How did Nazi Germany's views of Aryan superiority affect its relationship with its allies?

Italy, especially Mussolini, was always quite fearful that Germany was going to attack them - and this fear is partly to blame for Italy formalizing their alliance with Germany with the Pact of Steel, and further with the Tripartite Pact. In fact, Italy's entry into World War II had a lot to do with beliefs over what the Germans would do if they sat it out.

##Some quick background

A quick background on 'racial' policy: the Fascists never shared the same ideas on 'racial theory' that the Nazis did. This is because the Nordic centrist view point taught that the Mediterranean people were of a 'lower class.' As Italy was quite divided itself between a more 'Nordic' north and more 'Latin' south, the Fascists preached a pan-Italian nationalism: Italians were better because they were Italian and had been the only 'race' to form themselves. In regards to the Jewish people, the Fascists tended to leave them alone even if they held anti-Semitic beliefs personally. Mussolini was found oscillating in his public speeches between saying that the Jews "had been in Italy since the [Roman] Empire" as a reason for allowing them to stay, and then giving a speech echoing jewish-banking conspiracies. Mussolini's most famous mistress, Margherita Sarfatti, played a heavy role in Fascist Party propaganda and was Mussolini's chief biographer in the 1920s - becoming known as the Jewish Mother of Fascism.

So what does this all mean for Italian-German relations? The Nazi's views of Aryan superiority were not the decisive factor in relations between the two, it was different problems.

While there was a natural track within both Italy and Nazi Germany that their views generally aligned, it didn't mean that they did as a matter of course. Italy throughout the 1930s knew that it was not ready to fight another world war, and continued to walk a tight rope of alliances and appeasement with all the great European powers (Britain, France, Germany). Italy throughout the early 1930s would continue to push for pacts (usually outside of the League of Nations) which would hold Italy as an equal to the others to reenforce the notion that Italy itself was a great power. Dino Grandi's role as foreign minister was to ensure that Italy did not become a 'slave' to any side until at least 1935 - which was when when Germany's obligations under the Treaty of Versailles were to expire. Italy was not to make a decisive move until then.

Which would have been great, except very shortly after coming to power Hitler and the Nazis completely upset the careful plans that Italy had been striving for.

##Breaking of any level of trust

In 1932 Italy had called for a 'Four Power Directorate' that included Britain, France, Germany, and Italy. It would allow unrestricted rearmament for all parties (subject to inspection by each power), would greatly increase economic and diplomatic cooperation, would call for 'common thinking' in terms of colonialism, and would establish the four as hegemonic powers de facto over Europe. Each country had minor quibbles over the draft of the plan that Mussolini proposed but were all generally in favor of it.

Hitler, when he came to power in 1933, rejected it. He had absolutely zero interest in Germany having to let itself be inspected by foreign powers or be restricted to any level of arms control. Mussolini took this as a personal slight. Further, Mussolini was growing concerned over Hitler's movements in Austria. While Hitler had said he had no designs on South Tyrol, Mussolini did not trust him. When the Nazis assassinated Engelbert Dollfuss, the austrofascist dictator of Austria, in 1934 Mussolini was incensed. Dollfuss was considered a personal friend, and his children had been staying with Mussolini's family when he was assassinated. Mussolini immediately deployed the Italian army to the Austrian border and warned Hitler that any attempts at Austria would invoke an outright war. Tensions would cool as Hitler denied any responsibility and broke ties between the German and Austrian Nazi parties, but whatever trust may have existed between the two leaders was forever broken.

Mussolini would never forgive Hitler for lying to his face and would be attempting to craft anti-German alliances all the way into Italy's entry into World War II - even while being a party to alliances with Germany!

Germany and Italy would normalize their relations again in 1935 over German support of the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935, and in general there would be a greater alignment of Italian and German aims as for whatever personal differences there was between the two leaders it was generally recognized that their aims were similar. This would lead to Italy and Germany de facto being in alliance against the Anglo-Fraco realm. The signing of Italy to the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1937 is when the true foundations of the Axis Powers began (Mussolini had said in 1936 that Europe was to rotate on a Berlin-Rome axis). However, two issues would test these new found relations.

##The Path to War

First, the Sudetenland Crisis. Mussolini, by all intents, was a minor factor in Munich. He had been troubled by the Austrian Anschluss (Hitler had again promised him that he had no designs on Austria), but Italy was already becoming a client state of Germany and had little resource. Much has been made of the 'personal favor' that Hitler granted "my good friend" Mussolini by agreeing to delay invading the Sudetenland by 24 hours - which Mussolini had asked for as a favor to Chamberlain. This delay allowed the striking of the Munich Agreement to which Italy found itself a party. This agreement had a number of long lasting consequences:

Mussolini saw this as the springboard towards getting colonial concessions from France - including a role in the Suez Canal Company. France refused, and the British refused to back the Italians as well. This drew one of the final wedges between Italy and the Anglo-French sphere. Hitler and Mussolini would eventually conclude the Pact of Steel in early 1939, which was Italy's blank check of support to Germany.
Stalin would feel betrayed by the English and French, and begin rapprochement with Nazi Germany. This rapprochement would result in the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact in August 1939, less than four months after the Pact of Steel.

Mussolini, even though he was happy that Italy had entered into the Pact of Steel - which was seen as forestalling any war until at the earliest 1943 to allow Italy to arm itself properly - was blindsided by the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact. The fact that it was with the communists greatly troubled him, as the Fascists were explicitly anti-Communist. All of Mussolini's old fears and betrayals by Hitler came rushing back, and Mussolini suddenly became a force for the Anglo-French again in working against Nazi Germany. In the lead up to the German invasion with Poland, Mussolini would place himself as the 'grand negotiator' that he had played at Munich, doing whatever he could to stop German invasion of Poland. Mussolini feared that not only was Germany not ready for a continental war, but that Italy would be dragged in and Italy certainly wasn't ready.

Hitler would ignore Mussolini and invade Poland. Mussolini was now between a rock and a hard place, because he started to realize that Germany most certainly could invade Italy, and do it under the pretense of Mussolini's actions in the lead up to the Polish invasion and his actions in opposing the Austrian Anschluss. The only people that he could turn to for support (the British and French) simply didn't trust him. Between September 1939 and May 1940 Mussolini would constantly change his mind between appearing to be the grand "nonbelligerent" ("neutral" was an unfascist word and not manly), to stating that his and the Italian people's honor demanded they march with Germany, to warning Holland and Belgium of German attack, to demanding mobilization of the Italian army, to writing to Hitler personally that peace was the sensible option.

Finally, with the German invasion of France Mussolini cast his lot in with the Germans. The German stunning success caused Mussolini concern, because not only did it prove the effectiveness of the Germany military, or the ineffectiveness of the British and French against it, but how quickly said military could be turned against him. Mussolini, fearing that if he didn't get into the war as quickly as possible would invoke German ire - and also lose him a seat at the negotiating table - quickly mobilized the Italian invasion of France. Italy declared war on France (and Britain) on 10 June with Army Group West, composed of the First and the Fourth Armies, attacking France on June 21. The day after the French requested an armistice with Italy. By the time of the armistice taking effect four days later (in a move that Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano had said was quite fortunate for Italy) none of the objectives set out had been met. Italy actually ended up losing more soldiers to frostbite than then French lost in total. (The French suffered 229 total casualties, versus 2,151 lost to frostbite for the Italians.)

Mussolini had hoped the offensive would allow him to secure Nice, Savoy, Corsica, and French Tunisian ports. He received none. Hitler needed the friendship of the now-defeated France more than any friendship with Italy.