The Aden Emergency, which lasted 3 years, did not result in the development of counterinsurgency tactics. In fact, the Aden Emergency is perhaps the best example we have that past success in counterinsurgency operations does not translate to future success in counterinsurgency operations.

The Aden Emergency was in many ways a disaster. There was no focus or will coming from the British government to see this conflict through. The British were unable to offer socio-economic reforms and even the idea of resettlements were skipped since it would have been impossible to carry through due to the isolated nature of the tribes in the Radfan region. This made it very hard to gain any intelligence as well. The tribes in the Radfan had a very isolated way of living and had no love for outside interference. In the urban centres of Aden, the insurgents carried out a campaign of urban terrorism and this meant focusing on a mix of conventional and unconventional approaches to urban warfare for the British.

Mix this with very friendly border territories for the insurgents and the fact that the insurgents were so entrenched that not even the British offer of independence made the support for them weaker. While in military terms, everything was done well and a focus on smaller units like in Malaya (especially making good use of paratroopers and SAS) followed patterns already established, the British were completely unable to infiltrate the insurgents or in other way separate them from the people. With the rise of Pan-Arabism at this time and the Israeli victory in the Six-Day War that same year (a defeat that Egyptian dictator Gamal Abdel Nasser blamed on British and American support for Israel) that triggered a mutiny amongst indigenous forces, the support for the insurgents was simply too strong for the British to penetrate.

To quickly write a summary: The lack of even a proper attempt at civic action and with no real desire coming from the British government for more than a military effort in Aden meant that there was no room for innovation. This was a strictly military affair, something which should never be the case if you're trying to carry out counterinsurgency during the Cold War. As a result, no tactical or strategic innovations came from the war, although the importance of good intelligence was highlighted like never before. What the Aden Emergency did give to the British Armed Forces was experience, something that is always important when you're moving on to the next conflict.