossing of Rhine how did small unit and combined arms tactics evolve within 21st Army Group?

I already made a question, but kind of have another one. Feel free to ignore it, if you dont have much time. (I asked about the Liberation of France).

In the same topic: Why would you say Von Choltitz didnt accept Hitler's order of destroying Paris? Because he knew they would lose the war and he didnt want to get punished? Because he didnt wanted?

Thanks for the ama

I saw [a talk at the weekend] (https://programme.cvhf.org.uk/speaker/gunter-halm/) with Günter Halm, who was captured at Falaise, and on your website you say the [Falaise Pocket tour] (http://www.pegasusbattlefieldtours.com/FalaisePocket1DayTour.html) is without doubt your favourite; is that to do with the area as it is today, the significance of action there, the combination/contrast of the two, or something else?

Was there a a noticeable difference between how the Commonwealth forces waged war, and how the Americans did, after the landings? On any level, tactical/operational/strategic, but preferably the smaller, the better.

I mean, for example, I am aware of the slightly different approaches to automatic weaponry/machine guns with the US troops not having a proper squad MG in the same way many other combatants did, but I'm interested in other and perhaps even much more pronounced doctrinal/equipment/etc. differences.

Would, I dunno, CW forces wade through the hedgerows differently than the Americans? Was there something a Canadian battalion would do on a battlefield that the Americans wouldn't or vice versa? Did they have wildly different takes on calling down artillery? Things like that.

Now those are just random thoughts that popped into my head, not the questions I hope to get answered – I'm more interested in what (if any) big or peculiar differences there might have been.

Thank you for this AMA. I'm actually planning my first trip to Normandy.

Do YOU have a most interesting or personal favorite factoid or irony of the Normandy campaign you'd like to share?

My only question, and one that I've only just thought of, is why were the US Marines not tasked with any part of the largest amphibious landing in history? Granted they were busy in the Pacific, but the larger question is why were there no US Marines in the western hemisphere of fighting?

I know that I'm very late to the game, but I just wanted to thank you Mr. Weight for the AMA. I enjoyed reading your responses.

How contentious was the proposed date of the invasion when it was discussed at the Trident Conference? A year seems like an awfully long time to keep a secret on the magnitude of Operation Overlord. Also, were there major concerns that the Eastern Front would fall apart in that span of time without any relief from the Allies in the West?

Hi there, looking at your site got me wondering, what kind of folks usually book your tours? That is if there is a particularly usual kind at all! Have you had some very surprising customers? I'm thinking German veterans maybe or something unexpected like that.

When Hitler found out about the landings he said something to the effect of 'now I have them where I want them'. What would the result be of the destruction of the invasion force in your opinion, and how close did the allies come to defeat?

I was listening to an audiobook of Churchill's history of WWII and in one section he discusses the relative of merits of an invasion of the south coast of France as opposed to the cross-channel invasion. I was then kind of surprised to hear about Operation Anvil/Dragoon as I had never heard of it.

By Churchill's telling, it was basically a waste of time.

Did the invasion of the south of France have any strategic value on what was going on in Normandy at the time?

In a management book I have read "Krijgen is een kunst", (Dutch) for War is an art, they make the statement that because of the different command styles the casualty difference between the Germans and the allies was 2 on 3. So for every 2 German casualties there were 3 allied casualties and that they kept this up to almost the end of the war except the last few months.

The idea behind this is that the allies used the Anglo-American, detailed, top down command and control command style (by the book) and the Germans used the Auftragstaktiek. This supposedly gave the Germans more flexibility to adjust to battlefield conditions and events. Do you recognize this statement?

Hello again, and thank you for answering my earlier question. What proportion of the axis forces in Normandy were eastern front veterans, and how many of the allied troops were green?

How many tank destroyers were deployed in Normandy, and how effective were they in the first month, before the break out?

Put another way, what prevented German armoured counter-attacks from being successful.

What were the British doing on the Western Front during the winter of 1944-1945? Just watching the line while the Battle of the Bulge played out?