I don't understand what realities provoked the war. Did they fear collapsed economies as trade became dominated by the other great powers? I know Germany for example feared "encirclement", but what was the point of relatively wealthy resource rich nations starting a war?
Did they fear collapsed economies as trade became dominated by the other great powers? I know Germany for example feared "encirclement", but what was the point of relatively wealthy resource rich nations starting a war?
As I state in [this answer] (https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/51burv/does_war_is_a_racket_accurately_describe_the/), the likely disastrous consequences that a war would have on the economies of the Great Powers were largely ignored in Vienna, Berlin and St. Petersburg. The decision-makers here, being the most responsible for the war taking place, were mainly diplomats, soldiers and aristocrats who thought little about modern economics. When Germany's economic power was considered, at was seen as an element that should enhance Germany's, but which didn't show in terms of alleged rewards like diplomatic clout and imperial territories.
The fears and ambitions that to war were more idealistic than materialistic. In Austria-Hungary's case, Serbia was seen as threatening to tear the Empire apart and likely for the interests of the Russians. In Germany's case, efforts at power projection that since 1905 had sought to take advantage of the temporary power vacuum following the 1905 Russian Revolution, had largely failed. Rather than deter France from 'encircling' the Reich and force Britain to concede relative diplomatic dominance to the Germans in Europe, the Moroccan Crises and the Naval Arms Race had only brought these two powers, and to an extent Russia and Britain, closer together. More immediately, the chances of threatening a war or going to war to break this 'encirclement,' were seen to be diminishing steadily from 1912 onwards as Russia and France strengthened their armies and so stood a greater chance of resisting a German attack in the future. For the Russians, the humiliations of the 1905 Revolution and defeat by Japan, followed by diplomatic defeat in the Bosnian Crisis and the Balkan Wars, were seen as having diminished Russia's position as a European Great Power, and to stand down in the face of an Austrian incursion into Serbia in July 1914 would only further cement a perception of Russia as weak, even as it's economy and military grew. It would also leave the Balkan states open to closer relations with Germany and Austria-Hungary, as Romania, Bulgaria, Albania and Greece all had German monarchs and were pro-Triple Alliance in their relations with the Great Powers, with Romania even possessing an alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary.
Thus the reasonings for going to war were arrived at by narrow groups of military and noble elites, whose personalities played a large role in shaping policy, and whose ideas and understandings of economics, diplomacy and statecraft were often far from 'up to speed' on modern developments in these areas, or if they were, chose to ignore it.