Nationalism came to Vietnam in the early 20th century. Previously, political life in Nguyễn dynasty Empire (1802-1945) was structured on a Chinese imperial model. Their aim was to replicate the Sinitic, ‘civilized’ model of administration. The ideal, therefore, was not to be patriotic (ái quốc) but to be civil (văn hiến). This was a universal ideal, not a national one. Additionally, there were many Chinese and mixed Sino-Vietnamese (immigrants from the fall of the Ming dynasty) living in what is today Vietnam at this time. And so, circa 1900, French officials reported that the revolutionary calls the uncovered were “Overthrow the Qing dynasty, Restore the Ming dynasty.” In essence, there was no ‘national’ reference. China, instead, provided the point of reference.

What changed? Elites began to learn about the ‘nation’ as a concept from the West and found it appealing. It was useful means to restore pride midst colonization and assert a distinct Vietnamese identity. By the 1920s, revolutionary organizations like the Vietnamese Nationalist Party (Việt Nam Quốc Dân Đảng) were explicitly touting this national framework -- and looking for inspiration to Sun Yat-sen’s republican revolution in China -- in their program to overthrow not only the French colonial state, but the indigenous Nguyễn imperial state. At this time, the Indochinese Communist Party also came into being. Though it’s leadership was overwhelmingly Vietnamese, it did not accept a national revolution. In line with the Soviet Comintern, it sought a class-based revolution that included Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. As Christopher Goscha has shown, both the French colonialists and Vietnamese communists were thus set on Indochinese visions, not national ones. Throughout the 1930s and early 1940s, the Indochinese Communist Party advocated class revolution, while the Vietnamese Nationalist Party advocated national revolution.

The major shift came during WWII. The Vichy French administration in Indochina feared losing influence to Japan’s imperial rhetoric. Colonial authorities sponsored an assertive nationalist program that pushed a strong national identity for the Vietnamese. Then, in 1945, Japan overthrew the French colonial regime and sponsored The Empire of Vietnam. This semi-independent state was likewise based on the Nguyễn dynasty and a strong Việt national identity. For the six months it existed, this state also promoted a strong national identity. At this time the Indochinese Communist Party members were meeting in southern China along the border with Indochina. At some point in late 1945 they decided to pursue a national framework. Though we don’t have details about that decision, it seems likely that they surmised that five years of national identity building and the Empire of Vietnam had made people receptive to a national identity, not a regional Indochinese one. Thus, in September 1945 Hồ Chí Minh declared independence on behalf of a Vietnamese nation, not an Indochinese one. From that point forth the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) led three national revolutions in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Only in 1951 did the party official emerge as the Vietnamese Workers Party (Đảng Lao động Việt Nam).

The ICP managed to place itself at the apex of the new Democratic Republic of Vietnam state in 1945-1946, and officially ‘dissolved’ itself, but in reality remained active as ever. Though initially the government was a coalition between the communists and non-communists like the Vietnam Nationalist Party, they quickly clashed over the type of post-colonial state they would pursue. By the summer of 1946 the communist and nationalist parties were at war with each other. Võ Nguyễn Giáp led a series of raids – with French military approval – against the nationalist party troops in northern Vietnam. The nationals in the DRV National Assembly were arrested or expelled. Opposed to the ICP’s communism and authoritarianism – or simply hoping for a position of power – many of these nationalist sided with the French sponsored State of Vietnam. The war thus became increasingly civil with the State of Vietnam fighting the DRV. Until 1948, the ICP publically championed a national-front conception of the revolution and DRV, but behind the scenes consolidate control over the revolution. Increasingly, it brought the communist party to front and center and removed non-party members. This trend rose dramatically after Mao Zedong and China began supplying the DRV in 1949-50. That year Stalin also recognized the DRV. Now building a communist DRV state not only fulfilled the aspirations of ICP members who long hoped for a Marxist state, but also help the DRV build its credibility as ‘one of us’ among the major communist states.