I am sorry if thas has been asked before, my search has been fruitless.
I can't wrap my mind around the commander's rationale of sending troops into certain death over, and over, and over again. From what I understand about the war, is that as soon as the first encounters happened between Germans and Belgians, it became painfully clear that directly assaulting fortified positions was no longer a real option. Did they keep on thinking that the battle is won by whoever can throw more shells and ressources on someone?
I know, hindsight is always 20/20, but it just doesn't make sense to me: repeatedly, countless lives are literally wiped out without entailing drastic changes in strategy/tactics.
I would really appreciate to be enlightened on this.
^ These answers I've given should be pertinent
I can't wrap my mind around the commander's rationale of sending troops into certain death over, and over, and over again. From what I understand about the war, is that as soon as the first encounters happened between Germans and Belgians, it became painfully clear that directly assaulting fortified positions was no longer a real option. Did they keep on thinking that the battle is won by whoever can throw more shells and ressources on someone?
Your first misconception is to assume that all the commanders were doing was "sending troops to their death" over and over again. In reality, while allied offensives in 1915-16 showed an unfortunate tendency to devolve into disorganized battalion/regiment/brigade affairs, by 1917 the French and British armies were utilizing very sophisticated tactics.
Your second misconception is to assume that assaulting fortified positions "was not an option." How else were the British and the French supposed to expel the Germans from Belgium and occupied France, but by driving them back. It wasn't simply a matter of "throwing shells and resources," it required a substantial amount of artillery and sophisticated use of that artillery, and it also required better tactics and armament on the part of the infantry. The French had already identified this by the middle of 1915, and were utilizing limited objective attacks and infiltration/fire and movement tactics, though by no means universally, by 1916. The British experienced a similar learning process through 1916, and were employing highly sophisticated fire plans and infantry assault tactics by the time of the 3rd Battle of Ypres half a year later, if not earlier.
I know, hindsight is always 20/20, but it just doesn't make sense to me: repeatedly, countless lives are literally wiped out without entailing drastic changes in strategy/tactics.
Again, your misconception is in assuming tactics did not undergo a drastic change, when they did. By 1917 we have the emergence of what Soviet military theorists called the "deep battlefield," comprising armies occupying a continuous front, arrayed in depth and in dispersed formations for attack and defence, and supported by long range artillery and air forces. Tanks, armoured cars and above all, cavalry, provided the means of conducting maneuver in the defender's operational and tactical depths.
I'd recommend reading Andy Simpson's [thesis] (http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1349874/1/367588.pdf) on the evolution of corps command in the BEF in WWI. There has been a substantial amount of literature produced on the evolution of modern warfare in WWI, in the past few decades.