The Russian defeat was caused by several factors. The first, and probably the most important, was the vast distance involved for the Russian army. Russia was, and in many ways still is, defined by its European holdings. At the turn of the last century, the cities west of the Urals were the largest industrial and manpower centers in Imperial Russia, and much of the Army was based there. Then there was their bases along the Pacific ocean, which were garrisoned with some troops. But there was only a tenuous connection between East and West, namely the Trans-Siberian Railroad, a narrow ribbon of steel connecting East and West. In addition, ships could make the multi-thousand mile journey from Ports along the Baltic ocean, around Spain, through the Mediterranean, around India, then up to the Russian bases of Port Arthur and Vladivostok. But even this route was made more complicated when the British closed off the Suez Canal to the Russians and forced them to sail all the way around the Cape of Africa to get to Asia. All this meant that food, weapons, ammunition, and most importantly reinforcements, could never reach the battlefield in an efficient manner. The Japanese controlled the sea lanes around the Russian bases, and the Trans-Siberian was simply too restrictive to move a lot of supplies across.

Second, was the Japanese use of a surprise attack to paralyze the Russian's initial reaction. The Japanese main fleet moved against the Russian base at Port Arthur, where their fleet was, and in a bold nighttime attack heavily damaged most of the Russian fleet, including its most powerful battleships. Now, while the Russian fleet was certainly not beaten (proved by the surface engagement the following day, in which the Japanese were forced to withdraw) Russian high command was paralyzed, and saw the possibility for attacks at every turn. Rathern than sortie out and and challenge the Japanese fleet, and perhaps even sever the troop convoys which were landing forces in Manchuria, the Russian navy sat in Port Arthur until its fall.

Finally, the Japanese simply outfought their Russian counterparts. Even without the aforementioned defects, Russia's generals were cautious in the extreme, unwilling to take risks, and in many cases simply unable to execute their superiors commands. Especially during the land war, and at Mukden, the Japanese were able to get into advanced positions relatively unchallenged and then launch extremely bloody attacks which bewildered the Russian High Command and sowed confusion in the lower ranks. Again and again, the Japanese took heavy losses, but were able to drive the Russian armies from the field. And then remember that Japan, who had a short supply line through Korea to the home islands, was able to replenish their losses while the Russians were simply unable to meet their needs.

All this culminated in, and is exemplified by, the Battle of the Straits of Tsushima. By the time the Russian navy has sailed around Africa to reach the theater, most of the fighting was already done. The only major port left in Russian hands was that of Vladivostok, on the far side of Japan. Furthermore, the Russian ships were fouled, their engines clogged, and their crews tired. The Japanese admiral Togo, who had commanded the battles outside of Port Arthur, was one of the only admirals in the world with actual experience in battleship warfare. He used this experience, as well as the physical superiority of his ships, to outmaneuver the Russian fleet, engage it on his terms, and then "cross its T" several times, absolutely decimating it.

By the time that news reached Europe of the Russian's defeat at Tsushima, the Tsar was facing unrest at home (the lead up to the Revolution of 1905) and unrest amongst her allies. Peace became the only way for Tsar Nicholas to regain control over Russia.

A good book to read on the war is Tide at Sunrise. Its long, but its one of the few books Ive ever seen on the subject, and certainly the only one that Ive liked. It also has a wonderful photograph of the Russian supply depot for Port Arthur just before the war. The photograph was of the vodka reserve which was, I kid you not, a literal mountain of crates filled with alcohol. I consider that worth the price of admission alone.