By no means a professional historian, but I've just completed an A-level (exams for 17-18 year olds in the UK) in history; the French Revolution (1786-1830). So I can give a fairly sound answer, if not comprehensive.

The textbook we used was; Napoleon, France and Europe (Access to History). Dylan Rees, Andrina Stiles. You can find it on Abebooks for £2.80, not massively about military but interesting nonetheless.

Napoleon's first big losses came in the Peninsular War 1808-1813 in which the 280,000 strong Grand Armee was kept at bay by roughly 50,000 Spanish troops. Discounting the Egyptian campaign 1797 (which Napoleon abandoned in order to return to France), this was Napoleon's first big defeat. It revealed a number of problems with Napoleon's generalship and the way his army was ran. Problems that were only exacerbated by the time he decided to invade Russia.

One problem was a matter of terrain. Napoleon's greatest victories were in mainland Europe, from the Pyrenees to the very edge of Russia. These areas are incredibly fertile for farming, and rather flat (discounting the Alps) allowing Napoleon to A. Force quick and substantial losses on the enemy using the large areas of land for cavalry screens, and B. To live off the land. Living off the conquered land facilitated Napoleon's lightning campaigns by not having to rely on slower supply lines. Napoleon assumed this would apply anywhere, Spain was markedly more arid than France, and Russian winter much more arduous. The opportunities for food were thus much more scare and meant the Napoleon struggled to build up the same terrifying momentum he had elsewhere in Europe. This problem meant that the Spanish Campaign went much slower than he had hoped, and eventually lead to the absolute disaster that was the Russian Campaign(around 400,000 casualties and importantly 100,000 horses (becomes devastating during the Battle of Nations)).

As has been said before there was also the problem that people had worked him out. Napoleon's early success may have arguably been his downfall as he was never forced to innovate. His system of mixed order warfare and cavalry screens remained largely unchanged. Whilst this may not had been a problem had Napoleon decided to consolidate, he pushed on forcing the great powers to react. A large part of the inspiration for this was the Spanish Campaign, nobles throughout Spain (upset that Napoleon was trying to force a French-style revolution, and institute his brother on the Spanish throne) encourage so-called military juntas throughout Spain. Small pockets of Spanish Guerilla fighters managed to negate French influence throughout Spain and whilst they made territorial gains, reaching Lisbon by 1811. The Guerilla fighters attacked French supply lines and used their better knowledge of the Spanish terrain to their advantage. Similarly in Russia General Kutusov essentially "tactically retreated". Napoleon loved to force an early loss on his opponents with massive casualties for both sides, and then use that victory to encourage morale and momentum. Kutusov knew Russia better than Napoleon and decided to draw him deeper into Russia. He also had a policy of scorched earth. Destroying bridges and farms as they retreated the Russian Army ensured that Napoleon was both over stretched and under supplied. The scorched earth policy was rigidly stuck too, with the Russians retreating out of Moscow (after the Battle of Borodino) and setting fire to it as they went. 2/3 of Moscow was destroyed and Napoleons key target was rendered useless. So in both the Russian and Spanish campaigns Napoleons opponents used his inability to adjust his tactics to restrict the French army's movement and damage supply lines.

Napoleons system of control was also a huge problem (in my opinion the largest problem (Napoleons a bit of a dick)). Napoleon had himself at the head of every campaign he could. Even when he wasn't in charge of the country, he managed peace deals on his own terms instead of France's (see the Treaty of Campo Formio). Whilst he did have other generals around him he never gave them proper experience, they were there to act out his commands not to act independently. Now worked fine for his "smaller campaigns", the tactics were successful as his opponents still weren't reacting to his tactics properly. Addtionally his soldiers were well-drilled enough and his generals enthusiastic enough to properly institute his tactics. This seemed to hold true early on in the Spanish campaign, after the first French loss at the Battle of Baylon in 1808, Napoleon had started reasonably well. This was until he left the head of the Spanish campaign to deal with the Austrians who declared war (again) in January 1809. What he left behind were generals who were ill experienced at properly managing an army of the size that Napoleon was used to dealing with; 270,000 french troops were sent into Spain. The inability to win the Spanish war quickly lead to it being called the Spanish Ulcer. The French were unable to force a win and as such they remained at war until Napoleons abdication in 1813. With the size of armies that Napoleon had started using it soon became impossible for Napoleon to effectively wield the kind of control that he wanted and he didn't trust his generals enough to act independently of him.

This control problem wouldn't have been too bad had he had an effective army. But 8 years of perpetual warfare took it's toll on Napoleons army. By the Battle of Nations (the battle that lead to Napoleons first abdication) Napoleon had lost 800,000 men (300,000 in Spain and 500,000 in Russia) in just 2 campaigns. This wasn't great, but what was much worse was the loss of horses, in Russia 200,000 trained horses were lost. Losing men was okay (as far as losing men can ever be okay), France was a huge country (around 24 million people)and their empire even larger and still pretty nationalistic and Napoleon still very inspirational, he could find replacements and they would be fairly competent. Horses was a huge problem. It was difficult to find them and train them to the scale that Napoleon needed. Napoleon liked to train his armies as they marched to battle, which is reasonable (but certainly not optimal) for training people, near impossible for training horses. This meant that Napoleon could no longer effectively rely on cavalry screens to protect his soldiers, and as his opponents had since changed tactics to negate Napoleons you can see what a problem this would be.

