The linked page is pretty much a very selective reading of historical events that cherry-picks the writings and activities of various Bolshevik activists and gives them much greater weight than they possessed in reality. Bolshevik family policy under Lenin did not aim to abolish marriage or family structures, despite some extreme rhetoric on both sides of the equation, an did not seek to fundamentally alter the heteronormative family structure. There were changes from the pre-1917 family law, but sum of these changes was much less than their more progressive parts. The sex and family policies of the 1920s Soviet state was the byproduct of several different intertwined trends, several of which were rather contradictory.

One of the biggest reforms of family policy in the 1920s was the state's assumption of control over the institution of marriage and the legalization of divorce. This was of course a natural byproduct of assuming control over the Romanov state in which marriage and family policy was in control of the Orthodox Church. The Bolsheviks tended to treat secularization as a given, and in this family policy was no exception. The largely male Bolsheviks for the most part did not care much for the details of family policy and often delegated this work to female Bolsheviks like Alexandra Kollontai. A number of these activists expressed their intention to use Bolshevik family policy as a means for a wider policy of achieving equality between the sexes. This would not be a destruction of the family, but rather a thorough reconstruction of it along Marxist lines. Kollontai would actually argue that this new marriage would be:

a new form of relationship between men and women at comradely and heartfelt union of two free, independent, wage-earning, equal members of communist society.

Kollontai would further assert that traditional marriage, understood as of a piece with the old order, was an archaic remnant of a system of exploitation in the home.

Both her contemporaries and even in some quarters today have taken the statements of Kollontai on the nature of marriage and relations between the sexes as evidence that early Bolshevik regime sought to fundamentally recast gender roles. However, the opinions of these female activists carried relatively little weight within the corridors of power of the emerging Soviet state. Contrary to what the linked article claims, the special female sections of the Communist Party, the Zhenotdel set up in 1919 were often the source of mockery by their male colleagues and enjoyed relatively few resources from the state. In a pattern soon to become familiar to other states' legal guarantees of gender equality, rhetoric seldom lived up to reality; marriage might be a secular institution, but Soviet society remained quite patriarchal. Activists, whether in private or in the Zhenotdel, could earn the wrath of the state if they pushed for women's issues too stridently, often earning the charge of "practicing separatism," a claim that carried particular resonance for a generation accustomed to the factionalism of the RSDLP at the turn of the century. Many of the male Bolsheviks' championship of equal rights and sexual freedoms was relatively thin and very much rooted in the prejudices of their time. For example, when the German KPD activist Klara Zetkin appealed to Lenin for permission to organize Hamburg's female prostitutes, Lenin responded with a scathing critique. Lenin argued that prior attention the KPD paid to prostitution was a tactical decision to underscore the moral hypocrisies of bourgeois society. The Soviet leader then shot down any connection between Communism and increased sexual liberalization:

It seems to me that these flourishing sexual theories, which are mainly hypothetical, and often quite arbitrary hypotheses, arise from the personal need to justify personal abnormality or hypertrophy in sexual life before bourgeois morality, and to entreat its patience. This masked respect for bourgeois morality seems to me just as repulsive as poking about in sexual matters. However wild and revolutionary this behavior may be, it is really quite bourgeois. It is, mainly, a hobby of the intellectuals and of the sections nearest to them. There is no place for it in the party, in the class conscious, fighting proletariat.

Lenin wrote similarly sharp rebukes to Kollontai over her pamphlets such as "Make way for the Winged Eros," which predicted greater female sexual agency under the auspices of Communism. Rhetorical attacks on the traditional family, such as "Winged Eros"'s call for collective child-rearing shocked a number of male Bolsheviks and many dismissed calls for sexual liberation, or even devoting time to talk about the issues of sex and the family, as an unwelcome bourgeois distraction from building the socialist state. Nor were the activists of the Zhenodtel completely united; many of them deliberately eschewed the word "feminist" as it suggested bourgeois social norms. Within this context, Stalin's conservative turn in family policy, termed the Great Retreat (or "betrayal of the Revolution" in the linked piece), was not as much of a retreat in terms of practical application and understanding of family policy within the Soviet state. Many of the core tenets of the post-1917 reforms such as secularization of marriage and family policy remained in place under Stalin, suggesting a line of continuity between the Lenin and Stalin era in terms of family policy. The natalist policies of the Stalin era had their roots in the 1920s; the Department for the Protection of Motherhood and Infancy was established in 1918 and most of its efforts were devoted to increasing the population and encouraging healthy mothers. While the later tenet seems quite progressive, in practice, it often meant the regulation of women's bodies and defining them by their ability to give birth. The Department, which was also chronically short on funds, often stressed hygiene and scientific methods of pregnancy and child care. From the perspective of most Soviet women who interacted with the state, the state was not listening to them, but rather hectoring them into "correct" behavior.

LGBTQ issues (in actually, G would be more appropriate- lesbianism almost never factored at all in Soviet sexual discourse as it was assumed women had no independent sexuality divorced from childbearing) followed a similar trend as family policy. Homosexuality was never really tolerated within the USSR, but that Soviet state expressed that intolerance in various ways. What is usually referred to as the decriminialization of homosexuality was the USSR was really the repeal of sodomy laws. The tsarist state saw sodomy as a religious sin and since the tsar was the nominal head of the Orthodox church, enforcing this law became part of the state's religious policy. The Bolsheviks inherited this legacy of these religious-based laws and they rejected them.

The repeal of sodomy laws does not mean that the Soviet state saw homosexuality in neutral terms. Although few Bolsheviks had devoted time to this aspect of the sexual question, those that did saw that homosexuality was a deviant behavior that the modern Soviet state would solve through psychology rather than the religious means that typified the tsarist regime. Soviet psychologists saw homosexuality like other mental health issues: a disorder caused by larger society. The majority of Soviet psychologists associated homosexuality with bourgeois decadence and aesthete society that would have no place within the new Soviet Union, with a sizable minority ascribing to the theory that homosexuality was a glandular problem. Women who preferred other women as sexual partners likewise had their own sexuality pathologized in by the few Soviet psychiatrists that examined the issue with focus on the "active" partner who for whatever reason, biological or social, was acting as a man. Sexual choice was not really an option in the early USSR, but rather a disorder that the new society would cure. Scientific treatment, shed of bourgeois morality and hypocrisy, would understand this social problem and treat the unfortunate afflicted with it. As the Soviet psychiatrist V. P. Protopopov wrote in 1922 Soviet medical journal:

Doctors look upon homosexuals as unfortunate stepchildren of fate. They are like cripples, similar to the blind, deaf-mutes, etc, who owe their defect only to a physiological deformation; but they can in no way be considered ill-intentioned debauched people offending public morality and therefore, the term perversion, and not perversity, or even less so debauchery, is used to designate this pathological condition.

Protopopov would go on in the 1920s to be highly influential in Soviet medical circles surrounding sex by treating male homosexual sexuality as a type of pathology, differentiating between types of homosexual men, often examining the role of effeminacy in their behavior.