I am working on a hobby project and was wondering if anyone had any information pertaining to carrier based Aircraft during WW2.
How large would a flight or squadron of these aircraft typically be? Would a carrier usually launch its entire complement of aircraft for a strike? If a carrier was to launch a large number of planes, would they fly in smaller formations or en masse towards there target?
Did the IJN and USN have different approaches to formation size for planes? What about land based aircraft operating close enough to the ocean to strike at naval targets?
Finally would flights of aircraft mix torpedo bombers and Fighters into a single formation, or would they seperate based on there intended role?
Additionally, any free resource anyone knows of with this kind of information would be greatly beneficial. Wikipedia lacks the kind of specific information I am looking for.
Thanks very much in advance!
An Essex-class aircraft carrier, as commissioned in 1942, would hypothetically carry 90 aircraft plus a liaison aircraft (usually a dive bomber) and nine reserves (three of each type; F4F Wildcat, SBD Dauntless, and TBD Devastator) The size of the fighter squadron was initially 18 aircraft, but was changed to 27 shortly before the Battle of Midway. After the battle, this was further upped to 36. Many variations could occur, as additional aircraft could be taken on, spare aircraft could be kept, aircraft could be out of commission for repairs or simply not embarked due to a lack of aircraft or other situations.
| Squadron | Aircraft |
|---|---|
| Fighter | 36 |
| Scouting | 18 |
| Dive bomber | 18 |
| Torpedo | 18 |
| Liaision | 1 |
| Reserve | 9 |
| Total | 100 |
In late 1943 and early 1944, the air group was reorganized. In July 1944, the size of the fighter squadron was increased to 54 aircraft, and now included 4 fighters optimized for night operations (F6F-3 or -5N) Also by July 1944, the redundant scouting squadrons had been disestablished and combined with the dive-bombing squadrons in a single 24-plane squadron.
| Squadron | Aircraft |
|---|---|
| Fighter | 54 (4 night) |
| Dive bomber | 24 |
| Torpedo bomber | 18 |
| Total | 96 |
For the first time, not counting reserves, the Essex-class' complement swelled to over 100 aircraft. The new kamikaze threat beginning in October 1944 necessitated the increase in the size of the fighter squadron to 73 aircraft (4 of them optimized for night operations) and 110 pilots. In comparison, a land-based US Army Air Forces single-engine fighter squadron typically had around 100-120 aircraft. The number of dive and torpedo bombers was reduced to 30 total.
| Squadron | Aircraft |
|---|---|
| Fighter | 73 (4 night) |
| Dive bomber | 15 |
| Torpedo bomber | 15 |
| Total | 103 |
By January 1945, the 73-plane fighter squadron had proven too large to operate, and it was split into two squadrons, one with 36 fighters, and one with 36 fighter-bombers (typically F4U Corsairs, or two squadrons of Marine Corsairs; USMC squadrons were smaller, having only 18 planes)
| Squadron | Aircraft |
|---|---|
| Fighter | 36 (4 night) |
| Fighter-bomber | 18 x 2 or 36 |
| Dive bomber | 15 |
| Torpedo bomber | 15 |
| Total | 102 |
In January 1945, two air groups discarded their dive bombers, and operated with 93 fighters and 15 torpedo bombers.
Here is a sample of three air groups (CAG-9, CAG-15, CVG-83) embarked on the USS Essex (CV-9) in June 1943, June 1944, and June 1945.
June 1943 (CAG-9)
| Squadron | Aircraft type | Amount |
|---|---|---|
| VB-9 | SBD | 32 |
| VF-9 | F6F-3 | 35 |
| VT-9 | TBF-1 | 21 |
| All | All | 88 |
May-July 1944 (CAG-15)
| Squadron | Aircraft type | Amount |
|---|---|---|
| VB-15 | SB2C-1C | 36 |
| VF-15 | F6F-3 | 37 |
| VT-15 | TBF/M-1C | 20 |
| VFN-77 | F6F-3N | 6 |
| All | All | 99 |
June 1945 (CVG-83)
| Squadron | Aircraft type | Amount |
|---|---|---|
| VB-83 | SB2C-4, SB2C-4E | 8, 7 |
| VT-83 | TBM-3, TBM-3E | 6, 9 |
| VF-83 | F6F-5, F6F-5N, F6F-5P | 31, 6, 2 |
| VBF-83 | F4U-1D | 36 |
| All | All | 105 |
Independence-class light aircraft carriers such as the USS Independence and the various models of smaller escort aircraft carriers, as they were too small to carry several squadrons, usually operated around 25-35 aircraft in a single "composite" squadron (VC) This squadron was typically 24 fighters (F4F/FM Wildcat or F6F Hellcat; the F4U Corsair was generally regarded as too large for these small ships) and 8 torpedo bombers, (TBF/M Avenger) although it could vary.
Sources:
US Navy Aircraft Carriers 1942-45: WWII-built ships, by Mark Stille
Aircraft Carriers: A History of Carrier Aviation and Its Influence on World Events, Volume I: 1909-1945, by Norman Polmar
/u/the_howling_cow gave an outstanding answer as to American aviation. For the Japanese side of things, I would recommend Parshall and Tully's Shattered Sword for good reading on early-war Japanese aviation; although it focuses on Midway it goes to some length to explain how IJN doctrine differed from American. Specifically, the IJN organization was centered around a three-plane element as its smallest unit; two or three three-plane shotai were formed into chutai, the equivalent of a division. You can read the pertinent part from Shattered Sword here in Google Books. This is different from the emerging American doctrine of four-aircraft units.
The Japanese navy in the prewar period had also learned from its experience in China that massed, coordinated air attacks were much more effective than sending individual squadrons in dribs and drabs (although, in some ways the uncoordinated nature of American attacks at Midway disrupted the Japanese command and control cycle. But I digress.). Japanese doctrine was actually built around massing the air groups from two carriers into one unit, so the combined air wing of two carriers was the smallest unit they would generally send on a strike (at least in the early war period). Carrier air units were also organic to the carrier, rather than being independent organizations able to move from carrier to carrier as they were (and still are) in the US Navy. This meant, for example, that after the battle of the Coral Sea, when Shokaku was damaged with little loss to its air wing, and Zuikaku escaped damage but had its air wing shot up, both of them were out of action for Midway. There was no way within the context of the IJN to, for example, transfer Shokaku's air wing to Zuikaku and have Zuikaku fight independently.
In any case, a good online resource on this is the Combined Fleet webpage, http://www.combinedfleet.com, which has deep dives into much of the IJN's organization. I already mentioned Shattered Sword; Peattie's Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese Naval Air Power, 1909-1941 is more thorough but also more dense. Sunburst is a sequel to Evans' and Peattie's Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941, which focuses on the non-air-warfare history of the IJN. (Sunburst was originally a section in Kaigun, but it outgrew the book, and Peattie finished it by himself after Evans passed away.)
If you have the time, last week's episode of War College was about aircraft carriers. It has a primer on their history. It raised a topic that I'd like to hear more about. The interviewee mentioned that the Washington Naval Treaty was important to the development of carriers b/c some large battleships the US was constructing would have exceeded its limits so they were converted to carriers and these were significantly different than the previous carriers that had been made from coalers. I was hoping someone could expand on that. How were they different? How did that impact the carrier's mission?