i've been getting a lot of very negative views regarding general MacArthur from world war 2 and the korean war. From what i understand is that he had a stereotypical west pointer ego and had a reputation for poorly-thought decisions, at one point requesting permission to conduct nuclear strikes in korea.
is the hate well deserved? why?
MacArthur's problem is that he lost sight of the new geopolitical situation the world had entered into, and became ultra focused - almost in a tunnel vision aspect - on what lay in front of him. He also became ultra focused on his legacy, especially after the Chinese intervention into Korea.
There are two schools of thought in the debate about MacArthur, and his entire legacy tends to be defined by it's endpoint: his relief by Truman. Those that feel that MacArthur was in the right are more than likely to blame miscommunication between Truman, the Joint Chiefs, and MacArthur. They also tend to argue that the civilian-military relationship was evolving in such a way that was contrary to what made MacArthur a great general (of which he was, there is no getting around that). Those that back Truman acknowledge mistakes were made on both sides, but that there is more to the story. The focus usually surrounds how MacArthur’s view of himself prevented him from making the correct decisions in the context of world politics (incorrectly guessing the situation between the capitalist and communist blocs), that he had missed the paradigm shift in civilian-military relations, and that MacArthur's ultimate attempt to subvert military authority made his position completely untenable.
##Subverting orders and creating disharmony
One of the issues that played into MacArthur's relief was his reputation for subverting orders. Throughout World War II MacArthur engaged in what has been termed as ‘arrogant and near-insubordinate’ conduct. Included in this conduct were attempts at influencing political decisions of the United States (such as overtures directly to Winston Churchill). One of MacArthur's chief apologists, D. Clayton James, makes the assertion that, “his past achievements gave him no claim to special privileges in obeying orders and directives” from the JCS & President. MacArthur’s actions would prove that James is executing wishful thinking. His arrogance born of reputation, while allowing him to accomplish unbelievable feats of military ingenuity also unfortunately led to him directly contradicting established United States military policy. MacArthur’s position became untenable when he started to be viewed as an independent sovereign over that of an American general subordinate to other officers, and especially that of the President of the United States when he started making personal overtures to Taiwanese officials.
Another count against MacArthur were his attempts to upset the civilian control over the military while creating disharmony among his superiors, and subordinates. One of the most important aspects of the American system has been civilian supremacy and control over the military - MacArthur’s actions in speaking as a sovereign statesman to foreign powers, speaking out to the press to undermine the orders given to him, and then in sending a message to congress that deliberately attempted to undermine the Truman administration show a willful disregard to this system. Truman specifically references MacArthur’s disregard of authority in his relief, stating:
“I have concluded that General of the Army Douglas MacArthur is unable to give his wholehearted support to the policies of the United States Government…”
MacArthur’s immediate successor, General Matthew Ridgway, would acknowledge that the rifts sown between civilian and military authority were ones that were to be avoided. Ridgway’s observations on MacArthur’s conduct demonstrated the level on to which MacArthur’s actions drew an avoidable wedge. Ridgway would also find fault in his conduct as a battlefield commander, finding that MacArthur did not trust his subordinates.
##Misunderstanding the geopolitical situation
MacArthur was also calling for a widening of the war with Korea, and into China. There is a matter of debate on when/if MacArthur advocated for nuking Korea, but there is no debate that MacArthur held a very ill-informed opinion. He believed that attacking China would not provoke the Soviet Union. The testimony of General Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, before congress endorsed the view that if MacArthur’s position was acted on, it would have undermined the United State’s overall position in Asia. Bradley further contends that MacArthur had become too focused on immediate objectives rather than a long term plan.
General Matthew Ridgeway, MacArthur’s immediate successor, would paint a dim light light on not just MacArthur’s modern military acumen, but also on his long range planning:
...[i]n reaching my decisions I wanted to keep always in mind the clear policy decisions communicated to me by President Truman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff...
MacArthur’s conduct in command ultimately became boiled in politics. While his strategy was initially successful, once China intervened MacArthur was at a loss for how to proceed forward. This is when MacArthur's planned became a pitched political fight. He would create false dilemmas and troop shortages (on paper, not in reality) so that the only 'logical' course of action would be to follow his plans - and thus have the JCS pick his side over that of the President's. The JCS immediately caught onto this and were not amused. MacArthur’s testimony before congress proved the political nature of his leadership, by falsely stating that his superiors agreed with his strategy. They did not. Not a single member of the JCS spoke in his defense, and in fact they were unanimous in the stance of categorically disagreeing with it. His decision making reflected micromanagement, and distrust of subordinates.
Now to be fair to MacArthur, this had previously led to success. In the context of the Korean conflict, MacArthur was found greatly wanting.His prowess in command was directly called into contention by Ridgway, who directly characterized the former's leadership style as “faulty.”
The key area in which MacArthur’s relief was justified was in not realizing the full scope of the worldwide political situation. MacArthur was dedicated towards winning the war at all costs, but never saw the situation correctly beyond his limited vision in the context of the Korean conflict. Bradley's testimony before Congress spelled MacArthur's limited view of the situation out. The new era on conflict was contentious for all involved, with the Truman administration and MacArthur making mistakes while treading on unknown political ground. The consensus that was built was that limited war was the only strategic avenue in which the United States could afford to conduct the Korean Conflict. The unknown factors of Chinese aggression, and Soviet intervention were judged to be more important than that of MacArthur’s pride. MacArthur’s plans had the potential to disrupt America’s global interests and security, which the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered more paramount than a singular conflict in Korea.
##So to sum up
MacArthur's plans and conduct:
Even if MacArthur had been correct, his actions undermined United States national security by inserting an unknown element into global military operations. Ever since Clausewitz it had been understood that military commanders stayed out of political decisions. MacArthur had developed tunnel vision on the importance of Korea over a larger strategy, and in doing so attempted to subvert the authority over him. While MacArthur may have claimed to know how the China and the Soviet Union would act, Bradley was right in contending that not a single person in the Western world did. Bradley would in fact state that the only people that did were sitting in Moscow. While traditionally local commanders had been afforded freedom, the variables of nuclear weapons made this traditional position dangerous. With many national interests and security concerns being juggled, a rogue commander could not be trusted to act in accordance with the United State’s long term strategy.
Sources, reading