Once Sea Lion was postponed in September 1940 the continuing bombing campaign had two main targets: ports, as a component of the overall German strategy of blockade, and key military-industrial targets, especially the aircraft industry, to continue grinding Britain down. According to Richard Overy in The Bombing War: Europe, 1939-1945 Hitler took little personal interest, issuing no directives other to to reiterate the blockade strategy, and was sceptical that bombing alone would be conclusive. He was focused on Russia, concluding that once the Soviet Union was defeated Britain would seek terms, or could be dealt with by renewed attacks.

Continuing the bombing campaign and maintaining the threat of invasion fixed British forces in a defensive stance, minimising the risk of their interference with Barbarossa by e.g. committing more forces to the Mediterranean theatre. It also persuaded the Soviet Union that the UK was still the primary target of Germany, one of the contributory factors to Stalin not expecting the German invasion.