At the siege of Jadotville a force of at least several thousand Katangese troops failed to inflict a single KIA in the defending force of ~150 Irishmen over a five day siege despite their use of their heavy weapons and an airplane. How is that possible?

by ElectricVladimir

At Rourke's drift the Zulu's were underarmed compared to the British, so in that case and in other lopsided battles like it, where firepower sits on one side and manpower on the other, the wildly disproportionate casualties make sense. But at Jadotville the Katangese had mortars, and machine guns, and modern rifles, and an airplane. How could they possibly not have overrun the Irish quickly and decisively.

The_Chieftain_WG

If it's a consolation, the Katangans didn't believe it was possible either. They estimated that there were some fifty bodies buried somewhere, and after they captured the Irish position, they spent some time hunting around trying to figure out where the burial sites were hidden. Even Cmdt Quinlan stated "I would like to record here that every man had a deep religious feeling because our emergence from the battle with only five wounded was considered by all to be a miracle."

There are a couple of issues at play.

Firstly, the standards of healthcare. Anyone wounded on the Irish side would receive immediate aid from the company medic. The first fifteen minutes after an injury are considered the golden fifteen. I'm unconvinced the Katangans had similarly competent response. Compare with the standards of medical aid available at Rourke's Drift. (Even today, the chances of survival after a wound are substantially higher than they were in WW2).

Secondly, Cmdt Quinlan instructed his guys to dig, and dig hard. In interviews with the veterans, it is a common thread to hear that if it hadn't been for his instruction to fortify as soon as they got on the ground, they would have taken a lot more casualties than they otherwise did. So, if you can imagine charging across open country at guys in trenches when they are equipped with automatic rifles and a few medium machineguns, by way of example, consider how successful such techniques were in WW1. This decision is quite likely the most important factor in their survival. (Being told to take their weapons to mass is the corollary one hears them talk about. I guess they normally didn't do that). The unit history records that the company leadership "were brought to see the superb digging of Indian units and soon copied their standards."

A Coy also had a section of Ford MkVI Armored Cars. They may have been utterly obsolete, but when you have even an old armored car with a Vickers MMG, and the opposition doesn't have armor at all, you do have a very useful advantage.

The report stated that the attacks were broken by "devastating fire from Irish armored cars, MMGs, LAs and mortars." Given that the main cover from which the Katangans had to attack from was between 600-1,500 yards away, that's quite a bit of time to react and a lot of shooting can be done at attacking enemies.

Thirdly, we're talking about a professional, modern military against, well, I don't think you can call the Katangans that. Compared to Rourke's Drift, though, each of the defenders were equipped with combat multipliers. A well trained British soldier back in the day could take an aimed shot, what, every ten or so seconds? Give that soldier an FAL, and he's taking an aimed shot every two or three seconds. That's a lot more volume of aimed firepower going out, causing a significant emotional event to the attackers who can't cross ground any faster than the Zulus of old. And add in the Vickers, well...

When there were equivalent weapons used, the Irish generally gave better than they got. The Katangans had a French 75mm field gun, and a number of mortars. The Irish had Carl Gustaf, and 60mm mortars of their own. The CG, at those ranges and targets, was arguably better than the 75, and the 60mm was used in the counter-battery role by use of a helpful spotter who could see the Katangan mortar position, knocking them out. And, again, one side was dug in, the other not, and with little ability to close under cover. (I have seen no reference to, for example, use mortars to lay smoke to allow the Katangans to close the open ground without getting mowed down).

The airplane was a Fouga Magister, a trainer with a secondary light attack role. The weapons it carried were small, and, again, against dug-in defenders, the effect was probably more psychological than practical. The volume of fire greeting the airplane resulted in the pilot deciding to attack from higher altitude, with a resulting lack of accuracy. In a discussion currently going on over at an Irish board (Back in the day I used to wear an Irish army uniform, so I hang out on such a lot) it is stated that it was also dropping home-made bombs as they had been unable to acquire service munitions before taking on the UN. Still waiting on a source on that one, but it's believable.

However, yes, all the above said, you do wonder how several thousand could not just do a massed charge and overrun the opposition. I think this comes down to one of the intangibles of war. I have never seen anyone do a thorough assessment, but it seems to me that the Katangans quite simply did not press their attack. Five days is an awfully long time to be going without useful resupply, and modern combat just sucks up ammunition. Further, even Cmdt Quinlan was worried about night attacks, and they withdrew to a tight perimeter overnight (doing more digging when nobody was shooting).

Finally, there's the issue of 'luck'. Put bluntly, the luck of the Irish were smiling on them. An inch here, a crosswind there, and things could have caused far more damage than they actually did. But, without all the other factors, the luck would have been irrelevant. The Katantgans were flat out-soldiered.