From an earlier answer of mine

Caveat: This is one of the questions that really needs a book-length response (and there have been multiple books written on this issue!). Daily life and other issues pertaining to the wider social history of the Soviet Union is an immense topic and the lived experience of Soviet citizens will differ quite markedly over time and geography; for example, daily life in Tashkent in the 1980s will be quite different than the typical experience of a Ukrainian rural dweller of the 1940s or a Muscovite in the 1970s. So this following answer is going to be painting with a very broad brush.

• ca. 1945- ca. 1953 Victory over Hitler did not mean the end of severe hardships for the Soviet people. Much of the territory fought over in the western USSR was in ruins and much of its infrastructure damaged or outright destroyed. Throughout the USSR as a whole, the population had suffered significant losses and dislocation and much of the surviving economic infrastructure had been geared to war material. A "return to normality" was something that was incredibly difficult for the peacetime Soviet Union to achieve. On a macro-level, the Soviet economy transitioned to peacetime fairly well given this enormous hurdles placed in front of it. Economic growth and industrial production had exceeded 1940 levels by 1950 and the state had accomplished an impressive demobilization of the vast Red Army. However, these gains did not necessarily translate into a better life for most Soviet citizens. Housing shortages remained particularly acute and were a constant source of complaint throughout much of the USSR. Soviet industrial production was also geared more towards recovery of infrastructure and less on consumer products, making this a time of persistent shortages. Culturally, this was arguably the period when Stalin's cult of personality had reached its apogee. Victory over Hitler had given the dictator an ideological gloss that filtered down into ever more visible celebrations of his genius. This new personality cult had a troubling element as it became increasingly uncertain whether or not a new round of purges was in the making. The intensifying anti-American rhetoric of the early Cold War increased this uncertainty as to whether or not the events of 1937 would be replayed. On the opposite end of the ideological spectrum, there were also serious concerns about social disorder and the lack of state control, especially with regards to Soviet youth. The absence of father and parental figures because of the war created something of a youth problem as a generation of children came of age without much guidance. There were a number of reports from schools and youth organizations about youth apathy and hooliganism. So hardships and uncertainty were persistent social factors amidst the postwar glow of victory.

• ca. 1953- ca. 1964 The Khrushchev-led Thaw led to a number of important reforms in both Soviet society and the economy. This filtered down into the lived experience of Soviet citizens as the early 1960s in particular were a time of intense optimism and fueled the hope that the hardships of the previous generations had born fruit. One of the most salient features of the early Khruschev period is that the state finally devoted significant resources to resolve the housing shortage. The resulting buildings frequently used prefabricated concrete slabs and a Brutalist aesthetic that at the time was a modern style. The planned economy also began to produce more and a greater variety of consumer goods. While the issue of shortages would never be resolved throughout the entirety of the USSR's existence, the increased availability of consumer goods was one of the hallmark features of this period. Space exploration and Soviet firsts in space also was a source of much pride and nationalist excitement during the early 1960s as it seemed to suggest a bright future for the USSR. However, there were also emerging cracks in this new-found Soviet prosperity. The Soviet planned economy was still markedly inefficient at delivering the goods and productivity gains tended to be more ephemeral than lasting. The Thaw also brought increasing contact with the West and exhibitions like the famous American National Exhibition, which featured American wares, made it increasingly obvious that the Soviets were falling behind the Americans in terms of consumer products. The Thaw's destalinization drive was also the source of much confusion for the Soviet public. Prior changes in political leadership had led to a wholesale rejection and purging of the losing faction, but Khrushchev tacked to a very selective political course, exonerating some individuals and groups while excoriating others. Because the process of destalinization was secretive and selective, many Soviet citizens did not know what political positions were correct. The state eased censorship, but did not eliminate it. Thus Thaw cultural products had to tread a fine line between artistic expression and not drawing the ire of the authorities. The release of prisoners from the Gulags also created an unwelcome element of social disorder as many former inmates had been habituated to prison culture and mores and were not integrated fully into Soviet society. Adding to this uncertainty amidst optimism, rising nuclear tensions and the break with China added to greater anxiety about the future. One popular joke about nuclear war satirized the state's claim that it had control over the situation: in case of nuclear attack, all Moscow's citizens should cover themselves with a shroud and crawl very slowly to the nearest cemetery to avoid a panic.

• ca. 1964- ca. 1980 These years are something of the lost years for the Soviet Union. After Khrushchev's fall, the new political order is dominated by Brezhnev, who encapsulates the idea of a stagnant political, economic, and social system. One popular joke was that a KGB agent captures all the CIA agents during a Brezhnev speech. When pressed by his superiors as to how he accomplished this, he relents and tells his boss the CIA agents were the only ones awake during the speech. In short, Brezhnev did not inspire much confidence as a national leader. Economic growth is still occurring, but not nearly as fast as other economies like Japan and the Soviet economy is increasingly dependent upon oil exports to even out the books. Increased contacts with the West have meant that Western products can now fall into the hands of Soviet consumers on a wide scale, but there is a noticeable class distinction in the the availability of these goods. These goods are available in special stores which were not open to the general public, meaning that political connections and favorable state positions are necessary to enter. Despite the Soviet crackdown in Czechoslovakia and the threatened invasion of Poland, the Brezhnev period witnessed a further relaxation of censorship of Western cultural materials. The state accepts disco music because it perceived it as largely innocuous fluff. In one unprecedented move, one of Brezhnev's favorite American TV shows, the Western The Rifleman aired on Soviet television. TV itself became more common in this period and one of the most popular shows of the Brezhnev era, the Second World War spy thriller Seventeen Moments of Spring, tapped into some of the cynical zeitgeist. Although it touched a number of common state talking points about the war, the series's protagonist is an intelligent and resourceful double-agent whose German bosses very much resemble his Soviet ones. Elsewhere on the cultural front, aside from disco, Western music found a new home in various underground subcultures as copies of forbidden music circulates. There is also an emerging Soviet counterculture, especially within non-Russian areas and urban ones, that is increasingly at odds with the state's vision of a harmonious society. Towards the end of the 1970s, Soviet rock bands perform in grey areas and dissident literature began to make the rounds. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was an fitting capstone to the failures of the Brezhnev era, as the state found itself politically adrift and unable to translate the impressive figures of state power like indices of industrial progress into meaningful changes