Part I

It is something of a cliche in Napoleon studies to compare Napoleon's relatives to the great man himself and find the former collectively wanting. Napoleon himself was not above making such comparisons, quipping in 1804 when Lucien complained about the imperial line of succession that "you would have thought I had finagled out of them their rightful inheritance from our father, the late king!"

But as apt as Napoleon's snark was, the negative portrait of the Bonaparte clan overlooks two salient points. Firstly, while it is true that neither his siblings nor his stepchildren possessed his military acumen or the constitution for extensive administrative work, few people of that era possessed the same level of talent. The abilities of the clan, such as they were, would always be outshone by their more illustrious patriarch. Secondly, Napoleon's placing various family relations onto vacant or newly-created thrones was not a simple caprice, but an imperial strategy that evolved out of the Revolutionary period's process of erecting various sister republics that functioned as satellite states. These newly-minted crowns and titles were not just rewards, but part of the Napoleonic imperial project to normalize French political and cultural hegemony. As such, Napoleon's family had to implement various modernizing policies like constitutions, reorganize the economy to fit the Continental system, or impose conscription. This was a very tall order for the clan to accomplish as many of these policies were deeply unpopular, especially conscription, rationalization of the tax system, and the Continental system. Napoleon's penchant for micromanagement made matters worse for his family, as they often felt both resistance from their subjects and pressure from their imperial master to implement his vision of European order. Not surprisingly, Napoleon's relatives largely failed at the ambitious tasks Napoleon set out for him.

The regal career of Napoleon's elder brother Joseph illustrates the bind that Napoleon placed on his relations. In Napoleon's ascent, Joseph had played an important, if relatively undistinguished role, which gave him a degree of experience in governmental administration. Joseph had been part of the Amiens negotiations with Britain and the Treaty of Luneville with Austria, and this experience helped cement the image of Joseph as a loyal servitor in his brother's eyes. So when Napoleon appointed Joseph as King of Naples in 1806, it as not a reward for service, but a task for his elder brother to accomplish. In a letter he gave to André Miot, the future King of Naples's Minister of War, Napoleon told Joseph:

But I am determined to nominate someone else if Joseph refuses. All feelings of affection must now give way to raison d’Etat. I only recognize as relatives those who serve me. It is no longer the name of Bonaparte, but only that of Napoleon that binds my family together now. It is not with the thing in my breeches that I make sons, but with my fingers. I cannot now love anyone whom I do not esteem. Joseph must forget all the bonds of childhood and make himself worthy of my esteem.

Napoleon expected his brother to clean out the Augean stables of southern Italian governmental corruption and alleged backwardness, and Joseph accomplished this after a fashion. He did implement a constitution and streamline the bureaucracy, but he found that his kingship was very limited in terms of actual power. Joseph had to gain his brother's approval for new laws or appointments, which made French reforms very difficult to implement. As a man of the Enlightenment, Joseph was committed to these reformist ideals, but lacked the resources to fully implement them and Napoleon's micromanagement muzzled initiative. But Joseph's reforms appeared successful enough that his brother gave him the poisoned chalice of the Spanish throne. In Napoleon's mind, Spain's hidebound ancien regime traditions and political culture was Naples writ large, and Joseph had similar experience. But Spanish reform proved to be impossible given the Spanish insurgency and the fact that French generals in the Peninsula often carved out their own satraps in Spain that undercut any pretense of Joseph's sovereignty. The few reforms Joseph was thus able to implement reforms on a patchwork basis, such as liberalizing the economy, various educational reforms, and cultural work like the founding of the Prado museum. Yet Napoleonic rule in the satellite states often depended upon a large class of native elite collaborators, and the nature of the French seizure of power and military occupation denuded Joseph of a large class of Spanish elite who would rally to the new regime. There were very few elite Spaniards interested in participating in Napoleonic government, despite the presence of strong reformist elements in Spanish political culture engendered by the corruption of the Godoy ministry. Denied any real power, Joseph might issue fueros from Madrid, but increasingly such decrees existed largely on paper as the Peninsular War intensified.

A similar tale of failure, albeit in a different key, befell Louis in Holland, where unlike Joseph, he enjoyed a relatively large number of native elite collaborators and his kingdom was not under the same military pressures as Spain. As such, Louis was able to implement Napoleonic reforms relatively easily. He was able to centralize administration, implement various Napoleonic laws, and reorient local politics to the new Kingdom of Holland. But despite his overall loyalty to his brother, Napoleon violated his brother's sovereignty in a myriad number of wars, such as French gendarmes crossing the border to arrest smugglers. Louis's relaxation of the blockade to allow American ships in Dutch ports in 1809 proved to be the last straw for Napoleon and led to the annexation of the Kingdom, despite his brother's protests. The abortive British landing at Walcheren as well as Louis's perceived failure of implementing the Continental system justified Napoleon's fears that his brother was not up to the task of being his "finger" in the Low Countries.

The only one of Napoleon's family to have qualified success as an imperial servitor was his stepson Eugène de Beauharnais Napoleon's appointment of Eugène as Viceroy of Italy came as a surprise to the young man, and he was initially quite reluctant to take up the post. But once in northern Italy, he proved an able administrator. The Kingdom of Italy was able to provide the Empire both money and warm bodies and was a relatively quiet corner of the French Empire. Eugène had the benefit of working in an area that had long been under French rule, and thus had a large class of native elite willing to serve in the new regime. Eugène's youth and character also likely helped him follow his step-father's instructions; unlike Napoleon's blood relations, he recognized that his position was intertwined with keeping Napoleon satisfied. Both he and his sister Hortense, whose salon became one of the few pro-Bonapartist ones in Parisian society, proved to be more in tune with Napoleon's political vision than his actual family. Yet, Eugène's efficacy should not be overstated. Napoleonic rule in the Kingdom of Italy was very fragile and did not long survive the Empire's collapse in fortunes in 1813 and some of the Italian collaborators were lynched by mob violence in the retreat. Eugène's military career was also not very illustrious, with him having to be placed under Massena's command in 1809 and being charged with the thankless defense of the Duchy of Warsaw in the winter of 1812/13 after Murat deserted.

But if Eugène's conduct on campaign was not ideal, he stood out far better than Napoleon's brother Jerome. Although Napoleon tasked his younger brother to head a model German state carved out of the Prussian territories, Jerome proved to be ill-suited to this task. Like the Kingdom of Naples, the modernizing reforms of Westphalia were more apparent than real, as both Napoleon's micromanagement and Jerome's playboy character prevented them from being fully implemented. Unlike Eugène or Joseph, Jerome's regal title did go to his head and at several points Jerome tried to argue with his brother as a fellow monarch, a breach of Napoleon's intent in placing his brother on the throne in the first place. During the 1812 campaign, Jerome clashed repeatedly with Davout leading to the former's desertion of the army in July. Napoleon normally could not stomach this level of disobedience, but Jerome was saved by both Davout's scapegoating for some of the campaign's failures and the fact that Napoleon needed a secure central Europe after the collapse of the Russian invasion.

Jerome's actions in July 1812, which were in part prompted by his brother's treatment of him, were typical of how his siblings acted when confronted by their overbearing brother. Napoleon's sisters generally became more distant from their brother, with Caroline encouraging her husband Murat to strike a more independent tack. As the Grand Duchess of Tuscany, Elisa pushed back against her brother's calls for Tuscany to be more pliant. Her management of the Tuscan court tended to enable the amalgamation process between French and local elites, but from Paris, it looked like his sister was falling prey to localism. Pauline prove to be a fairly astute patron of the arts, but her brother's calls to rein in her behavior only encouraged her libertinism.