The short answer is no. Although counterfactual games are always slippery and remove both agency and contingency from their scenarios, the fact is in this case that Japan's industrial base was too insufficient to fight a modern industrial war with an opponent of the US's stature. As H. P. Willmott memorably put it:

Such was the scale of American industrial power that if during the Pearl Harbor attack the Imperial Navy had been able to sink every major unit of the entire U.S. Navy and then complete its own construction programs without losing a single unit, by mid-1944 it would still not have been able to put to sea a fleet equal to the one the Americans could have assembled in the intervening thirty months. [emphasis mine]

The American fleet was not only quantitatively superior, but qualitatively as well, with American ships having better electronics, guns, and planes. On the land, the IJA found itself literally outgunned throughout the war as Japan's industrial base could not keep competitive in global developments in artillery and small arms. The IJA remained behind the curve in these matters, and although the Japanese did try to rectify this problem, the programs to arm their soldiers with a new generation of weapons was rushed and not very effective. The IJA's tank and antitank program exemplified this overall trend. IJA tank development was largely a reflection of the needs for China, which stressed lighter tanks given the underdevelopment of Chinese roads and the terrain. Japanese industry was more than capable of producing tanks to this standard, but such tanks were no match to those being fielded in Europe. Likewise, Japanese antitank weapons were initially developed with an eye towards mobility, so tended to be light calibers. The IJA's bloody nose at the hands of the Soviets in the Nomonhan Incident showed the flaws of both the IJA's tanks and its antitank forces, and the IJA began a crash program to modernize both arms. But the results of this program were quite meager. Modernization of the Chi-ha tank did not keep up with global tank developments and adding more armor and a heavier gun to the chassis overstressed the engine. When the Americans encountered Japanese tanks, they found even light antitank guns sufficient to destroy them (some US tankers used HE instead of AP rounds) while the Japanese were relatively impotent to take out American tanks at a distance. The average Japanese rifleman typically was at a disadvantage in the weight of fire he could bring to bear or get support from, than his American counterpart.

Additionally, it bears stressing that Japan's plans for seizing the "Southern resources area" and holding it behind a defensive line were impractical and not feasible given Japan's capabilities. The defensive barrier in the Pacific looked good on paper, but wartime experience showed that strongpoints could always be bypassed. Japan not only lacked the resources to adequately man its defensive line, but also the engineering personnel to build the barrier in the first place. Just as it could not build enough tanks, Japanese factories could not produce enough tractors and building equipment to construct the vast network of military stations needed to make defense of such a vast territory possible. The same engineering bottlenecks made exploitation of the Southern resources area largely ineffective. The output of these European colonies' mineral extractions seldom reached pre-1941 levels as the Japanese were slow to make good on damaged infrastructure when they seized the areas in 1941/42. This meant that Japan was heavily reliant upon human labor and this was part of the reason why the Japanese administration of its newly-occupied territories was so brutal. Japan needed to press-gang vast numbers of natives to construct bases and extract their resources. But even what resources Japan could squeeze out of the Southern Resources Area, it was often for naught. Japan had barely enough shipping to meet its industrial needs at the start of the war, and the bottlenecks in Japan's shipyards meant that Japan often had to choose between prioritizing merchant or military construction to make good on losses. Attrition in the shipping fleet meant that Japanese factories were often starved of resources and often had to make do with ersatz materials.

There were multiple things that the Japanese leadership could have done when conducting the Pacific War. For instance, the chronic bureaucratic infighting between the IJA and IJN created a lot of unnecessary waste and duplication of effort. A more harmonious interservice relationship could have allocated scarce resources more efficiently. But that would not have rectified the fundamental disparities between the US and Japan. By most metrics, a Pacific War involving the US as its main opponent was just was not winnable for Japan.