How were the French and Austrian Habsburg armies organized during the seventeenth century, and how did this organization change over the course of the century? In particular I'm wondering how reliant these governments were on commissions granted to third parties to raise and command troops, how their soldiers were trained and disciplined, and how centralized their command structures were.
Hello,
The Habsburg armed forces of the Seventeenth century right up until the end of the Austrian War of Succession relied upon a fiscal military system which placed the burden on raising, equipping and feeding troops on the Estates. In exchange for such significant outlay, legislative concessions were given by the Monarchy to specific nobles who raised regiments for a particular campaign. Between 1650 and 1757, 80% nobles at the level of Counts (Grafs) had raised regiments, viewing such endeavours as a key part of projecting power, wealth and stability.
These regiments were then placed in brigades under the command of an officer appointed by the Hofkriegsrat, which administered and coordinated the Imperial armies in time of war under the direction of senior generals and civil servants attached to the Monarchy. The artillery was directly managed by the Hofkriegsrat as it required a standing force of guns and professional gunners who were then attached to the border fortresses and assigned to armies in the field.
Because of the decentralised nature of the army, much of its power was held by the Estates and their regimental proprietors (Oberstinhaber). This was a difficult position for the Monarchy to be in as the defence of its sovereignty was controlled by a polity with contrasting motivations. With each Oberstinhaber able to appoint officers all the way up to Colonel, a scenario was created where much of the middle officer corps had no significant attachment to the Monarchy. Prior to the 1750s the concept of an officer and a noble had no real consensus, as service in the army was deemed a suitable way for those climb the social ladder, but not to enhance an already established family. Whilst most if not all the high level positions within the army were held by high ranking nobility from the Erblande, there were not enough ‘trusted’ houses to fill all positions.
This saw a vast majority of the line officers comprising of Italians and those from the Reich, where Habsburg power had no great sway. What developed was a pragmatic and corrupt situation of careerism or ‘military entrepreneurship” where nepotism and back channel paybacks placed arrogant, inexperienced and ‘careful’ officers in direct control of men at a subaltern officers’ level. These men whose dubious loyalty both threatened the Monarchy and hindered the success of the army, especially during the Thirty Years War, but most predominantly during the Austrian War of Succession, were a significant hindrance to the modernisation of the Habsburg army and its role as protector and unifier of the Habsburg Monarchy.
The modernisation of the army corresponded with the centralisation of the Habsburg state and society. Both changes were informed by and for each other, with particular attention under the guidance of Haugwitz in the late 1740s on the removal of the Estates ability to raise regiments. This particular task would now sit with the Hofkriegsrat and the Austro-Bohemian chancellery he set up to end the joint responsibility of the Estate and the Monarchy in the running of the army. The officer corps’ was significantly reformed as well, with FM Daun leading the way on the training, indoctrination, reward and aligning the officer corps and the Monarchy through the education of young noble boys at military schools staffed by secular officers and Jesuit monks. More importantly, the army was incorporated into court life with officers recognised as part of the Monarchy’s inner circle by intertwining military dress, with courtly life and awarding grants and titles to those who served, before those who did.
The power of the Estates and the Oberstinhaber was sighted by many of the civil servant of Maria Theresia as one of the main reasons for the progressive civil reforms of the Austro-Bohemian lands. Wallenstein, the most influential Imperial commander of the Thirty Years war was the prime example of such power. With an Imperial mandate he had complete control of the recruitment, payment and coordination of the army, which was heterogeneous force by its very nature and whose training and discipline sat with the commanders of each regiment. Whilst some minor direction was given by the Hofkriegsrat on behalf of the Monarchy, Wallenstein had almost complete autonomy and was kept on side only until he had exhausted their coffers. The inner circle of Maria Theresia were at pains to prevent this from happening again and from 1747 until 1789, she and her son changed the social fabric of the Monarchy in support of what was the largest army on the continent by the outbreak of the French Revolutionary Wars. All of the particularisms of the seventeenth and early eighteenth century was removed for the relentless standardisation of an army, which was directly aligned behind the Monarchy in support of its foreign policy and facilitated by an administration who oversaw the centralisation and governance of the fiscal military power from the Estates to the Monarchy.
Michael Hochedlinger provides the best and most detailed synthesis to date in:
Hochedlinger, Michael. Austria's wars of emergence : war, state and society in the Habsburg Monarchy 1683-1797 / Michael Hochedlinger. n.p.: London ; New York : Longman, 2003.
His first foray I can find is: Hochedlinger, M. 1999. "Mars Ennobled The Ascent of the Military and the Creation of a Military Nobility in Mid-Eighteenth-Century Austria." German History 17, no. 2: 141-176.
The best introduction is James Van Horn Melton, ‘The Nobility in the Bohemian and Austrian Lands 1620–1780’, in Hamish Scott (ed.), The European Nobilities in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, vol. II (London and New York, 1995), pp. 110–43. and Thomas M. Barker, ‘Military Nobility: The Daun Family and the Evolution of the Austrian Officer Corps’, in Gunther E. Rothenberg, Be´la K. Kira´lyi and Peter F. Sugar (eds.), War and Society in East Central Europe, vol. II: East Central European Society and War in the PreRevolutionary Eighteenth Century (New York, 1982)
And if your German is up to scratch: Georg Heilingsetzer, ‘Prinz Eugen und die Fu¨hrungsschicht der o¨sterreichischen Großmacht 1683–1740’, in Erich Zo¨llner and Karl Gutkas (eds.), O¨sterreich und die Osmanen. Prinz Eugen und seine Zeit (Vienna, 1988), pp. 120–37
Apologies, my French history is poor and I don't have the competency to properly answer your question on that front.