What you are missing then is the middle step, the Rainbow Plans.

In the years just before the war it was becoming clearer that a 2 Ocean war was likely. So the Army and Navy came together to look at their options. Which gave a series of 5 options. Most centered around securing the Hemisphere first, and alternative numbers of allies, then including elements of Orange. And option 5 provided the US with allies, and a Europe first effort.

But coming on the heels of this was a memo by Admiral Stark, the CNO, known as the Plan Dog Memo, which confirmed US preference for Europe first by the end of 1940. And was reaffirmed in early pre war talks with UK leaders.

But that doesn't mean Orange was scrapped. Conversely it in large part was used verbatim. All the USN leadership in key planning roles, Nimitz, King, Spruance, Kelly Turner, and even the likes of Fletcher and Halsey, had studied and grown up with the plan and its evolution.

The idea of not fighting to save the Philippines or forward islands, of falling back essentially to Hawaii until ready and protecting the sea line to Australia were all fundamentally provided for in versions of the plan. Additionally at its core the buildup of a massive, mobile, forward sustained amphibious force and battle fleet were spot on. So was the key need of seizing islands in the Mandate of the Marshalls and Caroline islands. Virtually the only thing they got wrong was that the Naval balance of power was decided well before the island hopping was completed.