The Swedish army defeated the Polish Winged Hussars at a big scale at least twice.
The Swedes had experienced the efficiency of the Polish Winged Hussars the hard way at the Battle of Kirkholm 1605, where roughly 1 500 Winged Hussars, supported by about 1 000 light cavalry charged first the Swedish cavalry and then the Swedish infantry, a force of a total of about 11 000 men and completely and utterly destroyed it (only about 2 000 men of the Swedish army escaped).
Learning from this, Gustav II Adolf (Gustavus Adolphus) organised his cavalry to stop using the caracoll (a manouvre where cavalry rode in a cirkle firing pistols, in theory creating a machinegun at the front opening up infantry and enemy cavalry formations for a charge) and adopted a very offensive tactic based on going to melee immediately and not using pistols until the cavalry men could physcially place the muzzle on the armour of their enemy cavalryman - in essence adopting the Polish cavalry tactics.
The Swedish infantry were equipped with lighter muskets and drilled to keep formation even in the face of a heavy enemy cavalry charge, such as that of the Polish Winged Hussars or the Imperial Cuirassiers.
The Swedes also introduced light artillery to support the infantry with firepower - small and light 3pdr guns of bronze (experiments with thin-sheeted cannons reinforced with rope and leather, so called leather guns were quickly abadonded since the guns over-heated) were placed in single gun units between infantry batallions.
In the Battle of Warsaw, 1656, on the second day of the battle, 900 Winged Hussars charged the Swedish lines, supported by Polish Cossack and Tartar light cavalry and were met with a "hail of fire" from Swedish artillery using grape shot (a load of 36 musketsballs as big as grapes in the case of the 3pdrs, making the cannon into a giant shotgun) and shrapnel shot. Disciplined Swedish infantry also released musket salvoes and maintained disciplined formations of pikemen. The combination of fire and firmly standing pike hedgehogs made the Polish Winged Hussars bounce back after terrible casualties (the Royal Lithuanian Hussar Company is said to have returned with only 8 men in total), despite the Hussar Jakub Kowalski forcing his way to thrust his lance against the chest of the Swedish King, Karl X Gustav, who was saved by his cuirass breastplate.
The defeat of the Winged Hussars seem to have demoralised the Polish-Lithuanian-Tatar army and men started deserting during the night even as the Polish King ordered a retreat, despite his army still numbering some 35-50 000 against some 18 000 Swedes and Brandeburgers.
At Kliszow 1702, the Polish cavarly were no longer using their famous wings, but it was still the same type of men, tactics, horses, armour and lances that had been so successful at Kirkholm 1605, Klusjino 1610 and Vienna 1683. At this time, the Swedes had started to use thier cavalry even more offensively - the standard tactic was for Swedish cavalry to charge straight at any enemy cavalry in a tight plow formation where every man placed his right knee in the left hollow of the knee of the man right to him (if he was on the left part of the formation, the other way around if he was on the right part). Cavalrymen were strictly forbidden to use pistols unless in pursuit of enemy cavalry.
At the battle the Polish crown army, some 8 000 men cavalry, of which roughly 1 500 were Winged Hussars (although without wings) and the rest lighter cavalry counter-charged the Swedish cavalry of the Swedish left wing (19 squadrons of cavalry, roughly 1 500 men), threw them back and killed their nominal commander, Duke Fredrik of Holstein-Gottorp. The Swedish cavalry rallied under their de facto commader Vellingk and the Polish cavalry charged the nine battalions of infantry (roughly 3 500 men) but were thrown back by musket fire and disciplined pikemen (a Swedish battalion at this time were 2/3 musketmen and 1/3 pikemen). The Swedish cavalry then returned to the field, charged the Polish cavalry and drove them and the Saxonian cavalry sent to support them from the field.
The Swedish army used a combination of disciplined formations, offensive tactics and spirits, strong unit cohesion and above all combined arms tacts, where infantry, artillery and cavalry would support each other to defeat the charge of the Polish Winged Hussars. The Winged Hussars often charged with the support of light cavalry which many times were reluctant to follow the Hussars into the melee, as they were usually lighter and less well organised cavalry, such as Tartars, Cossacks and so on. Without the support of infantry and artillery, and at times even lacking support of the light cavalry, the Polish Winged Hussars could not do much against well-organised and disciplined combined arms armies that arose in northern and western Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries. Combined with the general decline of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth compared to their neighbours, it caused the Winged Hussars to fade away from history.
Sources:
Karolinska Krigare 1660-1721 (Carolean Warriors 1660-1721) by Christer Kuvaja.
Svenska Slagfält (Swedish battlefields) by Lars Ericson, Martin Hårdsteft, Per Iko, Igvar Sjöblom and Gunnar Åselius.
Ofredsår (Years of war) by Peter Englund.
Den oövervinnelige (The undefeatable) by Peter Englund.
Lejonet vaknar 1611-1660 (The lion awakens 1611-1660) by Tom Gullberg.
Gustav II Adolf och krigskonsten (Gustavus Adolphus nad the art of war) by Michael Roberts, part of Historia kring trettioåriga kriget (History around the thirty years war) edited by Göran Rystad.
Karolinen Rehnskiöld (The Carolean Rehnskiöld) by Jan von Konov.