Possibly the most common form of ransom in the Hundred Years War was the "ransoming" of non-combatants. Nicholas Wright has shown that this practice was "part booty, part protection racket, and part taxation" and consisted of groups of people from vulnerable constituencies (peasants, clergy, pilgrims, the elderly, and so forth) collectively purchasing their "freedom" from men-at-arms in order to return to their normal business. Nicholas Wright, "Ransoms of non-combatants during the Hundred Years War" Journal of Medieval History 17/4 (1991), 324-325.

The defensibility of the use of the term "ransom" here is perhaps problematic but it is worthy of inclusion in this discussion nonetheless.

This practice had very questionable legality as it was the notional secular and religious responsibility of the nobility to ensure that their men-at-arms did not systematically abuse or coercively exact payments from the poor. Naturally, the entire structure of late-medieval warfare depended upon large units being able to live off the land and supply themselves. Profiting violently off of the local peasantry was therefore an appealing and common feature of normal campaigning.

As for non-noble men-at-arms who participated in the fighting your prospects could be bleak. There was less incentive to take you prisoner as you could not afford a significant ransom payment like your noble counterparts. As a poor soldier you were only being paid a pittance. Clifford Rogers has written that a Welsh spearman for example could be hired for a sixth of an esquire's pay. Clifford Rogers, "The Age of the Hundred Years War" in Medieval Warfare: A History (Oxford: OUP, 1999), 144. As a consequence of these callous materialistic realities commoners could frequently expect summary execution.

However this was not always the case. Rémy Ambühl has argued that ransom culture experienced substantial "democratization" during the Hundred Years War with the expansion of "rank and file" units. As he reasons, "more rank-and-file soldiers captured more and more rank-and-file prisoners" triggering a somewhat greater commitment on both sides to more commonly adhere to basic rules of war. For Rémy as the war dragged on it became difficult for common soldiers to wish to contribute to a merciless battlefield culture in which surrender meant certain death in enemy custody. Rémy Ambühl, Prisoners of War in the Hundred Years War: Ransom Culture in the Late Middle Ages (Cambridge: CUP, 2013), 261. While exacting worthwhile payments for these captives could be much more difficult and less lucrative they did occur. He cites the examples of John More and Jean de Rousselet, both commoners, who claimed to have been ruined by "seven and fourteen captures respectively" by the end of the war. (Ibid, 10.)