I'm sorry if this is a bit vague and rambly, but a concrete answer is impossible for this kind of thing. His losses were largely a combination of factors, but in my view it will always be Napoleons arrogance that eventually lead to these downfalls. His inability to plan properly (I mean who starts a war with Russia without maps, honestly.) or even change his tactics lead to the death of millions of people. France's population dropped by 10% during the reign of Napoleon. Had he been able to accept defeat he may have reigned much longer, he denied a fairly kind peace deal in Dresden, leading to the "Battle of Nations" which largely sealed Napoleon's fate.

I was always in the habit of blaming Napoleon for his own failure, but not everyone agrees so I hope that I've explained the other arguments fully. The problems leading to his final losses were largely to do with the long term wear and tear of nearly 13 years of consistent war for Napoleonic France. (This answer also doesn't take into account Waterloo, not because these things don't apply but because I really really don't remember a single thing about it.) If you have anymore questions about this period, specifically to do with France, I can probably be of some help.

Hello There,

It is true that the majority of Bonaparte’s defeats came in the late stages of his career, but this does not mean he had lost the ability to out think and out fight his opponents. One only has to look at the less studied defence of Paris during the spring campaign of 1814 to see Bonaparte still had the ability to defeat coalition forces.

The coalition partners understood that Bonaparte was still a general to be wary of and this understanding led to a radical new strategy, as devised by the Austrian chief of staff Johann Josef Wenzel Anton Franz Karl, Graf von Radetzky and firmly argued for and applied by the Austrian general and commander of the Coalition forces Karl Philipp, Prince of Schwarzenberg. This strategy called for the allied forces to avoid battle with Bonaparte and instead tackle his subordinates at every possible opportunity, who by 1813 were of a calibre similar to the commanders of the coalition forces. Radetzky’s strategy was helped further by Bonaparte’s curious fixation with strategic points and terrain. This was clearly shown by his repeated orders to capture Berlin and his want to maintain an extended front along the Elbe, from Dresden through to Hanover. A peculiar set of orders as up until that point (or at least 1808) Bonaparte operated with the modus operandi of concentrating his forces on an enemy’s army at the opportune time. With such an extended frontage and by detaching his corps and providing them with independent strategic goals from one another, Bonaparte played right into the hands of the allies and enabled them to dictate when battle was given. Indeed, the victories of Lutzen and Bautzen showed vestiges of Bonaparte’s strategy, but they were inconclusive and served as an extension of a campaign of manoeuvrability.

It is hard to conclude the quality in men provided by the French shifted the balance of power towards the coalition. Yet, it can be easily concluded that both bodies of men were just as poor as each other as the Prussian, Swedish and indeed Austrian forces were all relatively inexperienced as all were raised in the months leading up to the campaign. Such a lack of experience further highlights the importance of army command and Bonaparte’s lack of faith in his commanders may have forced his strategy. Most probably by providing fix point objectives, Bonaparte was attempting to lessen the complexity of his strategy for the betterment of his subordinates understanding.

Still, the French could call upon a large body of NCOs and Line officers with more experience than their counterparts. Indeed, the recall of the French Dragoon regiments from Spain provided Bonaparte with a vastly more experienced cavalry corps than any of his enemies. The idea that the French army was still the mostly highly trained force in Europe by 1812 is of course false. It is clear even by 1806 that the 60% of line troops were serving in their first campaign. Even during the 1812 campaign the majority of the losses came from the Rhinebund contingents. I would argue that 1812 campaign though detrimental to Bonaparte’s standing in Europe, did not reduce the overall quality of the French forces. Though they did lack quality light cavalry, a further hindrance to Bonaparte’s strategy. What the French did not lack and continued to have even by 1814, was a highly motivated, professional and experienced body of battalion commanders and brigadiers to go along with the NCOs and company officers. These men maintained the unity of Bonaparte’s forces, even after the poor handling of the corps by the Marshals of France.

I would point to the timely introduction of the Austrian army and the work of Metternich and Schwarzenberg in uniting the three monarch’s strategic goals as paramount in the defeat of Bonaparte. The fiscal-military system of the Austrian army had been extensively reformed, enabling them to raise a large body of men quickly. Though they were poorly equipped and most of the third battalions were substandard, the vast numbers they contributed to the coalition enabled the Austrians to take the initiative in the strategic decisions for the first time. Thugut, Stadion, Cobenzl and Metternich had all argued extensively for this to happen during the coalition wars. Who knows what would have happened if the Habsburg Monarchy had been properly supported in the preceding wars.

Is it fair to say that his defeats led to the end of his career?

I haven't studied the tactical aspects of Napoleon's career except for the Battle of Waterloo. He was a brilliant strategist and judging by Waterloo he was just as good a tactician. What ruined him at Waterloo was that one of his subordinates issued an order that ended his cavalry presence on the field and forced him to follow it up with his infantry.

One of the core principles that made him successful was his absolute faith in his subordinate officers. At the time, most officers would report their situation to higher echelons and wait for further guidance. Napoleon empowered his lower echelon commanders to make their own decisions and take the initiative, which drastically accelerated the French military decision-making process. One of the downsides is that you absolutely must have officers of exceptional quality at all levels of command.

So, if Waterloo is anything to judge by, I would say that the weakening of his officer corps by prolonged campaigning started the fractures. The culture he created and his own personality meant that he could not or would not change his command philosophy and centralize the decision-making process. This allowed officers of lower caliber to make decisions that turned out to be tactical errors which would ultimately result in a battlefield defeat.

I'm reading conflicting comments on on his subordinates that's having me confused. I imagined there would be a historical consensus on this that could be sourced. Long posts are rooted in one view while the next is running with another

So which is it, did he trust them or not?