Hello! Just a few questions about Britain in 1914 and 1940 especially after watching "The Pity of War" on Netflix:
^ these answers I've given in the past should be pertinent, particularly with regards to Niall Ferguson's views on WWI (The Pity of War is based off his book).
Was there an awareness in the British government that while they may well be able to beat Germany and Austria Hungary when combined with France and Russia that a fatal blow to their position of a world power may be struck?
The initial expectations were that the main British effort would be via the Blockade, and that the British Expeditionary Force would largely play a supporting role on the Western Front until the 'Kitchener Armies' had been fully mobilized, trained and adequately equipped. Ultimately these proved optimistic, as the British Blockade only really began to bite in late 1916, while the BEF was forced into a major effort in the Somme Offensive of 1916. There were those such as Lord Derby and Chancellor of the Exchequer Reginald McKenna who thought that the British should hold back on committing to their own army, and focus on supporting their allies logistically and financially. While these were certainly influenced by a wish to maintain Britain's position as a world power, the need to check the threat of Imperial Germany to that very position of power ultimately required more substantial British involvement, as was the case from the Somme onwards.
That being said, I'm aware of Ferguson's position, and it is flawed in a number of ways. First and foremost, organizations such as Sinn Fein, the ANC in South Africa and the INC in India, and the push within the Dominions for greater autonomy, makes clear that the British Empire could not simply have been maintained indefinitely by staying out of WWI. Moreover, Ferguson greatly downplays the threat posed by Imperial Germany, particularly in depicting Mitteleuropa as simple a proto-EU (I've discussed the issue with that in a number of posts, on my profile page). Moreover, even with the financial setbacks of the war, Britain remained a formidable power. It's Navy was still a force to be reckoned with, it's Empire was enlarged by the war with valuable mandates in the Middle East, it played a leading role in the peace process and was a founding member of the League of Nations.
As for the Second World War, it's doubtful that many could have foreseen the collapse of Britain's continental strategy with France in 1940. Following the Fall of France, it did become apparent as the war went on that Britain's decline was to continue for the foreseeable future, especially with the 'Bases for Boats' deal and the Lend-Lease Programme between Britain and the US. This in part explains the importance of NATO to British policy makers, as it promised to keep an American presence in Europe to offset the Soviets and any potentially resurgent Germany. It has been suggested, notably by Corelli Barnett, that Britain might have pursued a more 'fabian' strategy that would have left them better off after the war. In response, I think Max Hastings has it right:
No honourable course of action existed which could have averted his nation's bankruptcy and exhaustion in 1945, nor it's eclipse from world power amid the new primacy of the United States and Russia.