If the US-led bombing campaigns and strategic maneuvering had been less effective would the largely American forces have had a difficult time fighting the Iraqis, or was the Iraqi military simply too outmatched to compete on any level with its western counterparts?
Follow-up question: to what extent can the First Gulf War be considered a late colonial war?
Equipment, politics, and the nature of the Iraqis' experience all played a role.
The "sharp end" of the coalition military were the U.S. forces. The military the U.S. used was the one they had almost entirely re-equipped and redesigned in the 1980's to fight the Soviets (a much more formidable enemy). As such, the Americans were equipped with mostly top-of-the-line equipment like the M1 Abrams and stealth aviation. In contrast, the Iraqis had large quantities of older, somewhat obsolete equipment like T-55 tanks and Mig-23 jets. The difference in the capacity of those models is very significant. It is also alleged that the Soviet supplied equipment Iraq had were not the best models, because the Soviets' kept the "good stuff" for themselves, and exported less-capable versions to their client states.
Politically and strategically, the coalition had an advantage in their ability to stage their attacks out of Saudi Arabia, largely without Iraqi interference. Rarely in history has anyone let their opponent organize so nearby with impunity. Thus allowed the Coalition to dictate the timing and scope of the battle.
Finally, there was a mismatch between the Iraqis' practical experience and the task at hand. They had significant recent experience against the Iranians from their recent war, but the two opponents were apples and oranges, militarily speaking. The Iranians were poorly supplied and led, to the point of sometimes resorting to human wave attacks. Iran also had little to no air power, so the Iraqis had little experience in countering that. Thus, what experience the Iraqis had was not really applicable to fighting a well-equipped and trained force with overwhelming air support. In contrast, attacking and destroying large masses of conventional armor and infantry is exactly what the American military was trained to do.
While it was possible (and at the time somewhat expected) that the fight would not have been so terribly one-sided, in retrospect it's difficult to see any way the outcome could have been meaningfully different. It's difficult to re-imagine the outcome of one of the most grossly uneven contests in recent military history.