Hitler's military decisions did not lead to failure, at least not universally. Especially early in the war, Hitler can be credited with several important decisions which turned out well for the Germans. The first was putting his weight behind the radical Manstein-Guderian plan for Fall Gelb (the attack on the west in 1940 that doomed the French). Hitler supported the plans on the basis of their potential to achieve a decisive victory, which was precisely what Germany needed at the time. If not for the spectacular reversal of fortune brought about in 1940, the Germans would have been in a poor position to win the long term battle against the Franco-British alliance, let alone the USSR, United States or any other combination of states that might at some later point throw their weight behind them.

After the invasion of the USSR stalled and winter set in, Hitler gave a famous "no retreat" order shortly before Christmas and the Soviet counter-attack. This decision was very likely the correct one, and may have prevented a total collapse of the German forces in the region. u/Tsuruta64 discusses this in a previous answer regarding Hitler's micromanagement, including quotes by German generals.

You mention the switch to civilian targets during the Battle of Britain, but that is a pretty controversial issue. It obviously didn't work for the Germans, but neither did the bombing of the airfields and the focus on fighter command. The Germans were losing either way. (Post by u/Domini_canes)

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More specifically answering your point, OP, is that by the end of the war, there was a lot of negativity surrounding Hitler and his decision making. TheMauveRoom has mentioned that there was an assassination attempt on Hitler in '44, and that wasn't the first plot to attempt that, although for the most part, after the initial success in Poland and then France, most were on board with Hitler. This did gradually fade as the war turned, but as the previous post mentions:

The idea that Hitler's micromanagement of the generals cost Germany the war...was propagated by the generals themselves, most of whom were alive to defend their record after the war while Hitler wasn't.

And this is the critical context here. Postwar memoirs were written with self interest on the part of the authors, people in the Nuremberg trials were often attempting to save their own skins, and everybody understood that Hitler's decisions (in their totality, not just military ones) had eventually led them to ruin and defeat. In any case, a lot of these were therefor happy to throw Hitler under the bus.

If you accept the premises that

1. Germany needed to launch a war at some point to make Germany great again

2. This war would be fundamentally focused on the drive to the East, destroying Communism, and seizing the resources there for the benefit of Germany.

(and it should be noted that while these premises in hindsight are crazy, the German general staff by and large accepted them)

then Hitler basically played his hand about as well as he could have. We have a tendency not to realize that the Nazis hit way above their weight given their relative economic weakness and resource dependency. They really shouldn't have gotten as far as they did, and that they did is a credit to Hitler. While u/Tiddums mentions correct decisions Hitler made, he misses the most important one of all: that Hitler was the only one who understood that Germany had to launch a war in 38-39 if it wanted to have any chance to win. The generals wanted to wait until 1945-46 when German mobilization would be "ready", but if that had happened, the British and French counter-mobilization and the resource shortages which Germany faced would have strangled their economy and left their army in utterly no shape to fight.

I would highly recommend that you read "The Wages of Destruction" by Adam Tooze for a new look at Hitler's goals and just how of a shoestring the Nazis really operated, myths of mechanical Panzer armies aside.