Maria Antoinette represented the aggressive, antagonistic, militarisation of the Habsburg Monarchy under her elder brother Joseph II. Who, from the 1765 until 1788 implemented a number of reforms focused on improving the capacities of the central, administrative and fiscal state in the creation and service of a military force which has been described by Robert Evans as ‘the fourth pillar of the Habsburg polity by the second half of the eighteenth century.’ During a time when France’s, who was allied with the Habsburg monarchy after the Treaty of Aix la Chappelle (1748), military presence and power in central Europe was greatly diminished thanks to the debt incurred supporting the Habsburg war of revenge during the Seven Years War, the Habsburgs were beginning to assemble a an army who could defend it ‘…against hostile neighbours and play a creditable role in European power politics’ and after the death of Maria Theresa in 1780 acted as ‘…the vehicle for recovery and if possible for the expansion, of territory and privilege.’ The balance of power, which for the majority of the century sat with Paris was quickly beginning to flow towards Vienna.

To the French people and particularly the revolutionaries of Paris, Maria Antoinette represented the old enemy (the Habsburgs and Bourbon monarchy fought over central Europe for two hundred years prior to their alliance) and her influence within the French court mirrored the Bourbon decline and the Habsburg ascendency. Most of what one reads about her indecency leading up to revolution comes from embittered aristocrats from both the diplomatic and officer military corps, unhappy with their position within the Realpolitik of Europe. Maria Antoinette embodied the decline of France, the sloth of its army and the emptiness of its treasury. As a women and a foreigner, she was a particularly easy target for men who wanted to make France great again.

The Habsburg monarchy initially viewed the revolution in France as a belated homage to the humanist, enlightened reforms of Maria Theresa and her son Joseph II, which were of course about removing the power of the Estates and their feudal privileges and replace them with the monarchy’s direct authority. Joseph was happy to let France tear itself apart and actively encouraged Louis XVI to accept his role as a constitutional monarch. The great Habsburg foreign minister Kaunitz also encouraged leaving France be in the hopes that he could renege on his old alliance with France and move closer to Russia. Domestically, the Habsburg monarchy was reeling thanks to the arrogance and obstinacy of Joseph II, whose reforms had greatly reduced the power of the aristocracy and the church, particularly in the Austrian Netherlands leading to open revolt in the province. In the east the Hungarian nobility were continually stalling his fiscal reforms within the kingdom, thus limiting the monarchy’s authority in two of its most populous regions. Externally, the monarchy was also dealing with a war it had been drawn into thanks to its alliance with Russia with the Ottoman. Strategic setbacks during the first campaigns had stalled any thoughts of a quick war, and the drain of keeping 200, 000 men in the field increased the debt the monarchy had continually accrued since the 1779. When Joseph II died, his younger brother Leopold II didn’t have the means or the will to get involved with France and in order to safeguard his realm from French aggression he entered into a poorly formed alliance with Prussia. It was not meant to be a declaration of intent against France, but part of the old system of balance and counter balance which prevented war. It did not work, thanks to the fiery naivety of the new French governments and war with France ensued.

By the time of her death, Maria Antoinette was the least of the Habsburg concerns. Her nephew the new emperor Francis I, knew little of her and the Austrian court were incensed with the royal family's flight to Varennes as it looked as if Vienna supported the French émigrés. In actual fact, Leopold, his son and their advisers grew sick of them almost instantly. They had no desire to reinstate a potential enemy and hoped to benefit from the chaos in Paris. By 1792, with war declared it looked like the Bourbon monarchy may have slipped under the National assembly’s radar, but thanks to the idiotic Brunswick manifesto, published before his failed march on Paris, most probably written by Louis Joseph de Bourbon, Prince de Condé (Louis younger brother), Louis and his wife became public enemy number one.

The invasion of France in 1792 was meant to a show of aggression with the goal of safeguarding the imperial powers of the Reich, but thanks to indulgence of the Prussians it turned into one of the most bloodiest ideological conflicts in European history. Maria Antoinette was but one of its first casualties and her death though shocking, was insignificant when compared to the issues that faced the Habsburg monarchy and the potential gains it could make through conflict with France.

More learned posters could help you with France’s view of these events than I. But, I hope this helps.

Evans, R. State and Society in Early Modern Austria.

Ingrao, C.W. "Habsburg Strategy and Geopolitcs during the Eighteenth Century," in War and Society in East Central Europe.

Beales, D. Joseph II, vol. 1: In the Shadow of Maria Theresa, 1741-1780.

Blanning, T. C. W. Joseph II

Hochedlinger, M. Who's Afraid of the French Revolution? Austrian Foreign Policy and the European Crisis 1787–1797

Recently decrypted letters of Marie Antoinette show that one of the points of accusation against her at least was true: she really was in love with Axel Fersen. (However, it does not say whether this was consummated).