The heyday of weapons like the zweihander and rodela would have been more than a century before the 30 years war. By the end of the 16th century it was becoming less common for pikemen to actually come into melee with other pikemen, and as coordination between pike and shot became closer the solution to any extended push of pike would be pouring musket fire into the enemy's flank rather than anything fancy involving sword and dagger men.

One of the major tactical innovations which was occurring towards the end of the 16th century was the division of soldiers into much smaller regiments, typically arranged into multiple rows of a checker-board like formation. This allowed an army to suffer small, isolated defeats over the course of a battle and keep on fighting. If a regiment in front broke then reserves were immediately available to cover their retreat and then fill in the gap, potentially allowing the broken regiment time to regroup and return to the fight. These sorts of tactics are credited with making making battles less decisive in the 17th century, since reserves generally allowed a losing army to retreat in good order and stave off pursuit.

Tactics generally tended to focus on shot doing most of the damage while pikes gave the infantry staying and shock power. On the offensive, a regiment would typically advance slowly with the musketeers giving fire by rank. Once the enemy got close enough and the commander deemed it fruitful he might order the pikes to start moving at double time until they smash into the enemy. Alternatively, some commanders were starting to prefer tactics pioneered by the Swedish in which the musketeers would preserve their fire until they came to a short range, then they would all discharge their muskets in quick succession 3 ranks at a time before joining the pikemen in a general charge, intended to break the enemy as quickly as possible.

Cavalry continued to play a very important role during the 30 years war. As battles became more attrition-based and less decisive commanders became less eager to seek them out. Much of the fighting during the 30 years war instead resembled guerilla warfare; raiding, foraging, harassing, ambushing, all areas that dragoons armed with muskets and light cavalry armed with pistols and carbines excelled at. In battles unsupported musketeers could be ridden down, but typically cavalry had to engage pike squares using a fire by rank tactic sometimes called the "caracole". Against other cavalry, many theorists recommended avoiding direct charges, for instance the technique described by John Cruso in which pistolers were supposed to split in two when charged in order to attack the enemy on both flanks. In practice though such maneuvers were difficult to pull off in a large battle and it was very easy for a feigned rout to turn into a real one. Instead the best tactic was typically for horsemen to preserve their pistol fire until physically colliding with the enemy, at which point they would race to start blasting each other in the face and thigh, where the armor was weakest. According to French soldier La Noue, one side or both would usually start fleeing by the time the reiters discharged their second pistol.

Cavalry would typically be positioned on the flanks of an army opposing the cavalry of the enemy. Sometimes they would be coordinating with loose companies of musketeers on foot who would deliver a volley right before the cavalry charge in order to cause casualties and disorganize the enemy horsemen. Even though pike and shot made infantry particularly difficult for cavalry to break, being surrounded was a big problem and whichever side was the last one with cavalry standing was typically the side that won the battle.